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Abstract
In this thesis we establish a quantitative framework to measure and study the security of code
obfuscation, an effective software protection method that defends software against malicious reverse
engineering. Despite the recent positive result by Garg et al.[ GGH+13] that shows the possibility
of obfuscating using indistinguishability obfuscation definition, code obfuscation has two major
challenges: firstly, the lack of theoretical foundation that is necessary to define and reason about
code obfuscation security; secondly, it is an open problem whether there exists security metrics that
measure and certify the current state-of-the-art of code obfuscation techniques. To address these
challenges, we followed a research methodology that consists of the following main routes: a formal
approach to build a theory that captures, defines and measures the security of code obfuscation,
and an experimental approach that provides empirical evidence about the soundness and validity of
the proposed theory and metrics. To this end, we proposeAlgorithmic Information Theory, known
as Kolmogorov complexity, as a theoretical and practical model to define, study, and measure the
security of code obfuscation.
We introduce the notion of unintelligibility, an intuitive way to define code obfuscation, and
argue that it is not sufficient to capture the security of code obfuscation. We then present a more
powerful security definition that is based on the algorithmic mutual information, and show that is
able to effectively capture code obfuscation security. We apply our proposed definition to prove
the possibility of obtaining security in code obfuscation under reasonable assumptions. We model
adversaries with deobfuscation capabilities that explicitly realise the required properties for a
successful deobfuscation attack.
We build a quantitative model that comprises a set of security metrics, which are derived from
our proposed theory and based on lossless compression, aiming to measure the quality of code
obfuscation security. We propose normalised information distance NID as a metric to measure code
obfuscation resilience, and establish the relation between our security definition and the normalised
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information distance. We show that if the security conditions for code obfuscations are satisfied
(the extreme case) then the NID tends to be close to one, which is the maximum value that can be
achieved.
Finally, we provide an experimental evaluation to provide empirical validation for the proposed
metrics. Our results show that the proposed measures are positively correlated with the degree
of obfuscation resilience to an attacker using decompilers, i.e. the percentage of the clear code
that was not recovered by an attacker, which indicates a positive relationship with the obfuscation
resilience factor.
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1 Introduction
The usage of software applications has become one of the corner stones of our lives. Nowadays,
we are surrounded by software applications, like online payments applications, social networking,
games, etc, and we have become more and more dependent on software and cyberspace even for
our simple daily life tasks. Software often get distributed over the Internet; once distributed to a
client machine, the software owner loses control over the software, especially as more applications
and platforms become mobile. Many mobile wireless devices, including laptops, tablets, and smart
phones, are becoming part of our daily lives. Developing professional and specialised software
such as complex graphic processing applications and sensitive military software, require massive
investment and efforts in terms of cost and money. Therefore, they can be very expensive and of
great importance to their owners.
Attackers whether they are individuals, crime organisations or rogue regimes have great mo-
tivation and interest in stealing, reuse, tampering and reverse engineer such artefacts; often for
the purpose of extracting secret information and/or proprietary algorithms. This type of attack
is called a malicious host-based attack, which is conducted by malicious software or malicious
users. Malicious host-based attacks operate in a white-box model; in this model, the attacker has
full access to the system in which the software is running, and the attacker has a full privileged
access to the system. This means that the malicious user can execute the program at her/his will,
for example, s/he can observe the memory, processor, registers, and modify bytes during runtime.
Malicious reverse engineering is the most common type of malicious host-based attacks; it is used
to reconstruct the program’s source-code, and to conduct other host-based attacks, such as software
piracy, reusing and tampering [CN09]. There are legitimate reasons for reverse engineering, for
example software developers leverage reverse engineering to improve their own products, especially
in the undocumented applications. In general, the aim of reverse engineering is to aid the process
of understanding the inner working of software, and to obtain essential knowledge of the reversed
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software in order to reuse it in other software. This process is unlawful if it violates the intellectual
property rights of software owner such as extracting proprietary algorithms. Therefore, thwarting
malicious reverse engineering is vital inhibiting host-based attacks.
There are different strategies to defend against host-based attacks, and to protect the working of
software, such as both legal and technical countermeasures. Copyright and patent are two main
approaches to protect software against unlawful copying and stealing of algorithms. Despite the
fact that copyright protection defends against illegal copying, it does not help in protecting the
idea or the implemented algorithms. Software patents help to protect the computer programs
inventions including the idea and the algorithm; however, they do not provide solid protection as
they are not always enforceable. The major drawback of such patents is the cost. There are usually
very expensive to enforce, and therefore unaffordable for small companies. According to the US
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and EU Computer Programs Directive legislations,
reverse engineering is allowed for the purpose of interoperability between computer programs, if
the programs are obtained lawfully. Hence, it is very difficult under these regulations to prevent
reverse engineering for the understanding of the inner working of software. Because of these
shortcomings, legal protection mechanisms, in most cases, have a small impact on foiling malicious
host-based attacks.
Technical measures present a cheaper alternative to protect against malicious host attacks.
Technical protection increases the cost of extracting secret information and reverse engineering for
malicious purposes—even on the current open computing platforms, where software’s execution is
relatively easy to inspect and modify. This process is conducted by following one of two paths:
hardware and software protection. Hardware protection techniques leverage the hardware devices
capabilities to provide protection, such as secure coprocessors, Trusted Computing (TC), tamper
resistance, and smart cards, where secure computation is carried inside the protected hardware
despite deployment in a hostile computing environment. However, hardware protection techniques
do not provide a complete solution to the malicious host-based attacks, and their logistic challenges
(such as the difficulty of upgrading hardware) usually create difficulties in adapting them to
computing infrastructures. For example, if the hardware protection technique gets compromised by
an attacker, it would be very difficult to provide a quick response to patch and fix this problem. It
would require a full upgrade and replacement cycle to get the device secure again [Ird13]. Moreover,
hardware protection devices have a high cost and suffer from compatibility issues with other open
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computer platforms.
Software protection techniques, on the other hand, provide security by preventing inspections,
modifications, and reverse engineering. Software defence approaches are more flexible as they are
less platform dependent, and cheaper, than their hardware counterpart. There are different forms
of software protection, for example remote executions, encryption and authentication. Remote
execution, such as server-side execution, treats software as a service, so that the software is not
distributed but run as a service. These techniques stop the hostile host from having physical access
to the secure software by running it remotely, in a similar way to black-box model as the attacker
can only analyse the external behaviour of the software (input-output). However, they require
reliable network communication and are prone to performance degradation.
Encryption and authentication methods help to secure software and sensitive data, and decrypt
the software code on the fly during the execution process. Unfortunately, since the execution
requires decryption, the clear (decrypted) code is revealed in the memory during execution, and the
attacker can dump the memory and construct the code. Therefore, encryption and decryption have
to be conducted by trusted hardware devices, and thus it suffers from the same hardware protection
drawbacks.
Software-tamper resistance techniques help to shield software against modifications and tamper-
ing by creating checksums and hash-codes for detection in the protected code. Beside detection,
they take actions post the detection phase, which may include disabling, deleting, or making the
software generate invalid results, rendering it useless to the reverse engineering attacks.
If the tamper resistance process is circumvented, then the software is left without defence against
malicious host-based attacks. One of the defence methodologies that can be effectively used in
this case, which is the subject of this thesis, is code obfuscation. In essence, the purpose of code
obfuscation is to make the code difficult to read and understand, and hard to analyse by attackers,
while preserving the intended functionality of the original program. The basic premise being that if
the attacker cannot understand the outcome of the reverse engineering, then it is virtually impossible
to usefully alter the reversed engineered code.
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1.1 Code Obfuscation
Obfuscators attempt to manipulate code in such a way that it becomes unintelligible to human, and
automated program analysis tools that are used by malicious reverse engineers, while preserving the
functionality. Code obfuscation is a low-cost technique that does not cause a concern for portability
and is promising for defending mobile programs against malicious host-based attacks [CN09].
In general, code obfuscation helps shield the inner working of the code against analysis attacks.
We enumerate some cases of software protection scenarios, where code obfuscation can be useful
at making attacks economically infeasible.
Protection of intellectual property. Decompilation and reverse engineering allow attackers to
understand the code, extracting proprietary algorithms and data structures (e.g. cryptographic
keys) from software. Code obfuscation defends against malicious decompilation and reverse
engineering, by complicating the analysis phase in this process. Thus, this process should
become very costly and too expensive, in terms of the required time or resources.
Code lifting. In this type of attack, the adversary tries to identify the sections in the code of
interest, rather than understanding the overall code. Code obfuscation does not stop copying
the code or part of it; however it helps to make the process of identifying these parts more
difficult.
Hiding vulnerabilities. This idea is based on the assumption that making the process of analysis
and understanding of the inner workings of a program harder, using code obfuscation, helps
to prevent attackers from discovering vulnerabilities in the code.
Software watermarking. Software watermarking is used to prove the ownership of the software,
normally through embedding a unique identifier within software that binds the program to a
specific user. Software watermarking does not stop software privacy, however it discourages
software theft, by proving to authorities the ownership of stolen software. The typical attack
on software watermarking is to identify the watermark and destroy it; code obfuscation can
be one of the protection techniques to prevent this attack, in a similar way to code lifting, by
making it harder to recognise the watermark.
Software birthmark. One of the software protection areas that are related to code obfuscation is
software birthmark [CN09]. A software birthmark is one or a series of unique and inherent
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characteristics that can be used to identify software theft, detect software piracy and identify
malware such as viruses and trojan horses. Code obfuscation applies many changes to the
code, which render detecting these birthmarks difficult.
Transform Private-Key Encryption to Public-Key Encryption. Obfuscation, when established
in a well-defined security, i.e. the possibility of having proven theoretical foundations for
security [BGI+01], could solve many problems which have not been addressed fully by
cryptography. Transforming a Private-Key Encryption (Symmetric Encryption) into Public-
Key Encryption is an example where Obfuscation can be used to transform Private-Key
encryption schemes by obfuscating a symmetric (private)-key encryption scheme. Given a
secret key k of a symmetric-key encryption scheme, one can publish an obfuscation of the
encryption algorithm Enck. Hence, everyone can encrypt, but only the one who possesses
the secret key k should be able to decrypt.
These are some legitimate usages of code obfuscation. However, code obfuscation is a double-
edge sword; it can be used also for malicious purposes, for example in malware design. Code
obfuscation1 is used in malware for the purpose of evading anti-malware tools. Most virus scanners
(AV) are signature based, and malware make these tools fail by using code obfuscation. Obfuscation
changes the structure and syntax of the malware while it preserves its behaviour, which makes
tracing, dissembling and detection analysis more difficult to perform.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
As discussed above, code obfuscation provides a promising technical approach for protecting
software. However, most of the current state-of-the-art obfuscation techniques are not based on
well-defined security principles that help to certify their success in protecting software. In essence,
there are two related challenges that arise in code obfuscation security: the lack of a rigorous
theoretical foundation, and the difficulty of finding consistent and, theoretically and empirically,
valid measures of code obfuscation quality.
1Using different terminologies such as metamorphism and polymorphism.
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Lack of a theoretical background for code obfuscation
A major challenge in the field of code obfuscation is the lack of a rigorous theoretical basis. The
absence of a theoretical basis makes it difficult to formally analyse and certify the effectiveness of
these techniques in safeguarding against malicious host-based attacks [PG09]. In particular, it is
hard to compare different obfuscation transformations with respect to their resilience to attacks.
The impossibility result of finding a generic code obfuscation by Barak et al. [BGI+01] demon-
strates the theoretical impediment to establishing a robust framework with well-defined security
requirements, as in cryptography, for code obfuscation. Barak et al. [BGI+01] provide a formal
definition of perfect obfuscation in an attempt to achieve well-defined security that is based on the
black-box model. Intuitively, a program obfuscator O is called perfect if it transforms any program
P into a ’virtual black-box’ O(P ) in the sense that anything that can be efficiently computed fromO(P ), can be efficiently computed given just oracle access to P . They proved that the black-box
definition cannot be met by showing the existence of a set of functions that are impossible to
obfuscate.
On the other hand, a recent study by Garg et al. [GGH+13] has provided positive results,
using indistinguishability obfuscation, for which there are no known impossibility results. Two
programs P and Q of the same size that compute the same functionality are computationally
indistinguishable if no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between the obfuscation ofO(P ) and the obfuscation of O(Q). However, as argued by [GR07] there is a disadvantage in
indistinguishability obfuscation: it does not give an intuitive guarantee about the security of code
obfuscation. Furthermore, indistinguishability obfuscation does not certify or reason about the
current state-of-the-art obfuscation techniques (practical obfuscation techniques).
The obfuscation definition that was proposed by Barak et al. is based on the virtual black-box
model, which is a very strong model for software protection, is an unrealistic expectation of
obfuscation for two main reasons. First, software run on an open computing platform, and for
this reason, any malicious host-based attacker has unlimited access to execute and modify the
protected code. Secondly, we cannot expect a defender to hide program’s functionality,2 as virtual
black-box model does for code obfuscation. Therefore, comparing any adversary who has access to
an obfuscated program based on the virtual black-box model is impractical, and hence, led to the
2People are not interested in buying software that they do not known what it does (the programs functionality).
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impossibility results.
The recent advances in code obfuscation theory by Garg et al. confirmed our argument; the
indistinguishability obfuscation definition showed the possibility to obfuscate securely. The success
behind indistinguishability obfuscation is based on eliminating the virtual black-box from the
definition of obfuscation. Nevertheless, this theoretical success has not yet conceived any practical
obfuscation algorithms. Consequently, the current state-of-the-art obfuscation techniques are
predominantly the only available techniques for code obfuscation; this necessitates a new direction
of research which allows to reason effectively over the security aspects of practical obfuscation
techniques.
To this end, we need a new formal approach and framework for modelling, designing, studying
and relating obfuscating transformations. Furthermore, a systematic methodology for deriving
program transformations is highly desirable in order to design obfuscating algorithms, which are
able to hide a desired property, and to defeat a given attacker. Toward achieving these goals, it
is crucial to provide new definitions for practical code obfuscation, in particular, and software
protection in general.
The problem of finding code obfuscation metrics
The current notion of code obfuscation is based on a fixed metric for program complexity, which
is usually defined in terms of syntactic program features, such as code length, number of nesting
levels and numbers of branching instructions. There is a need to practically examine and verify the
effectiveness of obfuscation transformation based on new quantitative means [PG09].
Most code obfuscation strategies are ad hoc and their metrics rely on software metrics that are
based on classical complexity metrics. Despite the usefulness of such metrics, they fall short of
achieving, quantitatively, the confidence and security trust level in code obfuscation.
Software similarity metrics could provide a way to reason about the amount of confusion added
by obfuscation transformation techniques. However, we believe, in their current state, they are not
adequate to measure the quality of code obfuscation. Two programs P and O(P ) can be similar or
dissimilar with a certain value v, but, that does not give any information on the code obfuscation
security, i.e. how difficult it is to comprehend the protected properties in the transformed programO(P ). In order to evaluate the quality of software protection such as code obfuscation, we have
to capture quantitatively the security of code transformations, and study the code-obfuscation
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resilience against an adversary, taking into account the adversary’s capabilities, such as malicious
software reverse engineering, static and dynamic analysis techniques, etc.
1.3 Contributions
In an attempt to tackle these problems, we followed two research methodologies. The first formal
approach is used to build a theory that defines and reasons about code obfuscation security; the
approach is based on Algorithmic Information Theory, which is also known as Kolmogorov com-
plexity [Kol65]. The Kolmogorov complexity for a binary string s is defined as the length of the
shortest program that runs on a universal Turing machine and produces s. Kolmogorov complexity
measures the intrinsic information content and randomness in a given string. Kolmogorov com-
plexity is uncomputable; however, it can be approximated using lossless data compression [KY96].
In this thesis Kolmogorov complexity serves as a unified notion to define and provide proofs for
code obfuscation security, and to derive a theoretical and practical model that establishes a set of
quantitative metrics, which is used to measure the quality of code obfuscation.
The second approach is based on experimental evaluation; we provide empirical evidence to
assess and validate the soundness and effectiveness of the derived metrics measuring the security
of code obfuscation. We correlate the value of these metrics with a heuristic-based obfuscation
resilience factor using decompilation attacks (percentage of failing to retrieve the original clear
code).
Based on the outcome of applying these research methodologies, we make the following contri-
butions.
A new theoretic framework for practical code obfuscation security. We provide a theoret-
ical framework for code obfuscation in the context of Algorithmic Information Theory
(Kolmogorov complexity), to quantitatively capture the security of code obfuscation. Our
definition allows for a small amount of secret information to be revealed to an adversary, and
gives an intuitive guarantee about the security conditions that have to be met for practical
secure obfuscation. We argue that our model of security is fundamentally different from
the virtual black-box model of Barak et al. in which their impossibility result does not
apply. We assume the functionality of an obfuscated program to be almost completely known
and available to an adversary, and only require hiding the implementation rather than the
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functionality itself. This approach to obfuscation is very practical and pragmatic, especially
for software protection obfuscation. We show that our model is very similar to indistin-
guishability obfuscation, yet it has an advantage over the obfuscation indistinguishability
definition in the sense it is more intuitive, and is algorithmic rather than probabilistic. We
then show that under reasonable conditions we can have secure obfuscation. We investigate
the security of the two main approaches to obfuscated code in software, encoding and hiding,
at the subprogram level. Moreover, we study the effect of combining several obfuscation
techniques in the same program, and investigate their overall security.
Modelling deobfuscation adversaries. We model deobfuscation adversaries using Algorithmic
Information Theory, and define the security properties that characterise the conditions for
successful code obfuscation attack.
Metric theoretical evaluation for Kolmogorov complexity. We apply the Weyuker validation
framework [Wey88] to check whether Kolmogorov complexity is theoretically sound as
a software metric. The results show that Kolmogorov complexity is a suitable metric for
measuring complexity in binary programs, and code obfuscation in particular.
Quantitative metrics to measure the quality of code obfuscation. We propose a new quan-
titative framework to measure the quality of code obfuscation; we rely on lossless data-
compression algorithms to approximate Kolmogorov complexity, and to have a practical
means to measure the regularity (randomness) in code obfuscation. We show that software
similarity metrics such as information distance [LCL+04] that measures the similarity be-
tween two blocks of code, can provide a plausible way to reason about the amount of security
added by code obfuscation transformation. The aim of using information distance is to quan-
tify the amount of obscured code that remains or is lost when the program is debofuscated.
We formalise the notions of unintelligibility index (degree of confusion introduced) and rela-
tive Kolmogorov complexity, and show that information distance metric is a suitable measure
for code obfuscation resilience. We also apply a modified version of information distance to
define code obfuscation stealth, and propose a statistic model based on linear regression that
combines all the proposed metrics to estimate the total security of code obfuscation.
Empirical evaluation for the proposed metrics. The empirical validation results show that the
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proposed metric are empirically valid for measuring the quality of code obfuscation. These
metrics outperforms the classical complexity measures in terms of being correlated with
the degree of code obfuscation’s resilience to decompilers. Moreover, the outcome of the
analysis of the results shed a light on the importance of taking into account the attack model
when measuring the quality of code obfuscation. Applying any quantitative measure without
parametrising it to a specific attacker can be misleading, in that it creates a false sense of
security.
1.4 Related Work
The first attempt to evaluate obfuscation was conducted by Collberg et al. [CTL97]; they relied
on classical software complexity metrics to evaluate obfuscation such as Cyclomatic Complexity,
and Nesting Complexity. Anckaert et al. [AMDS+07] suggested a framework of four program
properties that reflect the quality of code obfuscation: code, control flow, data and data flow. They
applied software complexity metrics to measure these properties; however they did not perform
any validation on the proposed metrics. Ceccato et al. [CPN+09] experimentally assessed one
obfuscation technique (identifier renaming) using statistical reasoning. They measured the success
and the efficiency of an attacker by considering the human factor in their threat model, without
introducing any new metrics.
In a recent study by Ceccato et al. [CCFB14], a set of software metrics (modularity, size and
complexity of code) were applied to a set of obfuscated programs to measure the complexity
and potency of obfuscated programs. Their results showed that a limited number of obfuscated
techniques, involved in their study, were effective in making code metrics change substantially
from original to obfuscated code. We apply a similar statistical validation methodology to evaluate
the proposed metrics, yet based it on non-parametric statistical techniques and regression analysis
[She07]. However, our approach differs substantially from their approach; they applied classical
complexity metrics, where we apply new quantitative metrics using Algorithmic Information Theory
and compression.
The most related work to our approach is the work that was conducted by Kirk et al.[KJ04] who
investigated the possibility of using information theory to measure code obfuscation through plain
Kolmogorov complexity and compression to measure the level of randomness in code obfuscation.
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However, their work lacks the theoretical and empirical evaluations that we provide in this thesis.
Jbara et al. [JF14] argued that most of the complexity metrics are syntactic program’s features
that ignore the program’s global structure. The global structure of a program may have an effect on
the understanding of that program, and they suggested the use of code regularity, which is estimated
by compression, to measure program comprehension, and conducted a controlled experiment
using cognitive tasks on a set of program functions. The results established a positive relation
between code regularity and program comprehension. The code regularity, according to Jbara
et al., is estimated by compression, which is also used to approximate Kolmogorov complexity
[KY96]. Their intuitions and results agree with our observation and theoretical treatments for code
obfuscation. However, our work differs from their work in two ways: we provide a sound theoretical
foundation and validation based on Algorithmic Information Theory (Kolmorgorov complexity) for
code regularity, and justify its use in code obfuscation security. They only used compression to
measure code comprehension in an empirical sense, without applying any theoretical validation.
Furthermore, they did not apply their experiment to study the effect of compression on obfuscated
code.
1.5 Thesis Layout
This thesis is organised in the following chapters:
Chapter 2. We provide the mathematical preliminaries that we are going to use in this thesis,
together with a brief introduction to computability theory, Turing machines, Information
Theory and Algorithmic Information Theory (Kolmogorov complexity).
Chapter 3. We present the current threats to software such as program analysis and malicious
reverse engineering, and present the untrusted host as an attack model for software. We
introduce the notion of code obfuscation as a potential defence method against such an
attack. We also provide some of the theoretical background in this domain, in particular,
the impossibility results of virtual black-box obfuscation, and the latest advances that are
based on a relaxed version of virtual black-box model, which provide positive results on
code obfuscation. We provide an overview of obfuscating techniques based on Collberg et
al.’s [CTL97] taxonomy on code obfuscation algorithms. We discuss some of deobfuscation
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methodologies that can be used to foil code obfuscation techniques. Finally, we present an
overview of metrics, which are currently employed to measure the quality of code obfuscation.
Chapter 4. We motivate the use of Algorithmic Information Theory in code obfuscation. We
introduce the notion of unintelligibility to define confusion in code obfuscation and argue that
this is not good enough. We then propose our notion of security that is based on algorithmic
mutual information, and compare both definitions, in particular, with the virtual black-box
model and indistinguisibility obfuscation. Then we apply our security definition to study the
security of the two main approaches to obfuscated code in software, encoding and hiding,
at the sub-program level. We also investigate the effect of combining multiple obfuscation
techniques and reason about their security.
Chapter 5. We propose a generic model of a code obfuscation adversary based on Algorithmic
Information Theory and Kolmogorov complexity. We present a formal grounding and a
new definition of a code obfuscation adversary that captures the adversary’s objectives and
capabilities.
Chapter 6. In this chapter we propose a model to measure code obfuscation quality that is based
on our theoretical investigation in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The model comprises of four
different metrics: unintelligibility index, normalised Kolmogorov complexity, normalised
information distance for resilience and code obfuscation stealth. We check whether Kol-
mogorov complexity is theoretically sound as a valid software metric based on Weyuker’s
validation framework [Wey88]. We show that information distance [LCL+04] can provide a
plausible way to reason about the amount of security added by code obfuscation transforma-
tion.
Chapter 7 We provide the experimental design and tool-sets that are necessary to conduct
and interpret the results of evaluating the metrics that were proposed in Chapter 6. The
experiment consists of a set of obfuscated Java jar files of SPECjvm2008 benchmark, using
two obfuscators: Sandmark, an open source suite, and Dasho, a commercial tool, and three
different decompilers as an attack model.
Chapter 8. In this chapter we focus on the experimental results and analysis. We present the
research questions, the formulated null hypotheses, and show the validation results of the
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proposed metrics model, using statistical hypotheses testing, in addition to other statistical
tools. We also provide comparison with the classical complexity metrics. Finally, we examine
the impact of code obfuscation using the proposed metrics.
Chapter 9: We sum up the main contributions of this thesis and briefly describe the directions for
future work.
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2 Preliminaries
The goal of this chapter is to give a reasonably self-contained account of the basics, as well as some
of the mathematical tools we will need in this thesis.
2.1 Notations
We use the notation U as shorthand for a universal Turing machine, x for a finite-length binary
string and ∣x∣ for its length. For a set S, the count of its elements are denoted by #S. s¯ is used
to denote the complement of s ⊆ S such that s¯ = S/s. We use  for a negligible value, p(n)
for a polynomial function with input n ∈ N, and O(1) for a constant. ∥ is used to denote the
concatenation between two programs or strings.
In this thesis, we are only using strings over a set of binaries i.e. {0,1}. The set of all finite
strings over {0,1} is denoted by {0,1}∗, which we use to represent the space of all possible strings
including the empty string, and can be formally defined as
{0,1}∗ = ∞⋃
i=0{0,1}i
where {0,1}0 = ε is an empty string, and {0,1}n+1 = {0S ∣ S ∈ {0,1}n} ∪ {1S ∣ S ∈ {0,1}n}.1
All objects, such as natural numbers and program code, are encoded as binary strings. For a
given string x ∈ {0,1}, ∣x∣ is measured in the number of symbols of that string. We also write{0,1}+ = {0,1}∗/ε to denote the space of all possible strings excluding the empty string.
Following this, we may inductively create a rule that allows us to totally order all strings that are
possible in {0,1}∗ in a conventional way, according to their length. Then we associate each string
by a natural number 2, this number act as an index in the length-increasing lexicographic ordering.
1 The symbol ∗ refer to a closure of the set, i.e. {0,1}∗ is closed under the operation of concatenation; that is, if x and
y are belongs to {0,1}∗, then x ∥ y are in {0,1}∗ too.
2 This scheme will make the string easily decodable.
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In this case, every string in {0,1}∗, can be identified by its index in the ordering [LV08].
(ε,0), (0,1), (1,2), (00,3), (01,4), (10,5), (11,6), ....
The length of a string x, ∣x∣ is related to the index or position of x in the above relation, which
can be computed using logarithmic term such that: ∣x∣ = ⌈log(x + 1)⌉, where ⌈.⌉ denotes the ceiling
operation that returns the smallest integer not smaller than the argument [LV08].P is a set of binary programs and Q is a set of binary obfuscated programs, L = {λn ∣ λn ∈{0,1}+, n ∈ N} is a set of (secret) security parameters that is used in the obfuscation process.3 A ={An ∣ n ∈ N} represents a set of adversaries (deobfuscators) where an adversary A ∈ A uses a set
of deobfuscation techniques (e.g. reverse engineering); the term adversary is used interchangeably
with deobfuscator. We say two binary programs P and Q have the same functionality (meaning)
if they produce the same output given an input and terminate, i.e. given an input set I , [[P ]] =[[Q]] ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ I.[P (i) = Q(i)].
2.2 Probability
Probability theory deals with predicting how likely it is that something will happen. For example,
if one tosses three coins, how likely is it that all will come up heads? The notion of the likelihood
of something is formalised through the concept of an experiment (or trial) - the process by which
an observation is made. In this technical sense, tossing three coins is an experiment.
Definition 2.1. The set of all possible experimental outcomes is called the sample space and is
denoted by Ω.
Sample spaces may either be discrete, having at most a countably infinite number of basic
outcomes, or continuous, having an uncountable number of basic outcomes.
The foundations of probability theory depend on the set of events F forming a σ-field, a set
with a maximal element Ω and arbitrary complements and unions. These requirements are trivially
satisfied by making the set of events, the event space, the power set of the sample space.
Definition 2.2. A set F ⊆ Ω is called a σ-field if:
3 The security parameter may include the obfuscation key, the obfuscation transformation algorithm or any necessary
information that the obfuscation function can use.
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1. ∅ ∈ F
2. if A1,A2, ... ∈ F then ⋃∞i=1Ai ∈ F
3. If A ∈ F then A¯ ∈ F
Definition 2.3 ([Sti05]). A probability measure Pr on (Ω,F) is a function Pr ∶ F → [0,1]
satisfying
1. Pr(∅) = 0,
2. Pr(Ω) = 1,
3. If A1,A2, ...An is a collection of pairwise disjoint members of F , i.e. if Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for
j ≠ j where Ai,Aj ∈ F , then
Pr( n⋃
i=1Ai) = n∑i=1Pr(Ai)
Pr is also called the probability distribution. The entire structure comprising Ω, with its event
space F , and probability function Pr, is called the probability space and is denoted by (Ω, F , Pr).
Lemma 2.4 (Basic Properties). For any events A,B ⊆ Ω, we have the basic properties:
1. Pr(A¯) = 1 −Pr(A), where A¯ = Ω/A,
2. Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) +Pr(B) −Pr(A ∩B),
3. Pr(A) ≤ Pr(B), if A ⊆ B,
4. Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) +Pr(B) if A and B are disjoint.
Conditional Probability and Independence
Sometimes we have partial knowledge about the outcome of an experiment, which naturally
influences what other experimental outcomes are possible. We capture this knowledge through the
notion of conditional probability. The probability of an event before we consider our additional
knowledge is called the prior probability of the event, while the new probability that results from
using our additional knowledge is referred to as the posterior probability of the event [LG07].
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Definition 2.5 (Conditional Probability). The conditional probability of an event A given that an
event B occurs, if Pr(B) > 0, is defined by
Pr(A ∣B) = Pr(A ∩B)
Pr(B)
In general, the occurrence of some eventB changes the probability that another eventA occurs,
the original probability Pr(A) will be replaced by Pr(A ∣B). If the probability remains unchanged,
then Pr(A ∣B) = Pr(A) and A, B are called independent.
Definition 2.6. Events A and B are called independent if
Pr(A ∩B) = Pr(A)Pr(B)
More generally, a family of events {Ai ∣ i ∈ I} is called independent if
Pr(⋂
i∈JAi) =∏i∈J Pr(Ai)
for all finite subsets J of I .
2.2.1 Random Variable
Rather than having to work with some irregular event space which differs with every problem, we
look at a random variable that allows us to talk about the probabilities of numerical values that are
related to the event space, without having to exhibit all the events in F .
Definition 2.7 (Random Variable [Sti05]). A random variable is a function X ∶ Ω → R with the
property that {ω ∈ Ω ∣X(ω) ≤ x} ∈ F for each x ∈ R.
Every random variable has a distribution function, which is the probability that the random
variable X does not exceed x.
Definition 2.8 (Discrete Random variable [Sti05]). The random variable X is called discrete if it
is taking some countable subset x1, x2, ... of R. The discrete random variable X has probability
function f ∶ R→ [0,1] given by f(x) = Pr(X = x).
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Definition 2.9. The expected value E of a discrete random variableX taking values x1, ..., xn is:
E[X] = n∑
i=1xiPr(xi)
2.3 Information theory
The field of information theory was developed in the 1940s by Claude Shannon, with the initial
exposition reported in [Sha48]. Shannon was interested in the problem of maximizing the amount
of information that you can transmit over an imperfect communication channel such as a noisy
phone line (though actually many of his concerns stemmed from codebreaking in World War II).
For any source of ’information’ and any ’communication channel’ Shannon wanted to be able
to determine theoretical maxima for (i) data compression, which turns out to be given by the
Entropy H (or more fundamentally, by the Kolmogorov complexity K (see Section 2.7)), and (ii)
the transmission rate, which is given by the Channel Capacity [CT06]. Before 1948, people had
assumed that necessarily, if you send a message at a higher speed, then more errors must occur
during the transmission. But Shannon showed that provided that you transmit the information in
the message at a slower rate than the Channel Capacity, you can make the probability of errors in
the transmission of your message as small as you would like.
The initial questions treated by information theory lay in the area of data compression and
transmission. The answers are quantities such as entropy, mutual information, and relative en-
tropy [CT06], which are functions of the probability distributions that underlie the process of
communication.
2.3.1 Entropy
Given a discrete random variable X we cannot know for sure which of its values {x1, x2, ...} will
occur. Shannon introduced the concept of entropy which is a measure of the uncertainty of a
discrete random variable [CT06].4 It is the number of bits on average that are required to describe
the random variable.
Definition 2.10 (Entropy [CT06]). Let X be a discrete random variable over symbols (alphabet)
X = {x1, ..., xn} and probability function Pr(xi) = Pr(X = xi), xi ∈ X . The entropy H(X) of
4Entropy can be also defined for continuous random variables.
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the discrete random variable X is defined by :
H(X) = − n∑
i=1Pr(xi) log Pr(xi).
The log is to the base 2 and it is measured in bits. Note that entropy is a function of the
distribution of X; it does not depend on the actual values taken by the random variable X , but only
on the probabilities.
2.4 Prefix Codes
A string x is called a proper-prefix of another string y, if for a string z ≠ ε, x = y ∥ z. A set
S ⊂ {0,1}∗ is prefix-free if no element is a proper-prefix of any other. A prefix-free set is used to
define a prefix-code. A function D ∶ {0,1}∗ → N defines a prefix-code if its domain, {0,1}∗, is
prefix-free; this function is called a decoding function.
A binary string y is a code-word (words of the code alphabet) for source-word (words from
the source alphabet) x if D(x) = y, and D is the decoding function. The set of all code-words
for a source-word x is the set E =D−1(x) = {y ∣D(y) = x}, and is called the encoding function
[LV08].
The interest in prefix-codes is motivated by the need for uniquely decodable codes. If no code-
word is the prefix of another code word, then each code sequence is uniquely decodable, since the
set of source words is infinite (N) and we would have to use variable-length codes.
Definition 2.11 (Prefix-code [CT06]). A code is a prefix-code or instantaneous code if the set of
code-words is prefix-free.
An example of prefix-free encoding for numbers, is to use a self-delimiting code; for a binary
string x such as 5
xˆ = 1∣x∣0x
In this case, the encoding function E(x) = xˆ = 1∣x∣0x, where 0 is the stop symbol. This is a type of
prefix-free code that is called a self-delimiting, since there is a fixed computer program linked to
this code, which determines where the code-word xˆ ends by reading it from left to right without
5Here x ∈ N which is represented by binaries so that x ∈ {0,1}∗.
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backing up. Using this encoding, we can construct a prefix-free set such as [LV08]
{xˆ ∣ x ∈ {0,1}∗}
Applying this method, the code can be parsed in its constituent code-words in one go by a computer
program. It is desirable to construct instantaneous codes of minimum expected length to describe
a given source; this is very crucial in data compression because we need to have code-words of
shortest possible length for encoding and decoding. It is obvious that we cannot assign short code-
words to all source symbols, for the purpose of unique encoding-decoding, and still be prefix-free.
The set of code-word lengths that are possible for instantaneous codes is restricted by the following
inequality, known as the Kraft inequality.
Theorem 2.12 (Kraft Inequality [Kra49]). Let l1, l2, .., ln be the code-word lengths for each of n
code-words in a binary prefix-free code. Then,
n∑
i=12−li ≤ 1
2.5 Computability Theory
The notion of computability is a basic principle in computer science, as it defines what a computer
can do. The classical computability theory originated with the seminal work of Go¨del, Church,
Turing, Kleene and Post in the 1930’s [Rob15]. Intuitively, computation is a process that produces
some output on certain input using a specific set of rules, which dictates how to perform the
computational operation. Computability theory is also known as recursion theory; it is concerned
with studying whether functions are computable or not. In essence, the classical computability
theory is the theory of functions on the integers that are computable by a finite procedure. The
computable functions are the fundamental object of study in computability theory. This includes
computability on many countable structures as they can be coded also by integers.
Models of computation are abstract specifications of how a computation can be performed,
which are expressed as the description of some kind of conceptual automaton. We need a model of
computation in order to abstract from implementation details using any programming language.
The most popular mathematical model for computability and computations is due to Alan Turing,
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who defined what is now known as Turing machines.
Different approaches to computability were introduced, using models that are based on recursive
functions, the first one by Go¨del [Rob15] then advanced by Kleene [Kle64] and Church [Chu32]
using Lambda-Calculus, which expresses computation based on function abstraction. All the
proposed models of computations are equivalent in the sense that they express the same class of
computable functions. Church and Turing provided two equivalent theses for computable functions,
which later were merged into a well known Church-Turing Thesis. It states that any partial function
that is computable in any model is also computable by a Turing Machine6: these functions are
called Turing-computable. The Church-Turing Thesis is a statement that is believed to be true but
is not proven, based on the fact that many computation models are equivalent, and so far no one
has presented a formal proof to reject this statement [Rob15]. In the following, we give a formal
definition of recursive functions according to Go¨del’s model.
Definition 2.13 (Primitive Recursive Functions [vB15]). The class of primitive recursive functionsFRr in Nk → N, for any k, is constructed by:
1. The initial functions
Z(x) = 0 (Zero)
S(x) = x + 1 (Successor)
Pn(x1, ..., xn) = xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (Projection)
2. Composition. If g1, ..., gm ∶ Nk → N, h ∶ Nm → N ∈ Fr, then f ∶ Nk → N defined by
f(x1, ..., xk) = h(g1(x1, ..., xk), ..., gm(x1, ..., xk))
is in Fr
3. Recursion. If g ∶ Nk → N, h ∶ Nk+2 → N ∈ Fr then f ∶ Nk+1 → N defined by
f(0, x1, ..., xk) = g(x1, ..., xk)
f(y + 1, x1, ..., xk) = h(y, f(y, x1, ..., xk), x1, ..., xk)
6The Turning machine term can be substituted with any equivalent model of computation.
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is in Fr
Using the above definition, we can define partial recursive functions.
Definition 2.14 (Partial Recursive Function [vB15]). The class of partial recursive functionsFpr ∈ Nk → N (for any k) is defined as the set of primitive recursive functions with additional
condition:
4. µ-Operation. If f ∶ Nn+1 → N ∈ Fpr, then h ∶ Nn → N ∈ Fpr, where h is defined by:
h(x1, ..., xn) = µy(f(y, x1, ..., xn)) = 0
where µy expresses the least y ∈ N, which causes f(y, x1, ..., xn) to return 0.
That means y begin with 0 and goes upward, until y is found, i.e. stepping through
f(0, x1, ..., xn), f(1, x1, ..., xn), f(2, x1, ..., xn), ...
However, it might be the case that such argument does not exist, then the search might not terminate,
and therefore, h is not defined.
Definition 2.15 (Total Recursive Function). A function is called (total) recursive if it is partial
recursive and total, i.e. its domain is all of Nk.
Sets that can be algorithmically generated are called recursive (computably) enumerable.
Definition 2.16 (Recursive Enumerable Set [LV08]). A set S is recursively enumerable if it is
empty or in the range of some total recursive function f , so f effectively enumerates S.
The intuition that motivates this definition is that there exists a Turing machine which lists the
elements of S. For every element in S, the Turing machine halts in a distinguished accepting state,
and the elements that are not in S the machine either halts in a non-accepting state or computes
forever [LV08].
2.5.1 Turing Machines
A Turing machine is a kind of theoretical state machine. At any time, the machine is in any one
of a finite number of states. It has an infinite tape that consists of adjacent cells as its unlimited
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memory, with a tape head that reads and writes symbols and moves around on the tape, having the
ability to store information.
On each cell is written a symbol. The symbols that are allowed on the tape are finite in number
and include the blank symbol. Each Turing machine has its own alphabet, i.e. a finite set of symbols,
which determines the symbols that are allowed on the tape. A Turing machine has a finite number of
states and, at any point in time, the Turing machine is in one of these states. It begins its operation
in the start state, and it halts when it moves into one of the halt states. In the next definition, we
present a formal description of Turing machine.
Definition 2.17 (Turing Machine [Tur36, Sip13]). A Turing machine T is a 7-tuple (Q,Σ,Γ, δ, s0
, saccept, sreject) where Q,Σ,Γ and δ are all finite sets, and
• Q is the set of states.
• Σ is the input alphabet not containing the blank symbol ⊔.
• Γ is the tape alphabet, where ⊔ ∈ Γ and Σ ⊆ Γ
• δ ∶ Q×Γ → Q×Γ×{L,R} is the transition function, where {L,R} is the direction of moving
(left or right) on the machine’s tape.
• s0 ∈ Q is the intial state.
• saccept ∈ Q is the accept state.
• sreject ∈ Q is the reject state, where sreject ≠ saccept .
Computing process: At the start of computation, the machine is in the initial state q0 and the
head is positioned over a designated cell of the tape, the head is scanning exactly one cell of the
tape.
• In a single step of computation, the machine looks up the symbol a ∈ Γ where the head points.
• Check the current machine’s state q and compute δ(q, a) = (q′, a′, d).
• Writes the symbol a′ on the tape where the head is positioned, and sets the internal state to
be q′.
• Moves the head one cell to the left or right according to the direction d.
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• The computation stops, or halts, if the machine reaches a final state (an accepting or rejecting
state), and is undefined if there is no valid transition and the current state is not final.
• The output is whatever is left on the tape, starting from the initial position and until the first
blank.
The above definition provides a description of Turing machines and how they perform com-
putation. We can obtain equivalent definitions if more tapes are added, with different operation
types such as read-only, write-only, bidirectional tapes, and using a different finite alphabet. These
equivalent definitions are variants of the basic model, i.e. a generalised model of the basic one,
which differs in their external configuration that makes this model robust and flexible, so we can
adapt a generalised version of Turing machines.
2.6 Universal Machines
An important consequence of computability theory is that the set of computable functions is
enumerable; each computable function can be assigned a natural number so that this number
uniquely represents that computable function. This is due to the existence of an effective method of
enumerating Turing machines, and that a Turing machine can compute these functions [CT06].
Turing machines can be enumerated by setting an encoding scheme that assign a unique identifier
called the Index. The encoding method is represented by associating words over some coding
alphabet.7 Each Turing machine, say T can be computed with other Turing machines by including
their indexes into T ’s input word. In essence, each Turing machine can have a tag m, which are
ordered lexicographically, and each tag assigned a unique index i, indicating its location in this
ordering. Using this idea of enumeration of his machines, Turing discovered an important fact
about Turing machines, which is stated in the following.
Theorem 2.18 (Universal Turing Machine [AB09]). Let Ti be the ith item in a lexicographically
ordered set of Turing machines such that Ti ∈ {T1, T2, ...}. There exists a Turing machine U such
that for every x ∈ {0,1}∗, U(x, i) = Ti(x).
This proposition gives rise to the notion of Universal Turing machine U , which solves the
problem of requiring different Turing machines, each one must be constructed for every new
7A suitable coding alphabet is {0,1}, because it is included in the input alphabet Σ of every Turing machine T [Rob15].
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computation, for every input-output relation. The Universal Turing machine can solve this problem
by having the ability to simulate any Turing machine.
The Universal Turing machine performs this simulation by set to receive a pair of inputs ⟨i, x⟩,
build a machine Ti using i and then simulates this machine on the input string x, such that
U(⟨i, x⟩) = Ti. Therefore, the Universal Turing machine can imitate the behaviour of any other
Turing machine. Based on the above; U can be viewed as a general-purpose computing device
which receives two inputs, P and x, where P is considered as a program for U and x the input data
for P [Pin07].
In this thesis we consider a type of Turing machines whose set of halting programs is prefix-free,
i.e. the set of such programs form a prefix code. One reason to look at this type of machines is
because no halting program is a prefix of another halting program.
Definition 2.19 (Prefix Turing machine [LV08]). A prefix Turing machine T is defined as a Turing
machine with one unidirectional input tape, one unidirectional output tape, and some bidirectional
work tapes. Input tapes are read only, output tapes are write only, and in the unidirectional tapes
the head can only move from left to right. The set of programs P on which halts on T forms a
prefix-code. These programs are also called self-delimiting programs.
We can define a Universal prefix Turing machine that simulates any Prefix Turing machine on an
input, in a similar way to the ordinary Universal Turing machine [LV08].
2.6.1 Asymptotic Notation
Asymptotic notation can be used to express the approximate behaviour of a function when the
argument tends towards a particular value or infinity with another function. In computational
complexity theory, it used to categorise algorithms by how they respond, in terms of (computational)
time and space resources, to different inputs. Instead of using the exact measuring of time and
space, it is convenient to focus on the asymptotic behaviour of resources as approximate functions
of the input size. There is a family of asymptotic notations with the same order of magnitude
symbols: O,o,Ω and Θ which are defined formally as follows.
Definition 2.20 (Asymptotic Notations [Sip13]). Let f and g be functions f, g ∶ N→ R, then:
• f(x) = O(g(x)) if there exists a constant c > 0 such that f(x) ≤ c.g(x), for sufficiently
large x,
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• f(x) = o(g(x)) if limx→∞ f(x)g(x) = 0 i.e. for any constant c > 0, a number n0 such that for all
x ≥ n0 .f(x) < c.g(x),
• f(x) = Ω(g(x)) if there exists a constant c > 0 such that f(x) ≥ c.g(x), for sufficiently
large x,
• f(x) = Θ(g(x)) if both f(x) = O(g(x)) and f(x) = Ω(g(x)).
So, we use the notation O(f(x)) when we denote a function that does not exceed f(x) by more
than a fixed multiplicative factor. This is helpful whenever we want to simplify an expression by
eliminating unnecessary detail, but also in case we cannot precisely estimate this quantity explicitly.
2.7 Kolmogorov Complexity
Kolmogorov complexity (also known as Kolmogorov-Chaitin or Algorithmic complexity) is used
to describe the complexity or the degree of randomness of a binary string. It was independently
developed by A.N. Kolmogorov [Kol65], R. Solomonoff [Sol64], and G. Chaitin [Cha66]. Intu-
itively, Kolmogorov complexity of a binary string is the length of the shortest binary program that is
computed on a Universal Turing machine. Informally, it measures the information content, degree
of redundancy, or the degree of regularities of a binary string.
Kolmogorov complexity tries to provide an answer to a fundamental question about randomness.
Consider the following binary strings:
10101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010
10011101001000101101101000101111010100100100110101
Comparing the above strings, it is easily to conclude that the second one is more random than the
other. Applying the law of probability, each string has an equal probability of (2−50) in being chosen
at random from the all binary sequences. Therefore, probability does not explain the intuitive notion
of randomness.
Kolmogorov complexity comes in handy at explaining the randomness or the level of pattern-
lessness in strings. The notion of randomness is highly related to patterns in strings and how to
describe these patterns. The first string in our example has a very short description e.g. (25 * 10) or
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1 in position n iff n is odd, whereas the second one is difficult to describe in comparison to the first
one. Kolmogorov complexity has advantages over the probabilistic based model when reasoning
about randomness in programs and strings, which makes it the right approach for determining string
complexity. Thus, given two strings, Kolmogorov complexity determines which string is more
complex. In comparing two strings, x1 and x2, if the Kolmogorov Complexity of x1 is less than
the Kolmogorov complexity of x2, then x2 is more complex than x1, because a larger program is
required to describe x2.
Unlike Shannon entropy (see Section 2.3.1), Kolmogorov complexity depends only on the string,
and not on the probability distribution from which it is sampled, that is Kolmogorov complexity
measures the intrinsic information and randomness of a given string [LV08]. Another important
difference between entropy and the Kolmogorov complexity is that entropy measures the amount
of information in the source regardless of the computational capabilities of the extractor. Despite
these major differences, they are also very similar: they are measured in bits, and have some
similar properties. It can even be shown that for a given distribution, the Kolmogorov complexity is
asymptotically equal to the entropy of that distribution [CT06] (see Section 2.11).
There is a major drawback of Kolmogorov complexity: it is not computable, that is undecidable
[CT06], even for using polynomial-time bounded Kolmogorov complexity, it takes an exponential
time; however, methods have been developed to approximate it. Essentially, the Kolmogorov
complexity of a binary string can be approximated using any (lossless) compression algorithm, and
is then close to, but greater than the length of the ultimate compressed version of that string. This
approximation corresponds to an upper-bound of the Kolmogorov complexity [LV08].
Definition 2.21 (Plain Kolmogorov Complexity [LV08]). Let T be a Turing machine and T (P )
the output of T when it is given a program P . The Kolmogorov complexity of a binary string x with
respect to T , CT , is defined as follows
CT (x) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ T (P ) = x}
CT (x) is the minimal length of a program for T to compute output x. Obviously, the Kolmogorov
complexity depends on the choice of the Turing machine T , and consequently that does not make
the model robust. The presence of a Universal Turing machine (see Section 2.6) can solve this
problem as the Invariance Theorem states; it basically shows the universality of Kolmogorov
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complexity using a Universal Turing machine.
Theorem 2.22 (Invariance Theorem [CT06]). Let U be a Universal Turing machine, for any other
Turing machine T and for all binary strings x, there exist a constant cT depending only on T , such
that:
CU(x) ≤ CT (x) + cT
This theorem helps to remove the dependence on a specific Turing machine and use instead a
universal Turing machine. Therefore, Definition 2.21 can be redefined, according to the Invariance
theorem, so the Turing machine T is replaced by a Universal Turing machine U . The Definition 2.21
can be extended to account for the case where an additional input is already available to the Universal
Turing machine, when describing a string x, this case can be referred to as the conditional plain
Kolmogorov complexity.
Definition 2.23 (Conditional Plain Kolmogorov Complexity [LV08]). Let U be a Universal Turing
machine. For any binary strings x, y, the Kolmogorov complexity of x given y:
CU(x ∣ y) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ U(P, y) = x}
2.8 Prefix Kolmogorov Complexity
Plain Kolmogorov complexity has some drawbacks. The plain complexity does not satisfy an
important property, namely the sub-additive property: for two strings x, y, CU(x, y) is the length of
the shortest program such that U computes both x and y, and in how many bits they differ, because
normally x and y are fed to U in a concatenated form, i.e. CU(x, y) = CU(⟨x, y⟩) = CU(x ∥ y).
In this case, it is desirable to have CU(x, y) ≤ CU(x) +CU(y) +O(1), but there is no information
to guide U in order to locate the beginning and end of x and y in x ∥ y with only O(1). Prefix
Kolmogorov complexity resolves this problem by using a prefix Universal Turing machine. As
shown by [LV08], having prefix code running on a prefix Universal Turing machine we can identify
x and y: CU(x, y) ≤ CU(x) + CU(y) + 2 log(min(CU(x),CU(y))), so the cost for U splitting
x ∥ y into a program for x and one for y is at most 2 log(min(CU(x),C(y)).
Definition 2.24. (Prefix Kolmogorov Complexity) The Prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of a
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binary string x with respect to a Universal prefix Turing machine U is defined as:
K(x) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ U(P ) = x}.
As we can see, the above definition is very similar to the plain Kolmogorov complexity in
Definition 2.21, with one main difference: the presence of a prefix Universal Turing machine. The
Invariance Theorem also holds for the prefix Kolmogorov complexity.
Similarly to the conditional plain Kolmogorov complexity, the conditional version of prefix
Kolmogorov complexity K(x ∣ y) of x given y is the length of a shortest program P that computes
x when y is given to P as input [GV04]. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.25. (Conditional Prefix Kolmogorov complexity) Let U be the prefix Universal Turing
machine, and x, y binary strings. The prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x conditioned to y:
K(x ∣ y) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ U(P, y) = x}
Unconditional Kolmogorov complexity is exactly equal to the conditional Kolmogorov com-
plexity with an empty input such that K(x) =K(x ∣ ), where U(P, ) = U(P ). The conditional
Kolmogorov complexity of x with x itself, as an input, is equal to zero i.e. K(x ∣x) = 0 [LV08].
The sub-addivity is ensured in the prefix version of Kolmogorov complexity as we explained
earlier. Formally, the next theorem states this property.
Theorem 2.26 (Sub-additivity [LV08]). Let x, y be binary strings,
K(x, y) ≤K(x) +K(y) +O(1).
In the rest of the thesis, we will use the term Kolmogorov complexity and its notation K to refer
to prefix Kolmogorov complexity that only works for prefix sets.
In the following we will provide some important properties of basic prefix Kolmogorov com-
plexity. Prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(x) is less than the length of a binary string x, and
the conditional complexity K(x ∣ y) is less than the length of the original prefix Kolmogorov
complexity of x. The following theorem states this fact.
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Theorem 2.27 ([LV08]). For all binary strings x and y
K(x) ≤ ∣x∣ + 2 log ∣x∣ +O(1) and K(x ∣ y) ≤K(x) +O(1).
The algorithmic information content ( measured by Kolmogorov complexity) in an object such
as a binary string and its conditional version, cannot be increased by any deterministic algorithmic
method by more than a constant. The following two theorems illustrate this idea.
Theorem 2.28 (Information Non-Increase [She82, Tav11]). For any recursive computable function
f ∶ {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ and for any binary string x, the Kolmogorov complexity of f(x) is bounded
by:
K(f(x)) ≤K(x) +O(1)
Theorem 2.29 (Conditional Information Non-Increase [ SUV14]). Given a recursive computable
function f ∶ {0,1}∗×{0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ and for any binary strings x, y, the Kolmogorov complexity
of f(x, y) is bounded by:
K(f(x, y) ∣ y) ≤K(x ∣ y) +O(1).
The next theorem, known as Muchnik’s theorem shows that there exists a shortest program P that
converts a binary string y to another binary string x such that ∣P ∣ =K(x ∣ y) and P is simple with
respect to x, i.e. the level of dependence on y is small O(logn) for strings of length n [Muc02].
Theorem 2.30 (Muchniks theorem [Muc02]). Let x, y be binary strings of length at mostn. Then
there exists a program p of length K(x ∣ y) such that K(p ∣ x) = O(logn) and K(x ∣ ⟨p, y⟩) =
O(logn).
There is a strong relation between random strings and Kolmogorov complexity. True ran-
dom strings are incompressible; however, how random are strings, we need to answer. We can
use Kolmogorov complexity to define randomness of strings, by introducing the notation of c-
incompressibility.
Definition 2.31 (Incompressiblity [LV08]). A binary string x is incompressible, if K(x) > ∣x∣.
Strings that are incompressible are patternless with lots of irregularities, because a patterned string
requires a shorter description length than patternless strings. Intuitively, patternless sequences are
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random, and random sequences can be used synonymously with incompressible sequence [LV08].
In the next section we quantify and measure the amount of randomness in binary string sets that are
enumerable recursive.
2.8.1 Two Part Description
If we are aware that x belongs to a subset S of binary strings, then it could be easier to describe
such strings. We do that by giving a description of S and then using the index of x in S, where the
elements of S follow some ordering. This is called two-part description, which is formally stated
as follows.
Lemma 2.32 (Two Part Description [LV08]). Let S be an enumerable set of binary programs and
x ∈ S, then:
K(x) ≤K(S) + log #S +O(1)
The first part, K(S), is the description of S; set S can be easily described. If S is a set of n bits
strings then its descriptive complexity, i.e. a minimum program that generate that set, is at most of
O(logn). The second part is the description of x’s position within S.
We can also provide a conditional version of two-part description according to the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2.33 (Conditional Two Part Description [Pin07]). Let S be an enumerable set of binary
programs and x ∈ S, for any binary string y we have:
K(y ∣x) ≤K(S ∣x) + log #S +O(1)
Also, we can measure the level of randomness (irregularities) using randomness deficiency.
Definition 2.34 (Randomness Deficiency [LV08]). The randomness deficiency of x with respect to
a finite set of binary strings S containing x, δ(x∣S), is defined as
δ(x∣S) = log #S −K(x ∣ S).
If δ(x∣S) is large, then there is a description of x with respect to a set S that is considerably
shorter than just giving x’s position or index in S. An element x of S with low randomness
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deficiency is said to be typical; the most efficient way to describe x using S is to find its exact
location in the set.
2.8.2 Algorithmic Mutual Information
Algorithmic mutual information [GV04] measures the information that one object gives about
another, i.e. the information that one sequence gives about another.
Definition 2.35 (Algorithmic Mutual information). Algorithmic mutual information of two binary
strings x and y, IK(x; y), is given by
IK(x; y) =K(y) −K(y ∣x).
Mutual algorithmic information is non-negative (∀x, y.IK(x; y) ≥ 0) and symmetric too [Ga´c74]
up to a logarithmic additive term, as the following theorem states. For any binary strings x, y, z we
write K(x, y ∣ z) =K(⟨x, y⟩ ∣ z), and K(x ∣ y, z) =K(x ∣ ⟨y, z⟩), where ⟨x, y⟩ means that x and
y are joint input.
Theorem 2.36 (Algorithmic Chain Rule [Ga´c74]). For all binary strings x, y, z
1. K(x, y) =K(x) +K(y ∣x) +O(logK(x, y))
2. K(x, y ∣ z) =K(x ∣ z) +K(y ∣ x, z) +O(logK(x, y, z))
3. K(x) − K(x ∣ y) = K(y) − K(y ∣x), i.e. IK(x; y) = IK(y;x), up to an additive term
O(logK(x, y)).
Logarithmic factors like the ones needed in the previous theorem are pervasive in the theory
of Kolmogorov complexity. As is done commonly in the literature, we mostly omit them in our
results, making a note in the theorem statements that they are there.
Definition 2.37 (Conditional Mutual Information [LV08]). The algorithmic mutual information of
two binary strings x and y conditioned to a binary string z is defined as:
IK(x; y ∣ z) =K(y ∣ z) +K(x ∣ z) −K(y, x ∣ z)
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2.9 Approximating Kolmogorov Complexity
Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable due to undecidability of the halting program; however,
it can be approximated based on losseless data compression as it shown in [KY96] Theorem 2
and in [LV08]. Intuitively, the theorem states that K(x) is the lower bound [KY96] of all the
compressions of x; therefore, we say that every compression C(x) of x gives an estimation of
K(x).
Formally a decompression algorithm is considered as an algorithm D running on a Universal
Turing machine U , such that for any binary string x
U(D(C(x))) = x
We say that a compressor is Lossless if there exists a decompresser that reconstructs the source
message from the code message without losing any source-code data.
Many compression techniques can be used to approximate Kolmogorov complexity, such as
lempel Ziv 77 compression algorithm [ZL77], Deflate(gzip) [Sal06], Burrows-Wheeler transform
(implemented in bzip2) [BW94] and PPMD compression (7-Zip) [CIW84]. The most popular
compression technique among them is the Lempel-Ziv algorithm, which is dictionary-based scheme.
Each repeated occurrence of a string is replaced with a pointer to the original occurrence. The
pointer consumes less space than the string itself, provided that the matched string is sufficiently
long enough [JF14]; the literals that are not matched will be produced verbatim.
Definition 2.38 (Compressor [CV05]). A compressor is a lossless encoder mapping C ∶ {0,1}∗ →{0,1}∗ such that the resulting code is a prefix code.
For convenience of notation we identify a compressor with a code-word length function C ∶{0,1}∗ → N, where N is the set of non-negative integers, i.e. the compressed version of a file x has
length C(x). The compressors we refer to here are bounded by C(x) ≤ ∣x∣ +O(log ∣x∣), where the
logarithmic term is due to the compressed files being prefix code-words [CV05].
Cilibrasi et al. [CV05] proposed a set of axioms: Idempotency, Monotonicity, Symmetry, Dis-
tributivity, which defines the notion of a normal compressor. These axioms were used to ensure
the desired properties of normalised compression distance (NCD) [CV05], because the outcome
of NCD, i.e. how good is the measured distance result, greatly depends on how normal is the
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compressor. In the following we write xy to express the concatenation x ∥ y between two binary
strings x and y.
Definition 2.39 (Normal Compressor [CV05]). A compressor C is normal if for all binary strings
x, y, z ∈ {0,1}∗ it satisfies the following axioms:
• Idempotency: C(xx) = C(x), and C(λ) = 0, where λ is an empty string,
• Monotonicity: C(xy) ≥ C(x),
• Symmetry: C(xy) = C(yx),
• Distributivity: C(xy) +C(z) ≤ C(xz) +C(yz),
up to an additive term O(logn), where n is the maximum length of x, y and z.
A conditional version of compression was also defined in a similar way to Kolmogorov condi-
tional and joint complexities (chain rule), there exists a binary string y such that
C(x ∣ y) = C(xy) −C(y)
C(xy) can be expressed as the excess number of bits in the compressed versions of xy compared
to the compressed version of y. It was also shown, based on the distributivity property of normal
compressor that conditional compressed informationC(x ∣ y) satisfies the triangle inequality (see
Definition 2.42).
C(x ∣ y) ≤ C(x ∣ z) +C(z ∣ y)
An important property that can be added to the above, is the sub-additivity which was proven
too in [CV05]. It states that the sum of two compressed binary strings is lower bounded by the
compression of their concatenation as the following:
C(xy) ≥ C(x) +C(y)
2.10 Time-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity
A way to make Kolmogorov complexity computable is the introduction of resource bounds. By
giving the Universal Turing machine a limit on the allowed time or the spaced, we can search for all
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programs within those bounds to describe a string x, and thereof, compute the resource-bounded
Kolmogorov complexity of x.
Definition 2.40 (Time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity [LV08]). Let U t(P, y) denote the output
of U running a program P on binary string input y for at most t(∣P ∣) steps, where t(n) is some
function suitable for representing time constraints.
1. The Time-bounded Kolmogorov complexityKt(x) of a binary string x with respect toU is
defined as:
Kt(x) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ U(P ) = x in less than t(∣P ∣) steps}.
2. The Conditional Time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity relative to y is defined as:
Kt(x ∣ y) = min{∣P ∣ ∣ U(P, y) = x in less than t(∣P ∣) steps}.
Most of the the properties of K(x) of binary string x also hold for Kt(x). In particular,
K(x ∣ y) ≤K(x) ≤ ∣x∣+2 log ∣x∣+O(1). Basically, Kt(x) becomes close to K(x) as t(∣x∣) grows,
similarly, the conditional version of Kt(x ∣ y) can be defined.
2.11 Kolmogorov Complexity and Shannon’s Entropy
There is a direct relation between entropy and Kolomrogov complexity, which was investigated
in [CT06] and [GV04]; these two notions turn out to be asymptotically the same. This is because
the expected value for a random variable in strings of the Kolmogorov complexity is close to the
Shannon entropy [LCL+04].
Theorem 2.41 ([GV04]). Let X be a discrete random variable over a sample space X = {0,1}∗.
For any computable probability distribution f over X , and entropy H(X) :
0 ≤ ∑
x∈X f(x)K(x) −H(X) ≤ cf
where cf is a constant defined by cf =K(f) +O(1).8
8Note that f is a function instead of finite binary string, i.e. K(f) = mini{K(i) ∣ Turing machine Ti computes f}
[GV04].
54
The expectation of K(x) differs from H(X) by a constant depending on f as we see from the
above theorem. However, Kolmogorov complexity, for a sufficiently large sequence, turns out to be
approximately equal to the entropy [LV08], such that H(X) ≈ ∑x∈X f(x)K(x).
2.12 Metrics and Measures
In mathematics, a number of concepts are defined using necessary and adequate sets of axioms.
One of these concepts is the metric, which is called measure of distance. Krantz et al. [KLST71]
show that a metric is a measure according to the representation theory of measurement.
Definition 2.42 (Distance Metric Axioms [KLST71]). A distance is a function d with non-negative
real values, defined on the Cartesian product X ×X of a set X i.e. d ∶X ×X → R+
d is a metric on X if for every x, y, z ∈X:
• d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (identity axiom);
• d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) (The triangle inequality);
• d(x, y) = d(y, x) (the symmetry axiom)
If d is a metric, then (X,d) is called a metric space. A distance measure that satisfies the metric
axioms is by definition a valid measure if it is described by proximity structure [KSLT89].
Definition 2.43 (Proximity Structure Axioms [KSLT89]). A set X with quaternary ordering
relations ≤X ∶ ⟨X ×X,≤X⟩, =X ∶ ⟨X ×X,=X⟩, and >X ∶ ⟨X ×X,>X⟩ is a proximity structure if
and only if the following axioms holds, ∀x, y ∈X:
• ≤X is a weak ordering of X ×X;
• (x,x) >X (x, y) iff x ≠ y (positivity);
• (x,x) =X (y, y) (minimality);
• (x, y) =X (y, x) (symmetry).
If X is a proximity structure and (X,d) is a metric space, then according to the representation
theory of measurement, d is a measure of distance (i.e. homomorphism from ⟨X ×X,≤X⟩ and⟨R,≤⟩), iff: ∀x, y,w, z ∈X ∶ (x, y) ≤X (w, z)⇐⇒ d(x, y) ≤ d(w, z)
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We use the term metric and measure interchangeably to refer to the same thing, although they
are different from a mathematical point of view. The measure is an outcome of the measurement
process where a number is assigned to characterise a specific attribute (a feature or property of an
entity).9 Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.44 (Measure [KLST71]). A measure µ is a mapping µ ∶ A→ B which yields for every
empirical object a ∈ A, a formal object (measurement value) µ(a) ∈ B.
9An entity may be an object, such as a person or a software specification, or an event, such as the testing phase of a
software project.
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3 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation is a software protection technique, which is used to obscure programs in order to
deter an attacker that is equipped with reverse engineering and program analysis tools. This chapter
will provide an overview of the current obfuscation definitions, threat model, the state-of-the-art
techiques, and the methods to evaluate the security of code obfuscation.
3.1 Introduction
Different program analysis methodologies and techniques have been developed in order to provide
automatic analysis of software behaviour. The main applications of program analysis are opti-
misation, correctness and determining the program properties. For example, optimisation allows
compilers to produce optimised code that reduce redundancy and provides relatively safe usage
of computation. As far as the correctness and type safety are concerned, the exact and absolute
program analysis is impossible to achieve, typically due to undecidability of the Halting problem
[Tur36] and Rice’s theorem [Ric53]. Furthermore, it was shown that reverse engineering binary
code using data disassembly and decompilation is undecidable [LD03]. Therefore, the ultimate
aim of program analysis techniques is to provide an approximation to software behaviour through
sound models, i.e. expecting program analysis to provide a larger set of possibilities than what will
happen during runtime execution of the program [NNH15].
Code obfuscation was advanced as a software protection method to deter malicious attackers who
are armed with program analysis tools and reverse engineering techniques. A determined attacker
can eventually break the protected code and reverse engineer it [CTL97]. This was confirmed
by Barak et al. [BGI+01] result, who showed that it is impossible, in general, to obfuscate.
They construct an idealistic general purpose obfuscator based on a virtual black-box model (the
obfuscated program should act as a black-box), then they showed that it is not possible for such
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an obfuscator to exist. Furthermore, Appel [App02] proved under certain assumptions, which are
related to how obfuscated programs behave, deobfuscation is NP-easy.1
Despite these results, the recent theoretical advances in code obfuscation theory by Garg et al.
[GGH+13] showed the possibility of obfuscating programs using indistinguishability obfuscation,
which is a relaxed version of virtual black-box obfuscation model. They construct Multilinear
Jigsaw Puzzles to obfuscate programs, and proved them secure with respect to their indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation definition. However, these advances in obfuscation theory were only theoretical;
so far, we have not seen any practical implementation of their proposed algorithm to obfuscate
programs [BOKP15]. Nevertheless, the usefulness of code obfuscation rises from its potentials of
delaying the exposure of software intellectual property for as long as possible time. The main aim
of the current code obfuscation techniques is to make the process of program analysis and reverse
engineering uneconomical for an attacker.
In this chapter we show the current threats to software such as program analysis and malicious
reverse engineering, and present the untrusted host as an attack model for software. We introduce
the notion of code obfuscation as the potential defence method against such attack. We also provide
some of the theoretical background in this domain, in particular, the impossibility results of virtual
black-box obfuscation and the latest advances that are based on a relaxed version of virtual black-box
model, which provide positive results on code obfuscation. We provide an overview of obfuscating
techniques based on Collberg et al. [CTL97] taxonomy on code obfuscation algorithms. We discuss
some of deobfuscation methodologies that can be used to foil code obfuscation techniques. Finally,
we present an overview of the current metrics, which are used to measure the quality of code
obfuscation.
Chapter Layout: Section 3.2 shows the current threats to software, and their attack model. In
Section 3.3 we provide the current advances in the theory of code obfuscation. Section 3.4 gives
an overview of code obfuscation transformation methods. Section 3.5 discusses the obfuscation
techniques according to their language paradigm. In Section 3.6 we provide an overview of the latest
advanced techniques for code obfuscation. In Section 3.7 we explore the current deobfuscation
techniques, which can be used to break code obfuscation algorithms. In Section 3.8 we discuss the
different evaluation methods that are used to measure the quality of code obfuscation.
1NP-easy is the set of function problems that are solvable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine with
an oracle for some decision problem in NP [GJ90].
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3.2 Threats to Software
Many different types of threats for software can be found; among these we identify two major
threats to software: malicious reverse engineering and program analysis. Despite using reverse
engineering and program analysis for legitimate reasons, they also present major issues for software
security. Malicious reverse engineering and program analysis are considered the cornerstone for
many different types of attacks on software, including: software piracy, tampering, unauthorised
modifications, discovering vulnerabilities and exploit them.
3.2.1 Program Analysis
Program analysis tries to predict the dynamic behaviour of programs without running it. Precise
analysis of program behaviour is impossible to achieve as the program input is unknown. If we do
not know the value of the input, then it is very hard to identify which execution path it might take.
Therefore, the answer can be only approximate. Approximation is an attempt to find an answer as
close as possible to the precise behaviour of a program. Precision of an analysis is improved by
reducing the amount of information describing spurious behaviour of the program. Approximation
can be achieved through semantics-based static analysis which investigates the dynamic properties
of program behaviour. Program analysis can be performed using two different approaches: static
program analysis and dynamic program analysis.
Static program analysis. This type of analysis is conducted to examine and study the program
properties without executing the code. Typical static program analysis techniques are: data flow,
control flow, alias analysis, type analysis and abstract interpretations [NNH15]; in addition to
program slicing, disassemblers, and decompilers. Static analysis is conservative, that means the
properties that are found by static deobfuscating techniques are weaker than the ones that may
actually be true (over-approximation). This guarantees soundness, although the induced properties
may be so weak as to be useless.
Dynamic program analysis. Performed by testing the program on sample input data, since it is
infeasible to test all possible program execution paths due to combinatorial explosion. Dynamic
analysis precisely analyses only a subset of all possible execution paths or parts of a program, i.e.
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this corresponds to an under-approximation [Pre07], examples of dynamic program analysis are
dynamic testing such as fuzzing [SGA07], profiling, debugging and program tracing.
The Impossibility of Program Analysis
Some characteristics of program execution behaviour are difficult to model correctly [Ost77]. It is
not possible to construct a procedure or analyser that will always, accurately, determine whether a
specific path will be executed. The exact analysis is impossible due to the lack of knowledge of
input data values. So the analysis can, at best, hope to yield information about a set of possible
computations.
The difficulty of reasoning about program properties lies in the condition, that there are many
paths in a program. However, not all paths correspond to an execution [Lan92]. In essence, the
exact prediction of program behaviour requires an algorithm that terminates, which is the equivalent
to the halting problem. For example, consider the following code2, which is prone to ‘divide by
zero’ errors:
read(x);
if (x > 0) then Y := 1;
else (Y := 0; S); // S is some other statement
z := 2 / Y; // error??
The issue in the above code is what value Y may have and whether this code could trigger the
vulnerability, i.e. Y=0. Apparently Y may take 0 or 1, If S does not terminate, Y cannot be 0 and
the zero bug situation will not be detected. However, since it is undecidable whether S terminates
or not, we do not expect the analysis to detect this situation [NNH15].
3.2.2 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering techniques typically use program analysis tools, in order to perform the reverse
process of reconstructing the program source code. It can be perceived as a methodology, which
combines both static and dynamic program analysis tools.
The reverse engineering process consists of several stages that aim to produce the source code
from the binary code. It starts with disassembly phase, where the machine code is translated to
2The pseudo code is equivalent, with some modification, to the code taken from Principles of Program Analysis by
Flemming Nielson, Hanne Riis Nielson and Chris Hankin.
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assembly code, then it ends up with the decompilation phase,3 which rebuilds the higher level
representations of the program from the assembly code. Typically, during this process, static
program analysis techniques are employed first, followed as required by dynamic program analysis
tools.
3.2.3 Threat Model for Software: Untrusted Host
Program analysis and reverse engineering are the typical attacks on software that are running on an
untrusted host. This model of attack is widely known as white-box model, where the adversary or
attacker has the host or the system under her/his full control. Aucsmith [Auc96] characterises three
different levels for this model of attack :
1. The attacker uses standard debuggers and system diagnostic tools, no special analysis tools
are required.
2. Specialised software analysis tools involved, such as specialised debuggers and sophisticated
reverse engineering tools.
3. Specialised hardware analysis tools are employed, these tools include, for example, CPU
emulators, and bus logic analysers.
White-box attacks are a very powerful type of attack especially for open computing platforms
such as PCs. The attackers have unlimited access to program binaries; however, it is assumed that
the attackers have very limited knowledge about the software source-code. Having the attacker
operating in white-box model, does not rule out the possibility of subjecting the targeted software to
black-box attack. In black-box model attacks, the software is considered as an oracle, because the
attacker can only analysing the external behaviour of the software, where the internal knowledge of
software is not required, or the attacker does not examine it.
Collberg and Nagra [CN09] propose an attack methodology which resemble attackers’ behaviour
or strategy during the attack process. The attacker goes through five phases : black-box phase,
dynamic analysis phase, static analysis phase, editing phase, and scripting phase.
The attacker starts with black-box testing in order to reveal the external behaviour of the
software; however this stage can be skipped if the attacker has a comprehensive understanding of
3The decompilation phase is discussed in more details in Section 7.3.7.
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the software’s functionality. Then the attacker moves to the dynamic analysis phase in order to gain
more understanding of the internal working of the program. At this stage, the attacker has a high
level understanding of the software and how it works. In the static analysis phase, the executable
code is checked and investigated directly.
This covers the reverse engineering process that we discussed earlier. Now, the attacker is
assumed to have very detailed understanding and a complete picture of the whole software design
and its implementation. For example, the proprietary algorithms can be exposed, cryptography
keys are revealed and vulnerabilities are discovered at this stage; therefore, the confidentiality of
software is compromised. Reaching the editing phase, the adversary (attacker) uses the acquired
knowledge of the software’s inner work to modify its executable, or to integrate it with her/his own
software for interoperability purposes.
So far the four stages are conducted manually, in practice these phases are not followed in order,
they are interleaved with each other using a trial and error process, pattern matching, running and
testing the code multiple times. Finally, when the attacker has fulfill her/his own goals and has
enough confidence in the soundness of her/his work, a scripting code is written in order to automate
this process.
3.3 Obfuscation Theory
In the previous sections we present the common threats and attack model for software, in the rest of
the thesis we will focus on code obfuscation as a defence strategy to hamper the threats to software,
in general, and malicious software engineering, in particular.
An obfuscator is a program or algorithm that transforms a program to another program in such a
way that the transformed (obfuscated) code is functionally equivalent to the original one but more
difficult to understand. The first attempt to define the notion of obfuscation was introduced by
Collberg et al [CTL97], they define obfuscation in terms of semantics-preserving transformation
functions.
Definition 3.1 (Collberg et al definition [CTL97]). Let P τ→ P ′ be a transformation of a source
program P into a target program P ′. The transformation P τ→ P ′ is an obfuscating transformation,
if P and P ′ have the same observable behaviour. More precisely, in order for P τ→ P ′ to be an
obfuscating transformation the following conditions must hold:
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• If P fails to terminate or terminates with an error condition, then P ′ may or may not
terminate.
• Otherwise, P ′ must terminate and produce the same output as P .
3.3.1 The Impossibility of Obfuscation
Obfuscation aims to make the program or circuit unintelligible, while preserving its functionality.
Ideally, an obfuscated program should be a virtual black-box (VBB), a form of strongest notion for
code obfuscation security. In that sense, whatever an adversary can compute from an obfuscated
program, it could also be computed from the input-output (oracle access) behaviour of the program
[Had00], i.e. it should not leak information about the program except its input output behaviour.
Barak et al provided a formal definition of obfuscation in an attempt to achieve a well-defined
security [BGI+01]. However they found a counterexample which showed this definition cannot
always be met. They proved the existence of a set of programs or functions that are impossible to
obfuscate according to that definition.
Preliminaries: PPT is a shorthand for probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine. LetAM(x)
be the output of A when executed on input string x given oracle access to M where A and M are
algorithms. Consider that A and B are probabilistic algorithms.4 Given two inputs X and Y , we
denote by Pr[A(X )] ≃ Pr[B(Y)], that is, the probability distributions of outputs of A and B on
their inputs X and Y are the same with negligible difference. ∣A∣ is denoting the size of A, whereSP (1∣A∣), S is a (simulator) algorithm with input of length ∣A∣ and having an oracle access to a
program P 5. Let O be a probabilistic algorithm that takes an input x, and an additional input of
random bits r, independent of x. Then the output of O depends on input x and random bits r.
Definition 3.2 (Vitual Black-box Obfuscator [BGI+01]). Let O be an obfuscator and P a program,O(P ) is an obfuscated program that must satisfy the following properties :
• Functionality: for any program P , O(P ) and P compute the same function as O(P ).
• Polynomial slowdown: for any Program P , the size and running time of O(P ) are at most
polynomially larger than the size and running time of P .
4Probabilistic algorithms, contrast to deterministic algorithms, takes a source of random numbers which helps to
produce random behaviour (random choices) for the algorithm, even for a fixed input.
5The oracle access toP , means we only have input-output access toP , rather than the P ’s internal or its source-code.
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• Virtual black-box: For any adversary A ∈ PPT (probabilistic polynomial time), there is a
simulator S ∈ PPT, such that:
Pr[A(O(P ))] ≃ Pr[SP (1)∣P ∣]
The last property, virtual black-box, simply states that anything which can be efficiently computed
from O(P ) can also be computed given an oracle access to P .
Barak et al. proved obfuscation is impossible, in general, according to virtual black-box definition.
They showed the existence of a set of functionsH that are inherently unobfuscatable. Let f ∈H be
one of these functions, randomly chosen inH, and has the property pi on f such that: pi ∶ f → {0,1}.
When given an oracle access to f , no algorithm exists that can efficiently compute pi(f), it just gives
pseudo-random result. However given any algorithm A that computes f , pi(f) can be efficiently
computed. This shows the virtual black-box property of perfect obfuscation is inherently flawed.
This is a generalisation of Barak et al’s result [BGI+01].
The significance of the Halting problem, in relation to program analysis and obfuscation, is
the impossibility of providing an exact analysis of whatever property can hold for a program.
However, this is not always the case in code obfuscation, as a program property can be found if the
deobfuscator has access to the obfuscating code according to Andrew Appel’s argument in [App02],
which makes deobfuscation an NP easy. This is confirmed too in Barak’s et al’s results.
3.3.2 Indistinguishablity Obfuscation
As a consequence of the negative results of general-purpose code obfuscator, a more relaxed
notion of obfuscation was proposed; Barak et al suggested another notion of program obfuscation
called indistinguishability obfuscation: an indistinguishability obfuscatoriO for a class of circuits
c guarantees that, given two equivalent circuits c1 and c2 of the same size, that compute the
same functionality, it is hard for a distinguisher D to differentiate between the distributions of
obfuscations iO(c1) and iO(c2), i.e. they should be computationally indistinguishable to D.
Definition 3.3. (Indistinguishability Obfuscator). A uniform PPT machine iO is called an indistin-
guishability obfuscator for a circuit class {C} if the following conditions are satisfied:
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• (Correctness). For all c ∈ C, for all inputs x, we have that
Pr[c(x) = iO(c(x))] = 1
• (Indistinguishability). For any PPT D, there is a negligible function α such that, for any two
circuits c1 and c2 that compute the same function and are of the same size k, it holds that:
Pr[D(iO(c1)) = 1] −Pr[D(iO(c2)) = 1] ≤ α(k)
The significance of using the indistinguishablity obfuscators, unlike the VBB (virtual black-box)
obfuscator, is its ability to avoid the impossibility results. Recently, Garg et al. [GGH+13] proved
the existence of general purpose obfuscation based on a candidate construction for indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation for all circuits. They proposed Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles which are a simplified
variant of multilinear maps. Garg et al’s construction, and variants thereof, were shown to satisfy the
VBB guarantee in ideal algebraic oracle models [BGK+14]. However, none of the aforementioned
results proved possible in achieving VBB obfuscation in the plain model [BCC+14]. Moreover in
[AS15], the authors present a framework for proving meaningful negative results on the power of
indistinguishability obfuscation.
3.4 Code Obfuscation Transformation
This section gives a brief overview of some obfuscation transformation techniques, based, mostly
on Collberg et al. [CTL97]. We will also consider other techniques that have been developed
since then. We will start by discussing the main categories of obfuscation transformation: Lexical
transformation, Control flow transformation and Data transformation.
3.4.1 Lexical Transformation
Lexical obfuscations are aimed at making the code unreadable. They are concerned with changing
the layout of the program rather than its semantics. Lexical transformation is a one-way transforma-
tion, where the original formatting cannot be recovered. It alters the lexical structure of a program
source code. Lexical transformations can be conducted by different ways; the most well known
methods are: Remove Comments, Source Code Formatting and Scramble Identifiers.
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Remove Comments. It is considered the simplest form of obfuscation. Comments are, normally,
added by software developers as part of software’s documentation. Removing a program’s com-
ments apparently makes the program less readable, although comments and debugging information
are often removed during the compiling process.
Source-code Formatting. Changing the programs formatting by removing all the whitespace
and indentations [Dra10] makes the program’s source-code less informative to a reverse engineer.
Examples of formatting obfuscation are found in the Obfuscation C contest [Dra10].
Scramble Identifiers. Identifiers like variables (including classes, methods, fields etc.) are
changed in a confusing manner, for example ‘Sum’ variable is renamed as ‘average’. Also,
meaningful names such as ‘Sum’ or ‘Output’ are transformed into names such as ‘d34’ or ‘34g’.
3.4.2 Control Flow Transformation
This approach alters the flow of control within the program’s code. Collberg et al [CTL97]
provide an obfuscation catalogue for control flow transformation based on its potential effect. They
categorise it into three main groups:
Aggregation. It breaks up computation that logically belongs together or merges computation
that does not. Examples of aggregation transformation are inlining (replace method call with the
body of the method), outlining (replace sequence of statements with a method call), interleaving
(merge separate methods into one), cloning (create many copies of the same method) [CTL97] and
loop transformation [Wol95].
Figure 3.1: Inlining and outlining transformation [CTL97] .
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Figure 3.2: Code obfuscation by splitting a function into two functions [CN09].
Ordering. It can randomise the order in which the computations are carried out. For example,
change the locality of terms with expressions, statements within basic blocks, methods within
classes and classes within files. In some cases [CTL97] it is possible to reorder loops, for example by
running the loops backward, loop reversal [Wol95] or control flow flattening. Control flow flattening
removes the control flow structure that functions have, the nesting of loop and conditional statements,
by flattening the corresponding control flow graph. Fig. 3.3 shows a modular exponentiation
function commonly found in cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA. Each basic block is put as a
case inside a switch statement and the switch is wrapped inside an infinite loop.
Figure 3.3: An example of code obfuscation using control flow flattening [CN09].
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Computation. It makes algorithmic changes to the source code or inserts redundant, dead code or
redundant operands (using algebraic laws in arithmetic expressions [CTL97]). The parallelisation
of code is another important example of computational obfuscation: it obscures the actual flow of
control by creating dummy processes that do nothing. It also splits a sequential section of code into
multiple sections running in parallel. The significance of this obfuscating method is that the static
analysis of concurrent processes is very difficult. The possible execution paths through the program
grow exponentially with the number of executing processes or threads.
This form of obfuscation can be further sub-divided into two categories: dynamic dispatcher
model [WDHK01] and opaque predicate [MTD06].
Dynamic Dispatcher Model. Wang et al [WDHK01] defined the Dynamic Dispatcher model
based on the NP-Complete argument of determining the exact indirect addresses of dispatcher
through aliased pointers. Chow et al [CGJZ01] on the other hand transform a program into a
flat model; they proved their model to be PSPACE-Complete 6 to determine the reachability of a
flattened program dispatcher. Control flow flattening makes the basic blocks look like having the
same set of predecessors and successors [MTD06]. The actual control flow during execution is
determined through the dispatcher. Therefore the dispatcher module is a crucial part in the flattened
(obfuscated) program.
Figure 3.4: Examples of opaque predicate and fake paths [CN09].
Opaque Predicate. Opaque predicate is a conditional expression whose value is known to the
obfuscator but is extremely difficult for an adversary to deduce statically. A predicateφ is defined
to be opaque at a certain point p in a program, if its result is known at obfuscation time and
only determined during runtime execution. The predicate is denoted by φTp (φFp ) when it always
evaluates to true (false) at program’s point p.
6PSPACE is the set of all decision problems which can be solved by a Turing machine using a polynomial amount of
space.
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Opaque predicates can be used to create bogus code in programs, and it is used heavily in control
flow obfuscations. There are several ways to create opaque predicates, such as Algebraic predicates,
which consist of invariants that are based on number theory, for example, the opaque predicate of
the mathematical expression: ∀x ∈ Z ∶ 2 ∣ (x2 + x) is always true, as 2 divides (x2 + x). More
complex examples are found in Fig. 3.5. Opaque predicates can also leverage the intractability
property of pointer aliasing to construct aliased opaque predicates as in [CTL97]. The basic idea is
to construct a dynamic data structure and maintain a set of pointers on this structure such as array.
Opaque predicates can then be constructed using these pointers.
∀x, y ∈ Z : 7y2 − 1 ≠ x2∀x ∈ Z : 3 ∣ (x3 − x)∀x ∈ N : 14 ∣ (3 ⋅ 74x+2 + 5 ⋅ 42x−1 − 5)∀x ∈ Z : (2 ∣ x) ∨ (8∣(x2 − 1))∀x ∈ N :2 ∣ ⌊x2
2
⌋
Figure 3.5: Examples of number-theoretical true opaque predicates [Arb02]
3.4.3 Data Transformation
Data obfuscation targets the data structure in the program intending to obscure their usage and
confuse their operations [ZHZ10]. Collberg et al [CTL97] classify the data transformation into
storage and encoding, aggregation and data ordering. Drape [Dra10] provided a classification based
on Collberg et al.’s taxonomy; in addition, he introduced the abstract data-type for obfuscation.
Variable Encoding. The basic idea behind variable encoding is to replace the variable by an
expression, such that variable i is changed to i = d × i + e where d and e are constants. One of
the main requirements of variable encoding is to be invertible, in the sense that the correct value
of a variable can be obtained when it is required, especially once the variable output is needed
for another variable. In short, this type of obfuscation depends on arithmetic computation that is
equivalent to actual variable value. It is important to check the new value does not cause overflow
e.g. integer overflow [Dra10]. The significance of this type of transformation is its effectiveness
against program slicing [DMT07].
Merging and Splitting. In addition to obfuscating individual variables, two or more scalar
variables can be merged into one variable, provided that the range of mixed variables fits within the
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precision of the new obfuscated variable. For example, two 32-bit variables are merged into one
64-bit variable. Consider X and Y two 32-bit variables, merged into a 64-bit variable Z, then we
can define Z as follows: Z = N ⋅ Y +X where N is a constant such that 0 ≤ x < N .
Splitting, on the other hand, can break up one variable in two or more variables, provided they
are of fixed range such as boolean variables. Drape et al. [Dra10] demonstrates how an integer
variable x can be split into two variables a and b such that: a = x ÷ 10 and b = x mod 10.
Array Transformations. Arrays can be obfuscated by restructuring transformations such as
changing the array indices. It is possible to split an array into several sub-arrays, merging two or
more arrays into one, fold (increase the number of dimensions) or flattening an array (decrease the
number of dimensions).
Abstract Data-types. The idea of obfuscating abstract data-types was introduced in Drape’s PhD
thesis [Ste04]. The abstract data-type consists of a unit containing declaration of the data type and
the procedures that implement the data-type. This is in some sense similar to an object oriented
view of classes, method and constructor. According to Drape’s thesis the abstract data-types
were specified using a functional language and their obfuscation was described according to data
refinement [DREB98] principles.
A data obfuscation O can be specified by defining two functions: cf, the conversion function and
af, the abstraction function. The conversion function performs the obfuscation and the abstraction
function carries out the deobfuscation, which satisfycf ∶ af ≡ skip where ≡ denotes the equivalence
between the outcome of cf :af to Skip. For example, a block of statements B is obfuscated to obtainO(B) using cf and af then B = cf ∶ O(B) ∶ af.
3.5 Language Paradigm Obfuscation
Object Oriented Transformations. Many objected oriented languages rely on calls to standard
libraries e.g. Java, however there is no way of obfuscating them [CTL97]. These library calls have
to be implemented in the program itself to be easily obfuscated. Collberg et al [ CTL97] provided
two basic techniques that obfuscate object oriented languages through modifying inheritance
relation among classes: splitting (refactoring) or inserting bogus classes. Refactoring is based on
finding common elements or components of classes and moving them to new classes. Another
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way of performing obfuscation is to use false refactoring on classes with no common behaviour or
elements.
Intermediate Language Transformation. Obfuscation can be done on Intermediate Languages
(IL) like Java byte-code and .Net CIL (Common Intermediate Language). The advantage of
obfuscation on IL level is the ability to perform transformations that are not allowed on source-code
level. For example jumps in loops are not possible in Java or C#, however it is allowed on IL level.
Adding jumps in IL is referred to as irreducible jumps since it cannot decompile to source-code.
Furthermore, many instructions in IL cannot directly decompile to a high-level language [ Dra10].
It is very complicated to obfuscate IL code manually, especially obfuscated loops. Creating loop
transformations at IL level is difficult, as we have to identify them in the code prior to obfuscation
transformation. It is necessary to identify the loop header, the body and the exits of the loop;
additionally it can be more complicated in the presence of nesting. Examples of obfuscation tools
that are used to automated IL are DashO for Java and DotFuscator for .Net.
Exceptions. Exceptions change the control flow of programs. The exception handler can be used
to obfuscate program; we can use opaque predicates with try-catch blocks. For example, if we have
code consisting of two statements: S1; S2; then we can use the false opaque predicate φF to
transform it into:
Try {if (φF) {throw error} else S1;}
Catch (error) {/*dead code*/} finally {S2;}
It is important to make sure that other uncaught exceptions are handled properly by different catch
blocks, otherwise it causes incorrect behaviours or it may crash ungracefully [Dra10].
Pointers. Inserting pointers to code makes the deobfuscation process much harder, since con-
ducting accurate alias analysis is considered NP-Hard [Hor97][BMRP09]. Wang et al [WDHK01]
support their control-flow flattening techniques by using pointers. Also, pointers can be used to
construct opaque predicates using complex dynamic pointer structures, such as double linked lists
or binary trees.
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3.6 Advanced Code Obfuscation Methods
In this section we present the most recent advances in code obfuscation techniques.
3.6.1 Preventive Obfuscation
Preventive obfuscation defends the obfuscated program against certain attack models [Ste04]
especially against automatic reverse engineering techniques. The main goal of this approach
is not to obscure readability and understanding of the program, instead to make the automatic
deobfuscation difficult to perform. For example, Drape et al. [Ste04] create artificial dependences
between program instructions in control-flow obfuscations to defend against attacks from program
slicers.7 Collberg et al [CTL97] described an interesting approach to preventive obfuscation by
leveraging known problems and vulnerabilities in the current deobfuscators and decompilers, they
called it Target Preventive Transformation.
3.6.2 Obfuscation Using Abstract Interpretation
Cousot and Cousot [CC77] formalise the relation between syntactic and semantic transformations
within abstract interpretation theory. Abstract interpretation is a general theory for approximating
the semantics of discrete dynamic systems [Cou96], where the program behaviour is seen as an
abstract, approximation, of a concrete program semantics. According to abstract interpretation
theory, given a concrete transformation it is always possible to find its abstract counterpart and vice
versa. Concrete and abstract domains i.e. the poset of mathematical objects which the program runs,
are related through a Galois connection (C,α, γ,D) where C is the concrete set of the programs,
α is the abstraction function, γ is the concretisation function and D is the abstract set. Galois
connection represents a particular correspondence (typically) between two partially ordered sets
(posets).
Cousot and Cousot [CC02] introduced a semantics-based approach to formalise program transfor-
mations based on abstract interpretation. They establish a relation between syntactic and semantic
transformation according to the abstract interpretation theory by mapping syntax to semantics
abstractions.
7A program slicer is a program analysis technique, which produces a set of program’s statements called slices. These
parts (slices) of the program potentially affect the values computed at some point of interest.
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Dalla Preda et al. [PG09] used Cousot and Cousot’s framework [CC02] to provide a formalisation
of program transformation to reason about obfuscation, by fixing a formal relation between syntactic
and semantic obfuscation transformation. They investigated the potential of deriving semantics-
based metrics for potency of code obfuscation. Shifting from the classic definition of code
obfuscation, which is just about preserving the input-output of denotational semantics of program,
they rely on preserving the code semantics in the hierarchy of abstract semantics [Cou97]. Potency
becomes associated with the rate of abstraction of concrete preserved semantics. This means the
transformed code is mapped to a lattice of abstract interpretation to measure the code potency.
3.6.3 Obfuscation Using Self-Modified Code
Self-modifying code is used to add additional layers of complexity to code obfuscation. However,
it does not guarantee a provable level of obfuscation [MKP11] due to the shortage of relevant
theoretical studies. The significance of self-modifying code for obfuscation is to reduce distinction
between data and code. Static code does follow the convention of one-to-one mapping between
instructions and memory addresses where self-modify code changes and mutates repeatedly during
runtime execution.
Self-modifying code is highly effective against current static-analysis techniques; according to
Bonfante et al. [BMRP09], this fact arises from the lack of thorough research on the theoretical
aspects of self-modifying code, especially from a semantic point of view. That is why malware
authors rely heavily on self-modifying code to avoid detection.
Self-modifying code has a long history of usage in software obfuscation. Early DOS programs
used it to conceal their functionalities [GCK05]. Also, it was exploited to prevent programs from
executing on competitor’s operating system [BMRP09] by obscuring the code format and properly
extracting and executing it at the runtime.
Self-modified code methods for obfuscation are usually guided by specific rules encoded by
templates, either static or dynamic templates such as Madou’s method [MAM+05]. Other techniques
overwrite program code by dummy instructions using hiding and restoration such as Kanzaki’s
method [KMNM03].
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3.6.4 Virtualisation-Obfuscated Software
Virtualisation-obfuscation implements a virtual environment and interpreter within which byte-code
programs are executed. In virtualisation-obfuscation the original program’s logic is inserted within
the byte-code for a (custom) virtual machine (VM) interpreter. The language accepted by the
interpreter is chosen at random at the time of protection. The interpreter itself is generated in
accordance with the choice of language, and is also typically heavily obfuscated.
It is known that this kind of code obfuscation is very hard to be deobfuscated, at least from a
practical point of view, due to the difficulty in recovering the logic of the original program. The
analysis of the executed code can only reveal the logic of the byte-code virtual machine instead of
the obfuscated program itself.
Virtualisation-obfuscators such as VMProtect8 and Code Virtualizer9 translate portions of the
program’s original x86 machine code into a custom language, which is then interpreted at run-time.
The language interpreted by a virtualisation obfuscator tends to be similar to RISC (Reduced
Instruction Set Computing). CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computer) x86 instruction can be
translated to multiple RISC-like virtual instructions. For example, for complex instructions such as
mov eax, [ebx+ecx*4+123456h]
the address calculation will be translated into several virtual instructions: one to get ecx, one to
multiply ecx by 4, one to fetch ebx, one to add these quantities together, one to add 123456h to the
result, and one to dereference the formed address [Rol09].
It is worth pointing out that this notion of obfuscation through virtualization is very similar
to the idea of control flow flattening by Wang et al. [WDHK01]. In control flow flattening, the
control flow of the program is altered in a two-step process. First, high-level control structures
are transformed into if-else-goto constructs. Next, the goto statements are replaced with
switch statements, where the switch variable is dynamically set within the if-else structure.
The effect on the code is that any basic block in the control flow graph may be a predecessor or
successor to any other basic block in the graph. The resulting analysis of the control flow then is
transformed into a data flow problem. That is, identifying the value of the switch variable at each
entry into the switch statement.
8http://vmpsoft.com/
9http://oreans.com/codevirtualizer.php
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Code Virtualizer, for example, can generate multiple types of virtual machines with a different
instruction set for each one. This means that a specific block of Intel x86 opcode can be transformed
into different instruction sets for each machine, preventing an attacker from recognising any
generated virtual opcode after converting from x86 instructions.
When an adversary attacks a block of obfuscated code by Virtualization obfuscation using
decompilation, s/he cannot get the original x86 instructions. Instead, s/he will see a totally new
instruction set which is not recognised by her/him or any other special decompiler. This will force
the attacker to conduct exhaustive search trying to identifying how each opcode is executed and
how each virtual machine works for each protected application. Which means that the attacker
needs to deobfuscate the virtual machine, and then tries to figure out the obfuscated code. This
approach is called outside-inside, which is extremely difficult, especially when the structure of
interpreter is unknown.
3.7 Code Deobfuscation
Code obfuscation cannot provide a complete protection against malicious host attacks: a competent
programmer, who is willing to invest enough time and effort, will always be able to reverse-engineer
any obfuscated program. The process of attacking and removing the obfuscation transformations is
called deobfuscation, it is considered as the reverse of code obfuscation transformation. Deobfusca-
tion may include the use of any reverse engineering or program analysis tools, that we discussed
in Section 3.2; in addition to any specialised tools to eliminate the obfuscated code and produce
the original code, or an equivalent representation of this program. It has been shown in [UDM05],
[CLD11a], and [YJWD15], that the combination of static and dynamic analyses, using a set of
heuristics can disclose some of the significant obfuscating techniques.
There are limited studies which investigate rigorously and formally code deobfuscation, in
a similar way to code obfuscation problem. One study by Della Preda et al. [Pre07] uses a
static program analysis method based on abstract interpretation theory as a deobfuscator to break
obfuscated code using opaque predicates. Kinder [Kin12] also applied abstract interpretation to
deobfuscate visualization-obfuscated binaries.
Intuitively, an adversary with deobfuscation capabilities can be considered as a transformation of
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an obscure program into a more intelligible program (easier to understand and work with), which is
functionally equivalent to the original program [BF07]. The importance of defining and specifying
a model for deobfuscation attacks, arises from the need to measure the quality of code obfuscation.
To check whether or not a certain obfuscation technique is good at protected a program, it has to be
certified against a certain attack model.
3.8 Obfuscation Evaluation
Evaluating the quality of code obfuscation necessitates the presence of robust metrics, in order
to measure the complexity of the code. There were several attempts to provide concrete metrics
for evaluating obfuscation [PAK98][AMDS+07]. Collberg et al. metrics [CTL97] are the most
comprehensive in terms of comparing and contrast obfuscation transformation techniques. Collberg
et al. used the software complexity metrics to evaluate obfuscation with respect to:
• Cyclomatic Complexity [McC76]. The complexity of a function increases with the number
of predicates in the function.
• Nesting Complexity [HM81]. The complexity of a function increases with the nesting level
of conditionals in the function.
• Data-Structure Complexity [MK93]. The complexity increases with the complexity of the
static data structures that are declared in a program. For example, the complexity of an array
increases with the number of dimensions and with the complexity of the element type.
These software complexity metrics allow us to formalise the concept of potency as a measure of
transformation usefulness.
• Potency. The potency of transformation measures how more difficult the obfuscated code is
to understand compared to the original code. Collberg et al [CTL97]l formalise it as follows:
PtCo(P ) = Co(O(P ))Co(P ) − 1
Where O(P ) is the obfuscated version of program P using O, Co(P ) is the complexity of
P , using a complexity metric Co. PtCo(P ), the potency of O(P ) with respect to P , using
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a complexity measure Co, is a measure of the extent that O changes the complexity of P .
PtCo(P ) is a potent obfuscating transformation if PtCo(P ) > 0.
• Resilience. measures how well a transformation survives deobfuscation attack. Resilience is
a qualitative measure reports on a scale of trivial, weak, strong, full and one-way, and takes
into account the amount of time required to construct a deobfuscator, and the execution time
and space actually required by the deobfuscator (polynomial time, exponential time).
• Execution Cost. measures the extra execution time and space for an obfuscated programO(P ) compared with the original program P .
• Quality: combines potency, resilience and execution cost to give an overall measure.
• Stealth. an obfuscation is stealthy if it is not obvious in the obfuscated program, i.e. it
resembles the original code as much as possible. Stealth is context-sensitive, what is stealthy
in one program may not be in another one.
The first four properties are measured informally using qualitative scale: (for example, resilience
measured on the scale of trivial, weak, strong, full, one-way). Stealth is difficult to be measured
since it is context-sensitive, it depends on the whole program and also on the experience of the
programmer [Dra10].
Anckaert et al [AMDS+07] proposed a quantitative framework to compare and evaluate code
obfuscation techniques based on measuring four program’s properties: code, control flow, data and
data flow. This framework relied on the classical complexity measures, similarly to Collberg et al.’s
work [CTL97], to measure their proposed properties. Every element of these properties is measured
by using a specific classical complexity measure. Code property can be measured (depending
whether its source or binary code ) using the number of instructions, the number of operands, or
the registers’ values. Control flow, which resembles the possible execution sequences of program
instructions, can be measured using Cyclomatic complexity or Nesting complexity. In data flow,
which reflects the possible set of assigned numerical values at various points of program instructions,
can be estimated, for example, using fan-in/fan-out complexity metric [HK81]. Fan-in/fan-out
measures the information flow between program’s components. The fan-in of a procedure is the
number of modules or procedures that call this procedure; in addition to any data structures that are
used by this procedure. The fan-out of a procedure are the number of modules and procedures that
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are called by this procedure, and the data structures that are updated by the same procedure. Data
that are related to programs can be measured using data-structure Complexity.
Linn et al proposed confusion factor [LD03] to evaluate the efficiency of code obfuscation with
respect to disassemblers, i.e. measure the extent of disassembly’s errors. The confusion factor
measures the parts of the obfuscated program (instructions, basic blocks, or functions), which are
mistakenly identified by disassembler as legitimate parts of the original unobfuscated code. It
counts the number of instructions (also basic blocks, or functions) that are incorrectly disassembled,
by finding their diff (difference). Formally, letA be the set of actual instructions addresses andA′
is the set of disassembled instruction addresses. The confusion factor is computed as follows:
CF = ∣A −A′∣
A
∣A −A′∣ denotes the count of incorrectly disassembled instructions. The confusion factor for
functions and basic blocks are calculated similarly to the instructions addresses: a basic block or
function is considered as being inaccurately disassembled if any of their instructions are incorrectly
disassembled.
Tsai et al. [HW09] proposed a framework for quantitative analysis of control flow graph (CFG)
obfuscating transformations. Their framework was based on a distance metric between the original
and obfuscated program and code potency, and is restricted to control flow graph (CFG) obfuscation.
The distance metric that they proposed is based on computing the common sub-graphs (CS) of
the control flow graphs of two programs. Then, the number of edges in each common sub-graphs
is counted to reflect the possible execution paths. Formally, given two CFGs GP and GO(P ) of
programs P and its obfuscated O(P ) respectively, the graph distance is computed as follows:
d(GP ,GO(P )) = 1 −∑
i
2∣edge(CSi(GP ,GO(P )))∣∣edge(GP )∣ + ∣edge(GO(P ))∣
Where CSi denotes the ith common sub-graph of GP and GO(P ), and edge(G) is the set of
edges in CFG G.
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3.9 Summary
Code obfuscation is one of the promising defence techniques for untrusted host based attacks.
In this chapter we provided an overview of the theoretical backgrounds of code obfuscation, the
impossibility results of virtual black-box obfuscation, and the positive results on code obfuscation
using indistinguishablity obfuscator. We provide an overview of the current state-of-the-art for
obfuscation techniques, deobfuscation techniques, and the current methods to measure the code
obfuscation security.
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4 Algorithmic Information Theory for
Obfuscation Security
In this chapter we undertake a theoretical investigation of code obfuscation security and its threat
model based on Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic mutual information. We introduce a
new definition that requires the algorithmic mutual information between a code and its obfuscated
version to be minimum, allowing for a controlled amount of information to be leaked to an adversary.
We argue that our definition avoids the impossibility results of Barak et al. and has an advantage
over the obfuscation indistinguishability definition in the sense it is more intuitive and is algorithmic
rather than probabilistic.
4.1 Introduction
Software developers strive to produce structured and easy to comprehend code, their motivation is to
simplify maintenance. Code obfuscation, on the other hand, transforms code to a less structured and
unintelligible version. It produces more complex code that looks patternless, with little regularity
and is difficult to understand. We argue that irregularities and noise makes the obfuscated code
difficult to comprehend.
Kolmogorov complexity [LV08] is a well known theory that can be used to measure regularities
and randomness. Kolmogorov complexity is the basic concept of Algorithmic Information Theory,
that in many respects adapts the viewpoint of well-established Information Theory to focus on
individual instances rather than on random distributions. In general, Algorithmic Information
Theory replaces the notion of probability by that of intrinsic randomness of a string.
Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable; however it can be approximated in practice by lossless
compression [KY96] [LV08], which helps to intuitively understand this notion and makes this
theory relevant for real world applications. Our aim in this chapter is to provide a theoretical
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framework for code obfuscation in the context of Algorithmic Information Theory: to quantitatively
capture the security of code obfuscation, to discuss its achievability and to investigate its limitations
and resilience against an adversary.
We introduce the notion of unintelligibility to define confusion in code obfuscation and argue
that this is not good enough. We then propose our notion of security and compare both definitions.
We argue that our model of security is fundamentally different from the virtual black-box model
of Barak et al., and that because the impossibility result does not apply. Then we show that
under reasonable conditions we can have secure obfuscation. We study the security of two main
approaches to obfuscated code in software,encoding and hiding, at the sub-program level. Finally,
we study the Kolmogorov complexity of applying multiple obfuscation transforms to a clear code,
and the security case using our proposed definition.
Chapter layout: In Section 4.2 we discuss the intuitions behind our approach and propose the
formal definitions of code obfuscation, and present positive results for secure code obfuscation
against passive attackers. Section 4.3 studies the security of two main approaches to code obfus-
cation at the sub-programs level. Section 4.4 investigates the security case of applying multiple
obfuscation to a clear code. Finally, we present a summary of the chapter.
4.2 Code Obfuscation using Kolmogorov Complexity
4.2.1 Motivation
The main purpose of code obfuscation is to confuse an adversary, making the task of reverse
engineering extremely difficult. Code obfuscation introduces noise and dummy instructions that
produce irregularities in the targeted obfuscated code. Classical complexity metrics have a limited
power for measuring and quantifying irregularities in obfuscated code, because most of these
metrics are designed to measure certain aspects of code attributes such as finding bugs and code
maintenance. Human comprehension is a key in this case; an adversary has to understand the
obfuscated code in order to recover the original; measuring code obfuscation has to take into
consideration this human factor. Although measuring code comprehension is very subjective,
there were some successful attempts to measure human cognitive reasoning based on Kolmogorov
complexity [GZD11].
Code regularity (and irregularity) can be quantified, as was suggested in [Lat97] and [JF14], using
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int n,i=0,x=0;
while(i<n)
i=i+1
x=x+i
(a) Sum code
int n, i=0; x=0; y=0;
while(i<n)
i=i+1
if (7*y*y-1==x*x) //false
y=x*i
else
x=x+4*i
if (7*y*y-1==x*x)
y=x*i
else
x=x-2*i;
if (7*y*y-1==x*x)
y=x*i
else
x=x-i;
(b) One opaque predicate
int n; i=0; x=0; y=0;
while(i<n)
i=i+1
if (7*y*y-1==x*x)//false
y=x*(i+1)
else
x=x+4*i
if (x*x-34*y*y==-1)//false
y=x*i
else
x=x-2*i
if ((x*x+x)mod 2==0)//true
x=x-i
else
y=x*(i-1)
(c) Three opaque predicates
Figure 4.1: Obfuscation example: (a) is the original code for the sum of n integers; (b) is an
obfuscated version of (a) with one opaque predicate and data encoding which has some
patterns and regularities; (c) is another obfuscated version of (a) with three opaque
predicates and data encoding, which has less patterns and regularities comparing to (b).
Kolmogorov complexity and compression. Code regularity means a certain structure is repeated
many times, and thus can be recognised. Conversely, irregularities in code can be explained as
the code exhibiting different types of structure over the code’s body. Regularities in programs
were introduced by Jbara et al. in [JF14] as a potential measure for code comprehension; they
experimentally showed using compression that long regular functions are less complex than the
conventional classical metrics such as LOC (Line of Code) and McCabe (Cyclomatic complexity)
could estimate.
The main intuition behind our approach is based on the following argument: if an adversary fails
to capture some patterns (regularities) in an obfuscated code, then the adversary will have difficulty
comprehending that code: s/he cannot provide a valid and brief, i.e. simple description. On the
other hand, if these regularities are simple to explain, then describing them becomes easier, and
consequently the code will not be difficult to understand.
We demonstrate our motivation using the example in Fig. 4.1. We obfuscate the program in
Fig. 4.1-(a) that calculates the sum of the first n positive integers, by adding opaque predicates with
bogus code and data encoding. If we apply Cyclomatic complexity (McCabe [McC76]), a classical
complexity measure, to Fig. 4.1-(b) the result will be 7. Cyclomatic complexity is based on control
flow graph (CFG), and is computed by: e−n+2 ⋅p, where e is the number of edges, n is the number
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of nodes in CFG and p the number of connected components in graph (in our example p = 1).
Fig. 4.1-(b) contains n = 8 nodes, e = 13 edges, then the Cyclomatic complexity is (13− 8+ 2) = 7.
We can see some regularity here: there is one opaque predicate repeated three times. Furthermore,
the variable y is repeated three times in the same place of the If-branch. We argue that we can find
the short description of the program in Fig. 4.1-(b), due to presence of regularity by using lossless
compression.
We take another obfuscated version in Fig. 4.1-(c) (of the same program); this code is obfuscated
by adding three different opaque predicates. The patterns are less in this version comparing to
Fig. 4.1-(b); where the Cyclomatic complexity is the same 7, and it does not account for the changes
that occurred in the code. Assuming the opaque predicates of Fig. 4.1-(c) are equally difficult to
break, attacking this code requires at least twice more effort than the code in Fig. 4.1-(b), as we
need to figure out the value of two more opaque predicates. Furthermore, in Fig. 4.1-(b) the code
can be compressed at higher rate than the code in Fig. 4.1-(c); again, this is due to the inherent
regularity in Fig. 4.1-(b).
We argue that an obfuscated program which is secure and confuses an adversary will exhibit a
high level of irregularity in its source-code and thus require a longer description to characterise
all its features. This can be captured by the notion of Kolmogorov Complexity, which quantifies
the amount of information in an object. An obfuscated program will have more non-essential
information, and thus higher complexity, than a non-obfuscated one. Thus, we can use Kolmogorov
complexity to quantify the level of confusion in obfuscated programs compared to the unobfuscated
one.
4.2.2 Applying Kolmogorov Complexity to Code Obfuscation
In this section we present a novel approach for code obfuscation based on notions from Algorithmic
Information Theory. We start with an intuitive definition that is inspired by practical uses of
obfuscation. The rationale behind this definition is that an obfuscated program must be more
difficult to understand than the original program. This uses the separate notion of c-unintelligibility:
Definition 4.1. A program Q is said to be c-unintelligible with respect to another program P if it
is c times more complex than P ,i.e. the added complexity is c times the original one, and thus more
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difficult to understand. Formally:
K(Q) ≥ (c + 1)K(P ),
for some constant c > 0.
Definition 4.2. A c-Obfuscator O ∶ P × L → Q is a mapping from programs with security
parameters L to their obfuscated versions such that for all P ∈ P , λ ∈ L . O(P,λ) ≠ P , where(P,λ) is the input to O, and satisfies the following properties:
• Secrecy: Security parameters are secret, and contains all the knowledge to obtain P givenO(P,λ).
• Functionality: O(P,λ) and P compute the same function, such that [[P ]] = [[O(P,λ)]].
• Polynomial Slowdown: The size and running time of O(P,λ) are at most polynomially
larger than the size and running time of P , i.e. for some polynomial function p.∣O(P,λ)∣ ≤
p(∣P ∣), and if P halts in k steps on an input i, then O(P,λ) halts within p(k) steps on i.
• Unintelligibility: O(P,λ) is c-unintelligible with respect to P .
The security parameters L are the secret keys that are used to obfuscate programs, and contain all
the knowledge that is required to obtain the original program from the obfuscated version. This is
very similar to symmetric encryption, where the key is secret and is required for both encryption and
decryption process.1 On the other hand, this is different from public key encryption, the encryption
key is public, where the decryption process requires a private key (secret key).
Now, it is interesting to ask to what extent unintelligibility is related to the quality of the security
parameter λ. Is a large, i.e. long string, λ necessary for high unintelligibility? Is it sufficient?
We answer the first question in the positive by showing that c-unintelligibility sets a lower bound
on the size of λ.
Lemma 4.3. Consider a program P and an obfuscated version O(P,λ) with security parameter λ
such that O(P,λ) is c-unintelligible with respect to P . Then, ∣λ∣ ≥ cK(P ) −O(1).
1There is a major difference between encryption and obfuscation: an adversary does not necessarily need to know λ to
deobfuscate and obtain the original code.
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Proof.
K(O(P,λ)) ≤K(P,λ) +O(1) by Theorem 2.28
K(P,λ) +O(1) ≥K(O(P,λ))
K(P ) +K(λ ∣ P ) +O(1) ≥K(O(P,λ)) by Theorem 2.26
By assumption on c-unintelligiblity, K(O(P,λ)) > (c + 1)K(P ), we have:
K(P ) +K(λ ∣ P ) +O(1) ≥ (c + 1)K(P )
K(λ ∣ P ) ≥ cK(P ) −O(1).
By the basic property of Kolmogorov complexity: ∣λ∣ ≥K(λ), and by Theorem 2.27: K(λ) ≥
K(λ ∣P ). Therefore, ∣λ∣ ≥ cK(P ) −O(1).
To answer the second question, we show a counter-example. So far, we have not addressed
the nature of O and how well it uses its obfuscation parameter. It could well be the case thatO only uses some bits of λ to modify P . In an extreme case, it can ignore λ altogether and
simply return O(P,λ) = P . The result satisfies the first two properties of an obfuscator, but can
be considered unintelligible only in the degenerate case for c = 0 and surely we would not call
the resulting code obfuscated. Another extreme case is when λ = P , we would have at most
K(O(P,λ)) ≤K(P ) +K(O) +O(1) which again would lead to a very small c. These two cases,
although extreme, serve only to show that the quality of an obfuscator depends not only on λ but
also on the obfuscation algorithm itself, O. This is addressed later in Theorem 4.12.
Definition 4.2 is perhaps the first natural definition one can find, but it has one shortcoming.
Merely requiring the obfuscated program to be complex overall does not mean that it is complex in
all its parts, and in particular, that it hides the original program. To illustrate this point, consider the
following example.
Example 4.4. Consider an obfuscated program O(P,λ) = P ∥ λ, which is a simple concatenation
of P and λ. Define n = ∣O(P,λ)∣. We know K(P ∥ λ) ≃ K(P,λ) within logarithmic precision
(see [LV08] page 663). Then, by applying the chain rule of Theorem 2.36, K(O(P,λ)) =K(P ∥
λ) ≃ K(P ) + K(λ ∣P ) + O(logn). For large λ independent of P , this might signify a large
unintelligibility, but the original program can be extracted directly from the obfuscated version
requiring only O(logn) to indicate where P ends and λ starts.
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This leads us to our second definition, where we require not that the obfuscated program be more
complex than the original but rather, that it reveals almost no information about the original. This is
captured by the notion of algorithmic mutual information and can be stated formally as:
Definition 4.5. Consider a program P and its obfuscated programO(P,λ). We say O(P,λ) is a
γ-secure obfuscation ofP if the mutual information betweenP andO(P,λ) is at most γ, that is:
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ γ.
We say O(P,λ) is a secure obfuscation of P if is γ-secure and γ is negligible.
It is common, in the literature about Kolmogorov complexity, to consider logarithmic terms
negligible. Thus, if both P and O(P,λ) have lengths of order n, we might consider that O(P,λ)
would be a secure obfuscation for γ = logn. This intuition, however, is bound to fail in practice.
Programs are typically redundant, written in very well-defined and formal languages, with
common structures, design patterns, and even many helpful comments. It is expected that the
complexity of a non-obfuscated program be low, compared to its length. Consider then the case that
for a given P and n = ∣P ∣ we have K(P ) = O(logn), and a scenario similar to Example 4.4, where
the obfuscation reveals the original program, then the mutual information between both programs
is maximum, i.e.,
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) =K(P ) −O(logn) = O(logn).
Even though this obfuscation cannot be considered secure, the resulting mutual information is so
small that Definition 4.5 would declare it secure. We have two ways out of this:
• we do not consider programs with K(P ) = O(logn), since this is the error margin of the
important properties of Kolmogorov complexity (see Section 2.7), and at this level we can
not achieve significant results;
• or we consider a relative definition of security, requiring that the mutual information be only
at most a negligible fraction of the information in P .
The second option leads us to the following definition:
Definition 4.6. Consider a program P and its obfuscated program O(P,λ). We say O(P,λ) is
a -secure obfuscation of P if the mutual information between P and O(P,λ) is at most K(P ),
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that is:
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ K(P ),
for 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
We say O(P,λ) is a secure obfuscation of P if it is -secure and  is negligible in some
appropriate sense.
4.2.3 On the Impossibility of Obfuscation
There exist other definitions of obfuscation in the literature. Of particular importance to us is the
work of [BGI+12], due to its famous impossibility result. As the authors argue in that paper, the
black-box model they propose for obfuscation is too strong to be satisfiable in practice.
The black-box model considers a program 2 P obfuscated into O(P,λ) using λ if any property
that can be learned from O(P,λ) can also be obtained by a simulator with only oracle access toO(P,λ).3 This essentially states that O(P,λ) does not give any particular information about that
property, since it is possible to learn it without having access to O(P,λ). Notice that this model
does not compare an obfuscated program with an original one, but rather with its functionality.
This is different from the definitions that we have proposed so far. Our definitions can be used to
capture this purpose, namely, measuring how much information a program O(P,λ) gives about the
function 4 it computes, which is denoted by [[O(P,λ)]].
It suffices to note that every function [[O(P,λ)]] has a minimal program for it, say, Q. Then,
its Kolmogorov complexity is the size of Q and for every other program O(P,λ) computing[[O(P,λ)]] we have
K([[O(P,λ)]]) = ∣Q∣ ≤ ∣O(P,λ)∣.
For every program P it must be that K([[O(P,λ)]]) ≤ K(O(P,λ)) + O(1) by Theorem 2.28,
otherwise we could build a program R of size K(O(P,λ)) that produced O(P,λ) and then ran
in succession R and U(R).5 This composition of programs is itself a program with complexity
K(O(P,λ) +O(1) which would be smaller than the assumed minimal program [[O(P,λ)]], i.e. a
contradiction. Therefore, our definition can be changed to compare the obfuscated program with
2Or rather, a circuit or a Turing machine representation thereof.
3In oracle access we can only have access to the program’s input-output.
4We assume all the functions that a program P is computing are decidable.
5That is, we run R to produce O(P,λ) then we execute the result of this first execution, that is O(P,λ) itself.
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the simplest (minimal) program computing the same function.
Definition 4.7. Consider an obfuscated programO(P,λ). We sayO(P,λ) is -securely obfuscated
if
IK([[O(P,λ)]],O(P,λ)) ≤ K([[P ]])
for 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
We say O(P,λ) is a secure obfuscated program if it is -secure and  is negligible.
We believe our definitions of obfuscation differ from the simulation black-box model in important
ways, and because of this they avoid the impossibility result of [BGI+12].
Our definition is a less stringent form of obfuscation rather than a weak form of black-box
obfuscation. We assume the functionality of an obfuscated program to be almost completely
known and available to an adversary, and only require hiding the implementation rather than the
functionality itself. This approach to obfuscation is very practical and pragmatic, especially for
software protection obfuscation, as usually the customer likes to know exactly what a product does,
although s/he might not care about how it was implemented.
In contrast, the black-box model definition requires that all properties of a given obfuscated
program O(P,λ) must be hidden from any adversary that ignores its source-code, but has access
to at most a polynomial number of points of O(P,λ). In the following we summarise the main
differences between the Algorithmic Information Theory approach to obfuscation and the black-box
approach.
1. We can see that in our case, the adversary knows more about the functionality. Since the
functionality is mostly public, this would be equivalent to giving the simulator in the black-
box model access to this extra knowledge, reducing the advantage of the adversary and
possibly making some functions obfuscatable.
2. On the other hand, our definition allows the leakage of a small, but non-zero, amount of
information. Compare this with the black-box model where a single-bit property that is
non-trivially computed by an adversary renders a function un-obfuscatable. Our definition
requires the adversary to be able to compute more than a few bits in order for obfuscation to
be broken.
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3. Our definition considers only deterministic adversaries, again making adversaries less power-
ful and reducing their advantage (see Chapter 5).
We can try to model the implications for our definition of a successful black-box adversary
against obfuscation. Consider an adversary AA attacking a predicate pi in an obfuscated programO(P,λ) by accessing an algorithm A, such that A(O(P,λ)) = 1 if and only O(P,λ) satisfies pi.
In this case, AA is able to compute 1 bit of information about O(P,λ), and we want to measure
how much this helps AA in describing some simpler program P that implements the same function[[O(P,λ)]].
Since the adversary knowsA, s/he can enumerate the set S, assuming S is a recursive enumerable
set, of all programs that satisfy A. Then, for some program P ∈ S, we can use two-part description
(see Section 2.8.1) and would have K(P ∣AA) ≤K(S ∣AA) + log #S.
Note that the set S may be infinite, and so enumeration is the best that can be done: we enumerate
all relevant programs and run A with each of them, noting the result. We could try to avoid this
infinity problem by noticing we are only interested in programs simpler than the original, and thus
satisfying K(P ) ≤ K(O(P,λ)) ≤ ∣O(P,λ)∣. This does not give absolute guarantees, since in
general there are programs with ∣P ∣ > ∣O(P,λ)∣ and K(P ) ≤ K(O(P,λ)), but our hope is that
these are few and far between as they increase in length. Thus, even if we make this assumption and
disregard a whole class of possibly relevant programs, we still have in the order of 2n specimens. IfAA were a deterministic algorithm, we would have K(S ∣AA) = O(1), and if S has less than a
half of all possible programs, then indeed we would find that
K(P ∣AA) ≤K(S ∣AA) + log #S
2= O(1) + log 2n
2≤ n − 1
However, AA is randomised, and in order to accurately produce S, for each program Q ∈ S,AA must be run with a set of random coins r such that AA(Q, r). One way to describe S fromAA would need a polynomial number of bits for each program in S. Now, we no longer have the
comfort of a negligible K(S ∣AA) term, and we can no longer be sure that knowing this property
would in any way reduce the complexity of our target program.
89
We can still try to go around this problem, by allowing our enumerator to list not only all
programs but also all possible random strings, and choosing the majority vote for each program.
The length, and therefore the number, of possible random strings is bounded by the running time of
the program, which in turn is bounded by a function of its length. Therefore, if we limit the length
of our programs, then we limit the number of random strings to search.6
This would eliminate the necessity of considering the extra information due to the random
coins, but on the other hand the running time would increase exponentially. Any successful
adversary would be very different to the PPT adversaries of [BGI+01], and although our definition
has been made, for ease of exposition, with unbounded Kolmogorov complexity (for unbounded
adversaries), it is easy to change it to consider polynomially-bounded adversaries by using an
alternative definition of mutual information (see Section 2.10):
I∗K(P ;O(P,λ)) =Kt()(P ) −Kt()(P ∣O(P,λ)),
where t() is a polynomial on the length of O(P,λ) that acts as a hard limit to the number of
steps the universal machine can be run for. We address adversaries and their capabilities using
Algorithmic Information Theory in Chapter 5.
With this definition of obfuscation, the above reasoning would lead to examples where non-
obfuscatability by the black-box model does not prevent obfuscatability in the Algorithmic
Information-Theoretic model. Our definition for security takes a program P (clear code), which
supposedly is an easy and smart implementation of functionality [[P ]], and compares it withO(P,λ), which is a different and supposedly unintelligible implementation of [[P ]], so that the
original P cannot be perceived or obtained from O(P,λ). The defenders’ aim is not to prevent
an adversary from understanding or finding [[P ]], but to prevent her/him from finding their own
implementations P .
This intuition best matches the idea of best possible obfuscation which was advanced by Gold-
wasser and Rothblum [GR07]. According to [GR07] an obfuscatorO is considered as best possible
if it transforms a program P so that any property that can be computed from the obfuscated programO(P,λ), can also be computed from any equivalent program of the same functionality. However,
despite the close intuitive correspondence, our definition also differs from best possible obfuscation,
6Conversely, if we really want to enumerate all programs, then we also have to enumerate an infinite number of random
strings.
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in the sense that their definition relies on some form of black-box simulation. It was proved in
[GR07] that best possible obfuscation has a strong relation with indistinguishability obfuscation
(see Section 3.3.2), if O is an efficient obfuscation i.e. run in polynomial time.
An indistinguishability obfuscator is considered insecure if an adversary can distinguish between
two obfuscated circuits (programs) (see Section 3.3.2). Indistinguishibility between two strings
(programs) was studied by Laplante et al. [LR96] in the context of Algorithmic Information Theory,
they proposed a modified version of Kolmogorov complexity that accounts for a distinguisher that
differentiates between two binary strings. However, it is not clear, and remains an open problem
whether their theoretical treatment can be used to model indistinguishability obfuscation, and under
which conditions.
Indistinguishability obfuscation, even if it can be defined using Algorithmic Information Theory,
is not very intuitive. Using indistinguishability obfuscation, it is very difficult to provide a guarantee
about what obfuscation hides (just only if the distinguisher succeed); for example, if O produces
a canonical representation of programs P1 and P2 without aiming to hide their implementation,
then the indistinguishability definition is trivially satisfied too. Therefore, it does not provide a
guarantee about what O can hide. On the other hand, our definition provides a security guarantee
about what is hidden, due to obfuscation process, by comparing the original code to its obfuscated
version using algorithmic mutual information.
4.2.4 Security and Unintelligibility
Our first attempt to characterise obfuscation was based on unintelligibility, and then we evolved
to a notion of security based on algorithmic mutual information. The first notion seemed more
immediately intuitive; traditional obfuscation techniques seem to rely only on making the code as
complex as possible in an attempt to hide its meaning. But precisely this notion of hiding meaning
is nothing more than reducing the information that the obfuscated program leaks about the original
one, and so we believe the second approach to be the correct one. However, we can ask the natural
question: is there any relation between these two concepts? Does high unintelligibility imply high
security, or vice-versa?
We give a partial answer to this question. In certain situations, high unintelligibility will imply
high security, as stated in the following theorem.
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\\ variable that holds authentication password
string user-Input = input();
string secure-password = ...;
if secure-password == user-Input
grant-access();
else
deny-access();
P : simple password checker
string O@ = x0();
string $F=...;
if O@== $F
x1();
else
x2(); O(P,λ) : obfuscating P
Figure 4.2: Obfuscating a password checker program
Theorem 4.8. Consider a program P of length m and its obfuscated version O(P,λ) of length
n >m (where n is at most polynomially larger than m), satisfying c-unintelligibility for c ≥ nK(P ) .
Assuming that the obfuscation security parameter λ satisfies K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) ≥K(λ ∣P ) − α, for
some α ∈ N, then up to O(logn):
I(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ α
Proof. K(O(P ;λ)) ≥ (c + 1)K(P ) by c-unintelligibility assumption, and by Theorem 2.28,
K(O(P,λ)) ≤K(P,λ) +O(1)7, we have:
K(P,λ) ≥ (c + 1)K(P )
K(P,λ) −K(P ) ≥ cK(P )
K(λ ∣P ) ≥ cK(P ) by Theorem 2.36
7The O(1) term is absorbed by the logarithmic additive term that we are not notating.
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Now, for mutual information, we have
I(P ;O(P,λ)) =K(O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) by Definition 2.35
≤K(O(P,λ)) −K(λ ∣P ) + α by c-unintelligibility assumption
≤ n − cK(P ) + α
≤ n − n + α by assumption
= α
Intuitively, if we consider an optimal obfuscation security parameter (it has all the information
needed to produce O(P,λ) from P , but not much more than that), we can say that if O(P,λ) is
c-unintelligible for large enough c, then O(P,λ) is a secure obfuscation of P .
The above theorem shows when high c-unintelligibility implies security of code obfuscation. It
turns out that the reverse implication does not exist, as the following theorem illustrates.
Proposition 4.9. There exists an obfuscation functionO that produces arbitrarily secure programs,
according to Definition 4.6, and yet does not satisfy c-unintelligibility for c ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider first the case of program P of Fig. 4.2, that simply checks a password for access,
and its obfuscated version O(P,λ), which was computed using layout obfuscation [CTL97]:
variable and function renaming and comment deleting. The obfuscated variable and function names
are independent of the original ones and so the information thatO(P,λ) contains about P is limited
to the unchanging structure of the code: assignment, test and if branch. The complexity of the
original code can be computed from several independent parts of the program: the complexity of
comments: nc, the complexity of structure: ns, the complexity of variable and function names: nv,
and therefore we can write K(P ) = nc + ns + nv.
The only thing that O(P,λ) can give information about is the structure part, since all the other
information was irrevocably destroyed in the process: there is no data remaining that bears any
relation to the lost comment or the lost function names. Therefore,
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ ns = ns
nc + ns + nvK(P ).
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We can make the fraction nsnc+ns+nv as small as necessary by inserting large comments, long names
and representing structure as compactly as possible, for example, keeping names in a dictionary
block and indicating their use by pointers to this. However, the complexity ofO(P,λ) is less than
that of P , since there is less essential information to describe: the same structure, no comments
and the function names could be described by a simple algorithm. Therefore, we have that c-
unintelligibility can not be satisfied for any non-negative value of c. This shows that high -security
does not imply high unintelligibility.
The next theorem shows how we can obtain a certain level of security that depends on: how
complex is the obfuscated code and the obfuscation key (security parameter), and the level of
dependency between the original program and the obfuscation key.
Theorem 4.10. Let O(P,λ) be an obfuscated program for a program P of length n and λ be
independent and random obfuscation security parameter, satisfyingK(λ) ≥ n − α and K(P,λ) ≥
K(P )+K(λ)−β , for some α,β ∈ N. Suppose the obfuscationO(P,λ) satisfiesK(O(P,λ) ∣P ) ≥
K(λ ∣P ) −O(1). Then up to a logarithmic factor:
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ α + β
Proof.
IK(P ;O(P,λ)) =K(O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) by Definition 2.35
≤K(O(P,λ)) −K(λ ∣P ) by assumption
≤K(O(P,λ)) −K(λ,P ) +K(P ) by Theorem 2.36
≤ n −K(P ) − n + α + β +K(P ) by assumptions
≤ α + β
The first two assumptions are natural: picking λ at random and independently of P will satisfy
high complexity and low mutual information with high probability, so we can simply assume those
properties at the start. The third assumption (K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) ≥K(λ ∣P ) −O(1)), however, is not
immediately obvious: it describes a situation where the obfuscation key λ is optimal, in the sense
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that it contains just the amount of information to go from P to O(P,λ), within a small constant
term. The following lemma shows how λ must have a minimum complexity to allow the derivation
of P to O(P,λ).
Lemma 4.11. K(λ ∣P ) ≥K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) −O(1)
Proof. Given the obfuscator O and any λ, construct the function qλ(⋅) = O(⋅, λ), and let Qλ be a
program that implements it. Then, clearly, U(Qλ, P ) = O(P,λ) and so ∣Qλ∣ ≥ K(O(P,λ) ∣P ).
To describe Qλ, we only need to specify λ and instructions to invoke O with the proper arguments,
but since P is already known, we only need to find a shorter description for λ. This gives
K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) ≤K(λ ∣P ) +O(1).
An optimal obfuscation key λ is then the one that uses as little information (minimum complexity)
as possible in the obfuscation function, to go from P to O(P,λ).
Obfuscation techniques can use randomness or not. In Proposition 4.9, we showed one case
where names could be obfuscated in a deterministic way, without any randomness. However, we
could equally have used instead random names, with the same effect on security but increasing
unintelligibility as well. We can as well consider that the set of obfuscation techniques is finite and
describe each of them by a unique number. This way, we can characterise a single application of
obfuscation by a key composed of the technique’s index and the randomness needed.
We now proceed to show that it is possible to achieve obfuscation security according to our
definitions, but restricted to a passive adversary, that is, one that does not realise transformations
over the intercepted code. The intuition is to use obfuscation techniques that behave as much as
possible as secure encryption functions, namely, using random keys (security parameters) that are
independent from the code and large enough that they obscure almost all original information.
The crucial difference that enables security is that because an obfuscation technique preserves
functionality, we do not need to deobfuscate the obfuscated code and so we do not need to hide the
key.
First, we prove the effect of obfuscating an elementary piece of code, by application of a single
obfuscation technique. Then, we reason about the case of a full program, composed of several of
these independent blocks.
Theorem 4.12. Let p represent a program block, O an obfuscation technique and λ ∈ L an
obfuscation key with a fixed length n. Let O(p, λ) be the obfuscated block. Assume O is such
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that it produces an output with length ` ≤ n + γ, where γ is the extra length due to obfuscation,
and is “nearly-injective” in the following sense: for every p, any subset of L of keys with the
same behaviour for p has cardinality at most polynomial in n. That is, for all p and λ0 ∈ L,∣{λ ∣ O(p, λ) = O(p, λ0)}∣ ≤ nk, for some positive integer k.
Then, if the key is random, K(λ) ≥ n − α and independent from p, K(λ ∣p) ≥ K(λ) − β, for
some α,β ∈ N, the obfuscated code O(p, λ) is (α + β + γ)-secure up to a logarithmic term.
Proof. By symmetry of information Theorem 2.36, we can write
K(p ∣O(p, λ)) =K(O(p, λ) ∣p) +K(p) −K(O(p, λ)).
It is easy to see by Theorem 2.29 thatK(O(p, λ) ∣p) ≤K(λ ∣p) +O(1), since O(1) is a constant
independent of p, λ or O(p, λ) it can be ignored for a sufficient large size programs [CT06]. As
well, we can show the reverse inequality. To produceλ from p, we can first produceO(p, λ) from
p (with a program that takes at least K(O(p, λ) ∣p) bits) and then build the set,
Sp,O(p,λ) = {λ ∣ ∣λ∣ ≤ n, [[O(p, λ)]] = [[p]]} of all compatible λ, by a program whose length is
O(1). Finally, we just have to give the index of λ in this set, and so K(λ ∣p) ≤K(O(p, λ) ∣p) +
log #Sp,O(p,λ) by Lemma 2.33. Then,
K(O(p, λ) ∣p) ≥K(λ ∣p) − log #Sp,O(p,λ)
≥K(λ) − β − log #Sp,O(p,λ) by assumption
≥ n − α − β − log #Sp,O(p,λ) by assumptions on λ.
By assumption on the output of O,K(O(p, λ)) ≤ ∣O(p, λ)∣ ≤ n + γ, and by Theorem 2.36,
we have:
K(p ∣O(p, λ)) ≥K(p) + n − α − β −O(logn) −K(O(p, λ))
≥K(p) − α − β − γ −O(logn) (4.1)
Therefore,
IK(p;O(p, λ)) =K(p) −K(p ∣O(p, λ)) by Definition 2.35
≤K(p) −K(p) + α + β + γ +O(logn) by Eq. (4.1)
≤ α + β + γ +O(logn)
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The randomness and independence conditions for the keys are natural. The other two conditions
may seem harder to justify, but they ensure that O effectively mixes p with the randomness
provided by λ: the limit on the size of subsets of L implies a lower bound on the number of possible
obfuscations for p (the more the better); on the other hand, the limit on the length of the output ofO
forces the information contained in p to be scrambled with λ, since it can take only a few more bits
than those required to describe λ itself. The extreme case is similar to One-Time Pad encryption8,
when both the output and λ have the same size n, and O is injective for each p: there are 2n keys,
as well as possible obfuscations for each p. Furthermore, because the obfuscated code has the same
length as λ, the exact same obfuscated strings are possible for each p, maximizing security.
In general, a program is composed of several of these minimal blocks in sequence, regardless
of the execution flow (control flow). The above proof shows when the obfuscated block O(p0, λ)
gives no information about its original block, say p0. As well, O(p0, λ) cannot give any more
information about any other block p1, as there is no relation between p1 and O(p0, λ). At best,
there is some information in p1 about p0, but then the information given by O(p0, λ) about p1
should be at most that given by about p0. Therefore, we conclude that if all the sub-blocks in a
program are securely obfuscated, then the whole program is. The above theorem, hence, shows that
secure obfuscation is possible under very reasonable assumptions.
4.3 Individual Security of Code Obfuscation
Studying the security of individual instances of obfuscated code provides more granularity. Even
if the obfuscated program is considered secure according to our definition, it may have parts
(sub-programs) which can provide some information about other obfuscated parts, which reduces
the security of the obfuscated code. It could be that a program is obfuscated but some modules
are not: some part of the obfuscated code stays still in its original form. We can demonstrate this
relation by providing some bounds on the complexity of sub-programs in the same program.
We can view (obfuscated) programs as finite, and therefore recursively enumerable, sets of
sub-programs (blocks or modules) such that Q = {qi ∣ i ∈ N}. If Q is an obfuscated program then
it may consist of obfuscated and non-obfuscated (clear) modules, it could be the case that the
8Which is proved to be an unconditionally secure symmetric cypher.
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obfuscation process left some modules of code unobfuscated, that is: there are qj , qi in Q, where qi
is an obfuscated module and qj is a non-obfuscated module.
Theorem 4.10 demonstrates the effect of security parameters λ on the whole obfuscation process.
The following results show the effect of each individual security parameter on each obfuscated
sub-program. Choosing a good λ (with a good source of randomness) requires the minimum
amount of shared information with obfuscated code and the clear code. It is important to study
the relation between the security parameter and the original (clear) code, as it may influence the
outcome the obfuscation process. In the following theorem, we use a simple way to check the
independence between λ and P on the sub-program level.
Theorem 4.13. Let Q be a set of obfuscated sub-programs, λ a set of security parameters (ob-
fuscation keys) such that λ = {κ1, . . . , κn}, and P a set of clear sub-programs, such that each
sub-program q of Q has length at most n, and is the obfuscation of a corresponding block in P :
there are pi ∈ P,κi ∈ λ such that q is an obfuscated program of pi using security parameter κi. If
K(κi, pi) ≥K(pi) +K(κi) − α, for some α ∈ N, then (up to a logarithmic term):
IK(κi;pi) ≤ α
Proof.
K(pi, κi) ≤K(κi ∣pi) +K(pi) +O(logn) by Theorem 2.36
K(pi) +K(κi) − α ≤K(κi ∣pi) +K(pi) +O(logn) by assumption
K(κi) − α ≤K(κi ∣pi) +O(logn)
K(κi) −K(κi ∣pi) ≤ α +O(logn)
IK(κi, pi) ≤ α +O(logn) by Definition 2.35
The following two theorems address the security of two different forms of code obfuscation:
obfuscation-as-encoding and obfuscation-as-hiding. In the obfuscation-as-encoding technique,
the original program is transformed in such a way it changes the structure of original code, but
preserving the functionality, for example Data transformation techniques such as Array Splitting,
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Splitting Variables, Restructure Arrays and Merge Scalar Variables (see Section 3.4.3). The
encoding process is considered as the security parameter that dictates how the obfuscation should
be performed and where it should take place.
Encoding differs from encryption; if somebody knows the encoding process, then the original
code can be recovered. In encoding obfuscation, the clear program is not presented in the obfuscated
code; what still exists, but is hidden, is the encoding process. Reversing the encoded program
(obfuscated) requires finding and understanding the encoding process. For instance, we use a simple
encoding in Fig. 4.1: x=x+i is encoded as x=x+4*i;x=x-2*i;x=x-i; the encoding process
converts i to 4*i;-2*i;-i, to figure out x=x+i , we have to find and combine 4*i;-2*i;-i,
which is the security parameter in this case.
The next theorem addresses the security of obfuscation code when applying an encoding to P (as
a set of sub-programs); here the encoding process is presented as a part of security parameter. We
aim to check how much the obfuscated sub-program leaks about the encoding process (the security
parameter). It turns out that the security of obfuscation-as-encoding depends on the randomness
deficiency (see Definition 2.34) of the relevant security parameter of the obfuscated sub-program,
as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 4.14 (Encoding). Let Q be a collection of obfuscated sub-programs qi of length at most
n using κi ∈ λ, a set of security parameters such that λ = {κ1, . . . , κn}. Then,
IK(κi; qi) ≤ δκi −O(1),
for δκi = δ(κi ∣Q).
Proof. Since Q is a collection of sub-programs, we can assume that it contains all the information
in qi as well as that of all other sub-programs. Then, K(κi∣Q) = K(κi∣⟨q1, . . . , qi, . . . , qn⟩) ≤
K(κi∣qi), as adding more inputs reduces the overall complexity, and so
IK(κi; qi) =K(κi) −K(κi ∣ qi) by Definition 2.35
≤K(κi) −K(κi ∣Q)
≤K(κi) − (log #Q − δκi) by Definition 2.34
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int n, i=0; x=0; y=0;
while(i<n)
i=i+1;
if(7*y*y-1==x*x) //false
y=x*i;
else
x=x+i;
Figure 4.3: Obfuscating x=x+i expression using opaque predicate with no encoding
Because each sub-program in Q has length at most n, then Q can contain at most 2n distinct
sub-programs. Assuming that each appears at most a constant number of times, we have that
#Q = O(2n) and log #Q = n +O(1). Then, by Definition 2.34
IK(κi;Qi) ≤ n − n + δκi −O(1) = δκi −O(1)
In obfuscation-as-hiding techniques, the original sub-program still exists in the obfuscated
program (set of obfuscated sub-programs), the security of such techniques depends on the degree
of hiding in the set of obfuscated sub-programs. An example is the Control-Flow obfuscations
such as Insert Dead basic-blocks, Loop Unrolling, Opaque Predicate and Flatten Control-Flow
(see Section 3.4.2). Normally these techniques are combined and used with encoding obfuscation
techniques, in order to make the code more resilient to reverse engineering techniques. For code
obfuscation, an opaque predicate is used as a guard predicate that cannot statically be computed
without running the code; however the original code still also exists in the obfuscated code, but
protected by the predicate. In Fig. 4.1 we used opaque predicates with a simple data encoding
technique. Consider the obfuscated code in Fig. 4.3 of the original code in Fig. 4.1-(a), where
the encoding has been removed. Obviously, x=x+i is still in the code, but is hidden under the
protection of opaque predicate. The security of obfuscation-as-hiding depends on the randomness
deficiency of the clear sub-program that is obfuscated, and still (hidden) exists in the set obfuscated
sub-programs. The next theorem states this case.
Theorem 4.15 (Hiding). Let Q be a collection of obfuscated sub-programs qi hiding original
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sub-programs pi, each of length at most n. Then,
IK(pi; qi) ≤ δpi −O(1),
for δpi = δ(pi ∣Q).
Proof. The proof is very similar to Theorem 4.14. The block pi is hidden in Q but in its original
form, due to the obfuscation. Since Q is a collection of sub-programs, we can assume that it
contains all the information in qi as well as that of all other sub-programs. Then, K(pi ∣Q) =
K(pi ∣⟨q1, . . . , qi, . . . , qn⟩) ≤K(pi ∣ qi)
IK(pi; qi) =K(pi) −K(pi ∣ qi)
≤K(pi) −K(pi ∣Q)
≤K(pi) − (log #Q − δpi) by Definition 2.34
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.14, #Q = O(2n) and log #Q = n +O(1). Then,
IK(pi; qi) ≤ n − n + δpi −O(1) = δpi −O(1)
4.4 Combining Obfuscation Transformation Functions
In this section we investigate the effect of combining different obfuscation techniques on a program.
Studying the effect of multiple obfuscation techniques is important. The general belief is: if we
apply more obfuscation then the obfuscated code becomes more complicated, complex and difficult
to analyse, especially for a malware writer and virtual machine obfuscation [FWWH11]. However,
that is assumed to hold with no formal or empirical evidence for support.
Investigating the effect of applying many obfuscation techniques is essential when using dynamic
obfuscation. Dynamic obfuscation is very similar to metamorphic malware and self-modifying
code; the code gets obfuscated during runtime, and each instance or version may be obfuscated
using different obfuscation techniques. Therefore, it is desirable to reason about the security of
combining many obfuscation transformations i.e. for such constructions to be secure, the original
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obfuscation has to be secure too under composition.
Let On(P,λ) denote an obfuscation function that is applied recursively n times to P such that:
On(P,λ) = O1(On−1(P,λ), λ), where O1(P,λ) = O(P,λ). The next theorem states the effect
of multiple obfuscation on an obfuscated code using the same obfuscated technique and the same
security parameter.
Theorem 4.16.
K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) + n∑
i=1K(λ ∣Oi−1(P,λ)) +O(1).
Proof. We proof this theorem using induction:
• Base case: we need to prove K(O(O(P,λ), λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) +O(1):
Applying Theorem 2.28 and using the chain rule of Theorem 2.36:
K(O(O(P,λ), λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ), λ) +O(1) =K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) +O(1)
• Inductive case: let∀i ∈ N.K(Oi(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ))+K(λ ∣O(P,λ))+...+K(λ ∣Oi−1(P,λ))+
O(1) holds, then we need to prove:
∀i ∈ N.K(Oi+1(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) + ... +K(λ ∣Oi(P,λ)) +O(1)
K(Oi+1(P,λ)) =K(O(Oi(P,λ), λ)) ≤K(Oi(P,λ), λ) +O(1)
By chain rule of Theorem 2.36:
≤K(Oi(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣Oi(P,λ))
By Theorem 2.28 and the inductive case:
≤K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) + ... +K(λ ∣Oi−1(P,λ))+
K(λ ∣Oi(P,λ)) +O(1)
Therefore, ∀n ∈ N. K(On(P,λ)) ≤ K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) + ... +K(λ ∣On−1(P,λ)) +
O(1) holds.
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We can see the maximum effect of applying the same obfuscation technique many times on
obfuscated code complexity. The obfuscated program is maximized when each instance of the
obfuscated code (as a result of multiple obfuscation) has the minimum shared information with the
security parameters i.e. K(λ ∣On(P,λ)) = K(λ), the conditional input On(P,λ) has no effect
on computing λ; hence, the shortest program to compute λ is no less than λ itself. Furthermore,
the maximum complexity of multiple obfuscations can be increased linearly in the best possible
scenarios i.e. O(n).
Theorem 4.17. K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) + (n − 1)K(λ) +O(1).
Proof. According to Theorem 4.16,
K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) +K(λ ∣O(P,λ)) + ... +K(λ ∣On−1(P,λ)) +O(1),
using Theorem 2.27, then:
K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(O(P,λ)) + n−1ucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyrightK(λ) + ... +K(λ)+O(1)
This theorem computes the maximum achievable Kolmogorov complexity by multiple obfusca-
tion repeating the same technique, but it does not guarantee any lower bound. We illustrate this in
the following example:
Example 4.18. Consider again the obfuscation of Example 4.4,O(P,λ) = P ∥ λ. If we apply this
obfuscation n times times to P using the same λ, we get:
K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(P ∥ λ) + n−1∑
i=1 K(λ ∣⟨P
iucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright∥λ ∥ ... ∥ λ⟩) +O(1).
Let n denote the length of P . Then, K(λ ∣⟨P iucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright∥λ ∥ ... ∥ λ⟩) ≤ logn for any i ≥ 1: since λ appears
in the strings P
iucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright∥λ ∥ ... ∥ λ, all we require to produce λ is to identify where it starts, which can be
given by the length of P . This takes O(logn) bits to describe.
Then, K(On(P,λ)) ≤K(P ∥ λ) +O(logn), and we can see that applying this obfuscation to
P more than one time is irrelevant.
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Now, let Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) stand for an obfuscation process that successively applies n different
obfuscation functions to P , using different security parameters such that:
Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) = Ot⃗n−1.t1(P, λ⃗n−1.λ1) = Ot⃗n−1(Ot1(P,λ1), λ⃗n−1)
where Oti represents an obfuscation using transformation algorithm ti, and λ⃗n is a vector of
different security parameters. The next theorem examines the effect of this successive obfuscation
on complexity.
Theorem 4.19. K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n)) ≤K(Ot1(P,λ1)) +∑ni=2K(λi−1 ∣Ot⃗i(P, λ⃗i)) +O(1)
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.16.
From the above results, we can see the complexity of an obfuscated program as a result of
applying different obfuscation transformations greatly depends on the effect of a new obfuscation
function on the previous obfuscated instance, in particular the security parameter. The maximum
obfuscation level is achieved when each obfuscation parameter is independent of the corresponding
obfuscated instance, i.e. K(λi) =K(λi ∣Ot⃗i−1(P, λ⃗i−1)). Moreover, if each obfuscation function
in Ψ = {Otj ∣ j ∈ N} is applied independently to different modules or blocks of the original
program P = {pi ∣ i ∈ N}, i.e. each obfuscation function Oti ∈ Ψ is mapped (obfuscated) to one
module in pi ∈ P , then we localise a unique obfuscation transformation function to a particular
code block or module. In the following Lemma, we prove the optimality of the security parameters
in the obfuscation process, which involves applying different obfuscation techniques using different
security parameters, in a similar way to Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.20. Given Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) an obfuscation function that is applied recursively n times to P ,
using a set of different obfuscation functions: O⃗ = {Ot1 , . . . ,Otn} and a set of security parameters:
λ⃗ = {λ1, . . . , λn} such that: Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) = Ot⃗n−1.t1(P, λ⃗n−1.λ1) = Ot⃗n−1(Ot1(P,λ1), λ⃗n−1). Then,
K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) ∣P ) ≤K(λ⃗n ∣P ) up to a logarithmic term.
Proof. Construct a function F such that F (O⃗, λ⃗, .) = Ot⃗n(., λ⃗n), let QK be the program that
implements it. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.11, U(QK , P ) = F (< O⃗t⃗n , λ⃗n >, P ) and so∣QK ∣ ≥K(F (< O⃗t⃗n , λ⃗n >, P ) ∣P ). To describe QK we need to describe every single instance of
λ⃗n and invoke a set of instruction to determine which obfuscation function to use and in which
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order. Since we haveP , we can use it to describe each instance of λ⃗n with a short description. We
still have to describe the obfuscation functions. Assume O⃗ is a recursive enumerable set, then by
Lemma 2.33 it is sufficient to pin-point the index of obfuscation function O in a set O⃗ so that
K(F (< O⃗, λ⃗ >, P ) ∣P ) ≤K(λ⃗n∣P ) + log #O⃗.
Therefore, K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) ∣P ) ≤K(λ⃗n ∣P ) +O(logn).
Having provided the optimality in cases of multiple obfuscation, we turn to provide security
results in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.21. Consider a set of obfuscation functions O⃗ = {Ot1 , . . . ,Otn} and a set of security
parameters: λ⃗ = {λ1, . . . , λn} as before. Let P represent a program of length m. Assume that the
keys (security parameters) are random, ∀λi ∈ λ⃗,∃αi.K(λi) ≥m − αi; the segments are mutually
independent even in the presence of P , ∣K(λ⃗n)−∑ni=1K(λi∣P )∣ ≤ O(logm); independent from P ,∀λi ∈ λ⃗,∃βi.K(λi ∣P ) ≥K(λi)−βi; and satisfyingK(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) ∣P ) ≥K(λ⃗n ∣P )−O(logm).
Then the obfuscated code Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) is ∑ni=1{αi + βi}-secure up to a logarithmic term on the size
of P .
Proof.
IK(P ;Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n)) =K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n)) −K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) ∣P )≤K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n)) −K(λ⃗n ∣P ) +O(logm) by Lemma 4.20
by the assumption on randomness and independence of λ⃗
≤K(Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n)) − n∑
i=1K(λi ∣P ) +O(logm)
By the assumption on K(λi ∣P ) and K(λi):
≤m − n∑
i=1{K(λi) − βi} +O(logm)≤m − n∑
i=1{m − αi − βi} +O(logm)≤ n∑
i=1{αi + βi} +O(logm)
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter we provided a theoretical investigation of code obfuscation security. We defined
code obfuscation using Kolmogorov complexity and algorithmic mutual information. Our definition
allows for a small amount of secret information to be revealed to an adversary, and it gives an
intuitive guarantee about the security conditions that have to be met for secure obfuscation. We
argued our definition is more lenient than the virtual black-box model of Barak et al. and that for
that reason the impossibility result does not apply. In contrast, we showed that under reasonable
assumptions we can have secure obfuscation according to our definition.
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5 Modeling Adversaries using Kolmogorov
Complexity
In this chapter we propose a generic model for a code obfuscation adversary based on Algorithmic
Information Theory and Kolmogorov complexity. We provide a formal grounding, a general
description and a new definition of code obfuscation adversary including the adversary’s objectives.
We explore its potential and the attacking process.
5.1 Introduction
In all different aspects of information security, the adversary model represents the corner stone
for understanding and defining security of any system. In the previous chapter, the adversary
model was implicit in our definition of security: the adversary knows the obfuscated code and
its objective is to produce the original code. However, the definition we have provided, which is
based on Algorithmic Information Theory (as with Classical Information Theory), only accounts
for an adversary with unbounded computational power. There are no limits being imposed on
the adversary’s computational power, which evidently presents a very powerful attacker. As with
cryptography, this type of adversary is impractical, and there is almost no defence mechanism that
can resist such an attacker.
In the practical cases of attacking code obfuscation, the adversary is equipped with a limited
number of reverse engineering tools at her/his disposal, besides the bounded time. It is very
beneficial to consider such cases, although the context in which the attacker is operating is fully
open. This type of attack is called Man-at-End (MATE), where the adversary has full access to
the computational resources, including physical access to the device. S/he can execute, tamper,
modify and inspect hardware and software freely without any restriction. Our definition for
obfuscation security, which is based on algorithmic mutual information, implicitly models such a
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powerful adversary through the conditional Kolmorgorov complexity. However, its very important
to explicitly define such adversary by providing a formal attack model, which can demonstrate
her/his capabilities, goals, the attack process, and its limitation; hence, we can provide a rigorous
meaning for code obfuscation security. Furthermore, the adversary model has to account for the
situations where the adversary has a limited resources to use in the attack.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a formal and mathematical model
for a code obfuscation adversary; we are not aware of any formal model for a generic adversary
model for code obfuscation, apart from the traditional static and dynamic program analysis tools.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the obfuscation
adversary model. In Section 5.3 we define a legitimate adversary. Section 5.4 investigates the
security of an obfuscated program, using multiple obfuscation transformations, against an adversary.
5.2 Obfuscation Adversary Model
5.2.1 Adversary Capabilities
To properly define security we need to specify the capabilities of our attacker. The most basic
case we are trying to capture is that of a human who seeks to obtain some original code from
an obfuscated version thereof, without the assistance of any automated tools. The difficulty of
the adversary’s task is measured by the amount of information that s/he lacks to obtain the target
code. If the obfuscation is weak, this will be small. A good obfuscation will force the adversary to
obtain more information to reach its target, possibly some of the randomness used to execute the
obfuscation in the first place.
At the other extreme, we have an adversary with access to a complete range of analysis tools.
S/He can execute the obfuscated code (which we refer to as a challenge) as many times as required;
s/he can run any program on the challenge (that is, it can execute any computable function of
the obfuscated code) to obtain static analysis information on that code or, on the other hand, to
produce modifications and variations of the challenge code, which s/he can subsequently run as
many times as needed. The adversary is not restricted in how many times s/he runs these functions
or modified obfuscated programs nor in what order. Ultimately, with all the information gathered
from this process, the adversary will attempt to produce a deobfuscated version of the program,
that is, well-structured code which is very similar to the original program and has less noise.
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This model equally captures automated reverse-engineering analysis techniques such as static
program analysis and dynamic program analysis (see Section 3.2). A distinction commonly made
in the literature is whether the attacker is passive or active. The first kind of adversary is limited to
analysing the source code of the challenge, but cannot run it nor modify it. The second adversary
can execute the challenge code and the modified versions thereof. We model these two kinds of
adversary in the choice of computable functions that are available to the adversary.
5.2.2 Adversary Goals
On the other hand, there is also some lee-way in the adversary’s goal. The most strict victory
condition is to produce the original code. More relaxed conditions would allow the adversary
to win if it could produce code that was close enough to the original source and had the same
functionality. In our scenario, the adversary already knows the functionality to a large degree.
If s/he did not, an adequate victory condition would be simply to produce as simple as possible
an equivalent version of the obfuscated code, which would mean the adversary had understood
the functionality and found a more compact implementation for it. But this does not mean the
adversary’s implementation is better than the original in some practical terms, for example, more
efficient. Our aim is to represent a situation where the obfuscated implementation of a specific
functionality holds some value for the attacker; although the latter might know the full functionality,
the way in which this is implemented is not known, and might be better in some practical terms
than all the implementations the adversary currently knows. Given the above, it seems to us that the
adversary’s goal must be to recover code as close as possible to the original, and definitely with
similar practical properties. This last requirement is difficult to formalise, because the possible
criteria are so many, so it is easier to settle with the strict condition.
5.2.3 Adversary Definition
In this section we provide a definition for a generic attacker for code obfuscation and software
protection based on Kolmogorov complexity. We start by providing a new definition for an adversary
(deobfuscator), in a similar way to the code obfuscation definition (see Definition 4.2).
Intuitively, an adversary with deobfuscation capabilities can be considered as a transformation of
an obscure program into a more intelligible program, which is functionally equivalent to the original
program [BF07]. Kolmogorov complexity can be used to define intelligibility as it measures the
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level of regularity in programs.
Definition 5.1. (Deobfuscation Adversary) A deobfuscation adversaryA ∶ P ′ → P is a function that
maps an obfuscated program to an approximate version of the original program. The deobfuscation
outcome, D(P ) = A(O(P,λ)), has the following properties:
• Functionality: for an obfuscated program O(P,λ) and its original code P , applying the
deobfuscation gives a program with the same functionality, i.e. : [[P ]] = [[D(P )]].1
• Polynomial Slowdown: for any obfuscated program O(P,λ), the size and running time of
D(P ) are at most polynomially larger than the size and running time of P i.e.:
∣D(P )∣ ≤ p(∣P ∣).
• Proximity: The deobfuscation is δ-close if :
∣K(P ) −K(D(P ))∣ ≤ δK(P )
for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
• Intelligibility: Deobfuscation is c-intelligible if:
∃c > 0 . K(O(P,λ)) ≥ cK(D(P ))
Where ∣P ∣ and ∣O(P,λ)∣ are of O(n).
The proximity property explains the situation where the adversary is trying to recover a program
that is as close as possible to the original program complexity; alternatively it can be stated in a
less compact form as ∣K(P ) −K(D(P ))∣ ≤ δK(P ). Additionally, the result code should not be
significantly more complex than the true original code, which means they must have also similar
Kolmogorov complexity. This prevents cases where the adversary has not sufficiently reduced the
complexity of the code, and has returned something that is probably still rather obfuscated. This
does not mean the original and the candidate programs have high mutual information and can be
easily derived from each other, it only means that they have similar amounts of information.
1If this cannot be checked, e.g due to a large function domain, the adversary must provide a formal proof that the
functionality is the same.
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The intelligibility property sounds intuitive here, because most of deobfuscation strategies by
passive and active adversaries, whether static or dynamic, are aiming at producing less complex
code, in order to make it as simple as possible for understanding. However, reducing the complexity
of obfuscated code does not provide a guarantee about adversaries’ abilities. Take for example
the obfuscated code in Fig. 4.2, consider an active adversary A who constructs, successfully, an
intelligible versionD(P ) ofO(P,λ), by replacing all these variables by meaningful ones. However,
by using the same reasoning of Proposition 4.9, D(P ) can be of higher complexity compared toO(P,λ), as there is more information to be described in D(P ). Therefore, c-intelligibility is not
satisfied by this attack, although A managed to produce an intelligible program from O(P,λ).
This leads us to consider a further definition to compute the adversary’s outcome, where the
adversary’s success is captured by the notion of algorithmic mutual information. We consider
the revealed information about the original code as the adversary’s advantage in attacking the
obfuscated code. It can be stated formally as:
Definition 5.2. Given an obfuscated code O(P,λ) and an active adversary A; the adversary’s
advantage is defined as:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A = IK(P ;O(P,λ))
If A has α, which contains some knowledge about P , then:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A (α) = IK(P ;O(P,λ) ∣α)
The above definition is very similar to Definition 4.5, the adversary is implicitly considered
using conditional Kolmogorov complexity, with one difference: it accounts for an adversary A
with additional knowledge about P . The notation AdvP,O(P,λ)A does not indicate a different mutual
information nor a restrictive version. It explicitly states the existence of an adversary A that is
trying to describe P given the knowledge of the obfuscated version O(P,λ).
Having a high advantage AdvP,O(P,λ) means the obfuscated code is less secure and shows a
high capability for that adversary, and vise versa. However, this definition as it is cannot be used
to measure the adversary’s success at attacking the obfuscated code; if the advantage is equal to
γ, then the adversary reveals no more than what the defender wants the adversary to learn i.e. the
allowed information to be leaked, γ (see Definition 4.5).
The next proposition provides an example of how to compute an adversary’s advantage that
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attacks an obfuscated program. It shows that the adversary’s advantage coincides with the amount
of retrieved information from obfuscated code with only up to logarithmic precision.
Proposition 5.3. Consider a clear program P of length n with K(P ) ≥ n−α, for some α > 0, andA an adversary that extracts at least m ≤ n consecutive bits of P from O(P,λ) then:
1. K(P ∣O(P,λ)) ≤ n −m +O(logn).
2. AdvP,O(P,λ)A ≥m + α +O(logn)
Proof. We prove this proposition by building the following algorithm:
Algorithm:
• Run A(O(P,λ)); we obtain m ≤ n bits of P . Denote this by ω.
• Now, run a program β such that P = (s1, s2) = β(ω) which computes two blocks of bits:
those that come before and those that come after ω in P .
To produce P , β needs at most to produce the pair of two strings (s1, s2) with combined
length n −m. To describe the pair, we need at mostO(logn) bits saying where to divide s1
from s2. Thus, K(β) ≤ ∣β∣ ≤ n −m +O(logn).
By construction, K(P ∣O(P,λ)) + O(1) ≤ K(β) + O(1) ≤ n − m + O(logn). Using the
assumption aboutK(P ), it is straight forward to compute IK(P,O(P,λ)) ≥m+α+O(logn).
An adversary can fully obtain P , with only a logarithmic error, if s/he knows λ, the security
parameter (obfuscation key) that is used to obfuscate.
Lemma 5.4. Given an obfuscated programO(P,λ), for an adversaryA who knows λ, the security
parameter.
1. K(P ∣O(P,λ), λ) = O(logn).
2. AdvP,O(P,λ)A (λ) =K(P ∣λ) −O(logn).
where n is the length of P,A and λ.
Proof. By secrecy property of Definition 4.2, λ ∈ L contains all that A needs to obtain P
from O(P,λ). The shortest program for a Universal Turing machine U that describes P givenA,O(P,λ) and λ, is logarithmic; as it is sufficient for U to describe P from A,O(P,λ) and λ
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using just O(logn), which is the overhead cost required by U to combine A,O(P,λ) and λ and to
locate them on U tape. The advantage of A given λ is obtained as follows:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A (λ) = IK(P ;O(P,λ) ∣λ) by Definition 5.2=K(P ∣λ) −K(P ∣O(P,λ), λ)
=K(P ∣λ) −O(logn)
These results are not surprising. Intuitively, an adversary can easily recover the original code
from the obfuscated version once the security parameter that is used for obfuscation is known. This
is an extreme case where the adversary has a possession of the security parameter, which it can be
used to fully deobfuscate the obfuscated code.
If the adversary has a prior information about the original code or the security parameters used
in the obfuscation process, then we can use the result of the next theorem to estimate its outcome,
based on the complexity of the clear code and the security parameter, which shows the amount of
resilience of code obfuscation against the adversary.
Theorem 5.5. For an adversary A:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ),K(λ)} −O(logn)
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A (α) ≥K(P ∣α) −min{K(λ ∣α),K(P ∣α)} −O(logn)
where n is the length of P,A, λ and α.
Proof. K(P ∣O(P,λ)) ≤ K(P ) by Theorem 2.27, and K(P ∣O(P,λ)) cannot exceed K(λ)
i.e. K(P ∣O(P,λ)) ≤ K(λ), as P can be recovered using O(P,λ) and λ by Lemma 5.4, and
Theorem 2.30. Therefore K(P ∣O(P,λ)) ≤ min{K(P ),K(λ)} +O(logn), since Kolmogorov
complexity require the shortest possible program.
The proof to the conditional part, is very similar to the above proof with a minor change, it just
requires adding α to both sides of inequality i.e. having K(P ∣O(P,λ), α).
The previous theorem sets the lower bound on adversary’s advantage. In Lemma 5.4 we provide
an extreme case where the adversary has the security parameter, which is used to fully deobfuscate
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the protected code. Intuitively, the adversary’s advantage, in this case, is the best result that the
adversary can achieve. The next theorem states these intuitions formally, by providing the upper
bound on the adversary capabilities.
Theorem 5.6. For an adversary A:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A ≤K(P ) −O(logn)
where n is the length of P,A and λ.
Proof. To prove this inequality, we follow the same methodology that was used to proof Muchnik’s
Theorem [Muc11], with changes that fit our theory. We constructO(P,λ) = P ⊗λ as an obfuscated
version of P using λ, where ⊗ is an operator used to obfuscate (encode or hide see Section 4.3).
Applying the results of Lemma 5.4, we obtain P = A(O(P,λ)) ⊗ λ, the outcome of attackingO(P,λ) when λ is known to A. Using the conditional description of Theorem 2.30, we can
construct λ′ such that K(λ′ ∣λ) = O(logn), here λ′ is relatively simple compared to K(λ) with
only a logarithmic difference. Now, we have the following derivations, with only a logarithmic
term in each step:
K(P ∣O(P,λ)) =K(λ,O(P,λ) ∣O(P,λ)) +O(logn)
by Theorem 2.30
=K(λ,λ′,O(P,λ) ∣O(P,λ)) +O(logn)
from λ′ and O(P,λ), A can construct P , according to Lemma 5.4
=K(λ,P ∣O(P,λ)) +O(logn)
=K(λ,P,O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ)) +O(logn) by Theorem 2.36
≥K(λ,P ) −K(O(P,λ)) +O(logn)
≥K(λ,P ) −K(P,λ) +O(logn) by Theorem 2.28
By symmetry of information, Theorem 2.36, we have
≥ O(logn).
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Now, it is straightforward to compute the algorithmic mutual information:
Adv
P,O(P,λ)A ≤K(P ) −O(logn).
The above result provides a upper bound on the adversary’s power, which shows that the
adversary’s advantage should not exceed the complexity of the original code. Intuitively, it shows
the maximum knowledge (the clear program) that an adversary hopes to extract from the obfuscated
program.
5.3 Legitimate Adversary
It is customary to first fix an adversary and then select the challenge at random, so that the adversary
cannot be tailored to a specific instance, i.e. the adversary has no information at all about the
messages that are used to construct the challenge. This then leads to a probabilistic analysis of the
success of the adversary.
Kolmogorov Complexity theory is used to analyse individual instances and avoid the analysis of
probabilistic ensembles, and this is the route we follow in our approach. We intend to guarantee
that the adversary holds no information about the plain code, but instead of requiring this to be
picked at random, we simply state that the mutual information between the plain code and the code
of a legitimate adversary must be very low.
Our model of security is focused on individual instances of an obfuscation process, instead of
considering at the same time all possibilities. This makes analysis much easier in a practical setting,
since we can choose a particular case of obfuscated code and analyse its security without having
to consider all other cases. This also shifts the focus of the security definition in the direction of
actual examples of obfuscated code, and away from the obfuscator algorithm per se.
Definition 5.7 (Legitimate Adversary). An adversary A is said to be legitimate if and only if:
IK(P ;A) = O(1).
IK(P ;A) = O(1) excludes the trivial case where a particular adversary already knows the
source code or a good deal of it, and could therefore win without having any ’intelligence’ to undo
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the obfuscation. For a particular obfuscates instance, it is always possible to find a deterministic
algorithm that trivially undoes the obfuscation: for example, an algorithm that simply ‘knows’ the
solution and prints it. Since A can print P even without knowledge of O(P,λ), K(P ∣A) = O(1)
and so I(P ;A) =K(P ) −O(1). This case is excluded by this mutual information requirement.
Another trivial algorithm is one that does not have any particular intelligence for a general
obfuscated program: it just has a hard-coded list of changes that revertO(P,λ) to P , for example,
a list of the steps in obfuscation process detailing the state before and after that step. But then, this
means A already contains in its code parts that are specific to P : some attacker can look into A
and thus reconstruct these parts of P even without knowing O(P,λ). The complexity of these
parts is the information contained in A about P and if P and O(P,λ) are reasonably different, the
complexity of this list will be larger than O(1).
This case is subtly different from one where the obfuscation process is so weak; it is possible
to write a simple reversal algorithm, say, R, that simply undoes each step of O. In this case, A
would use R as a list of steps to turn O(P,λ) into P , much like in the previous case, but with the
difference that these can be applied to any obfuscated instance O(P,λ) of this obfuscator. For
example, containing instructions that convert a particular structure into another, or add or remove
specific letters to a variable name. In this case, A knows R, but this does not have any information
about a specific P , which makes A a legal adversary, giving evidence that O is a bad obfuscator
and instances computed from it are weak.
5.4 The Case of Multiple Obfuscation Transformations
So far we have studied the adversary’s advantage for a single obfuscation transformation. In this
section we investigate the advantage of an adversary attacking an obfuscated program, which
is obfuscated by applying rounds of different obfuscation algorithms in an iterative way. The
following theorem shows the resilience against an attacker.
Theorem 5.8. Given Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) an obfuscation function that is applied recursively n times to P ,
using a set of different obfuscation functions: O⃗ = {Ot1 , . . . ,Otn} and a set of security parameters:
λ⃗ = {λ1, . . . , λn} such that: Ot⃗n(P, λ⃗n) = Ot⃗n−1.t1(P, λ⃗n−1.λ1) = Ot⃗n−1(Ot1(P,λ1), λ⃗n−1), for
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an adversary A with knowledge α:
Adv
P,Ot⃗n(P,λ)A (α) ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1 ∣α), ...,K(λn ∣α)} −O(logn)
where n is the length of P,A(O(P,λ)) and α.
Proof. We use induction to proof this theorem:
• Base case: using Theorem 5.6
K(P ∣Ot1(P,λ1), α) ≤ min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1 ∣α)} +O(logn)
• Inductive case: let
∀i ∈ N.K(P ∣Ot⃗i(P, λ⃗i), α) ≤ min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1 ∣α), ...,K(λi ∣α)} +O(logn)
then we need to prove:
∀i ∈ N.K(P ∣Ot⃗i+1(P, λ⃗i+1), α) ≤ min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1 ∣α), ...,K(λi+1 ∣α)} +O(logn)
K(P ∣Ot⃗i+1(P, λ⃗i+1), α) =K(P ∣Oti+1(Ot⃗i(P, λ⃗i), λi+1), α)
By Theorem 5.6 and inductive case:
≤ min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1 ∣α), ...,K(λi ∣α),K(λi+1 ∣α)} +O(logn)
Then, by Definition 5.2 we compute:
Adv
P,Ot⃗n(P,λ)A (α) ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ∣α),K(λ1∣α), ...,K(λn∣α)} −O(logn)
The previous results demonstrate the effect of different obfuscation techniques with different
security parameters, applied to clear code. The next theorem shows the adversary’s advantage
when the same obfuscation technique, with the same security parameter, is applied iteratively to the
original code.
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Theorem 5.9. Let On(P,λ)) denote an obfuscation function that is applied recursively n times to
P such that : On(P,λ) = O1(On−1(P,λ), λ), where O1(P,λ) = O(P,λ), for an adversary A:
Adv
P,On(P,λ)A ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ),K(λ)} −O(logn)
where n is the length of P , and A.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.8,
Adv
P,On(P,λ)A ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ),
nucurlyleftudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlymidudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymoducurlyright
K(λ) + ... +K(λ)} −O(logn)
Then, by Definition 5.2 : AdvP,On(P,λ)A ≥K(P ) −min{K(P ),K(λ)} −O(logn).
From the above results, we conclude that the resilience of obfuscated code, which is measured
by adversary’s advantage AdvP,On(P,λ), does not improve as the results of multiple obfuscation
using the same security parameters, and the same obfuscation technique. On the other hand, the
resilience of applying different obfuscation techniques with different security parameters depends
on the Kolmogorov complexity of the security parameters used by different obfuscation techniques.
If the security parameters have a high level of independence, i.e. have no shared information with
the original code, then they guarantee a high level of security.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we introduced a new generic model for code obfuscation based on algorithmic
information theory. We provided a new definition for an obfuscation adversary and provide the
security properties that characterise the success conditions for code obfuscation adversary. We
investigated the security of an obfuscated program, using multiple obfuscation transformations,
against an adversary.
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6 A Theoretical Framework to Measure Code
Obfuscation
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce quantitative metrics for software obfuscation. We propose
a mathematical framework to measure the quality of code obfuscation, by providing metrics based
on Kolmogorov complexity, information distance and compression.
6.1 Introduction
Many obfuscation transformation techniques were proposed in the past, which intuitively can make
the program difficult to understand and harder to attack; however, there are no practical security
metrics, justified theoretically and empirically, to measure the effectiveness of these obfuscation
transformation techniques.
Several attempts were made to provide concrete metrics for evaluating obfuscation [CTL97,
AMDS+07], using classical complexity measures. However, most of these metrics are still context
dependent and differ among development platform, and therefore it is very hard to standardise
them. There is a need to evaluate how obfuscating and deobfuscating transformations affect
the understanding of the program, and measure the strength of seemingly resilient obfuscating
transformations against reverse engineering and program analysis attacks. This reason and the fact
that there are currently no provable security metrics to measure the quality of the code obfuscation
leads to the following questions:
1. Can we derive from Algorithmic Information Theory quantitative metrics, with practical
relevance, which can be used to measure the protection level in code obfuscation?
2. How to evaluate the usefulness of these metrics?
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In this chapter we are aiming to answer these questions. First, we propose a novel metric for code
obfuscation that is based on Kolmogorov complexity and compression. Then we apply the Weyuker
validation framework [Wey88] to check whether Kolmogorov complexity is theoretically sound
as software metric. We also show that software-similarity metrics, such as information distance
[LCL+04] that measures the similarity between two blocks of code, can provide a plausible way to
reason about the amount of security of code obfuscation.
In order to evaluate the quality of code obfuscation using similarity metrics, we have to capture
quantitatively the degree of confusion in code transformations, taking into account the attacker’s
capabilities. The aim of using information distance is to quantify the amount of obscured code that
remains or is lost when the program is debofuscated.
Similarity metrics are used to determine the diversity of the generated code; however, it does not
mean anything in terms of security. We have to establish a way to relate the level of confusion in
code obfuscation to the degree of difference in infomation distance between obfuscated code and
its original code.
We adapt the work of Li et al. [LCL+04] on the notion of information distance, and extend their
theoretical work to reason about the quality of code obfuscation by relating information distance to
the security in code obfuscation that was established in the previous chapters.
We formalise the notion of unintelligibility index (degree of confusion introduced) and normalised
Kolmogorov complexity, and show that information distance metric is a suitable measure for code
obfuscation security. In particular, we demonstrate that the information distance between a program
and its obfuscated version tends to be bigger if the level of confusion used is higher.
Chapter layout: In Section 6.2 we provide an overview of algorithmic information distance.
Section 6.3 provides a theoretical metric validation for Kolmogorov complexity based on Weyuker’s
complexity axioms. In Section 6.4, we propose a quantitative model to measure code obfuscation
based on algorithmic information theory, which comprises a set of metrics : unintelligibility index,
normalised Kolmogorov complexity and compression, normalised compression distance, and code
obfuscation stealth.
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6.2 Information Distance
Li et al. [LCL+04] formalised the notion of information distance, a similarity measure, using Kol-
mogorov complexity and compression. They showed that the information distance satisfies metric
axioms [BGM+98] and can be used as a measure of distance; their work was used successfully
in the context of bioinformatics measuring the similarities among mitochondrial DNA genomes,
also in pattern recognition, data mining, phylogeny [CV05], malware clustering and classification
[ABCD15].
The informational distance or similarity distance between two binary strings, x and y, is the
quantity of information sufficient to translate between x and y, generating either string effectively
from the other. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Information Distance [BGM+98]). The information distance DK(x, y) is defined
as the shortest binary program that computes both x from y and y from x, such that
DK(x, y) = max{K(x ∣ y),K(y ∣x)}.
The maximum distance is the shortest program (shortest length of a binary program) that
computes a maximum amount of information to get from x to y and from y to x, i.e. to measure
the absolute quantity of the shared information between x and y.
We can define a conditional version of information distance, which intuitively explains the
situation where the information distance supplied by extra information that contributes to the
translation between two binary strings x and y. This auxiliary information contributes to the
information distance by providing extra to compute x from y, and vice versa.
Definition 6.2 (Conditional Information Distance). The conditional information distanceDK(x, y ∣ z)
is defined as the shortest binary program that computes both x from y and y from x, conditioned to
z, such that
DK(x, y ∣ z) = max{K(x ∣ y, z),K(y ∣x, z)}
The conditional version of information distance computes the information content that goes from
x to y and the information from y to x relative to an auxiliary information z.
The relative quantity of shared information between two binary strings x and y is measured by
the normalised information distance (NID), which was introduced by Li et al. [LCL+04].
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Definition 6.3 (Normalised Information Distance [LCL+04]). The normalised information distance
NIDK is defined as
NIDK(x, y) = max{K(x ∣ y),K(y ∣x)}max{K(x),K(y)} .
Dividing by max{K(x),K(y)} normalises the information distance to take a real value between
0 and 1. In the next definition, we extend the normalised information distance and propose a
conditional version of it.
Definition 6.4 (Conditional Normalised Information Distance). The normalised information dis-
tance conditioned to string z is defined as
NIDK(x, y ∣ z) = max{K(x ∣ y, z),K(y ∣x, z)}max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)} .
The normalised version of information distance was proved to satisfy the metric axioms in
[LCL+04]; however, we need to make sure that the conditional version we introduced above also
satisfies the axiom metrics, see Definition 2.42. We proceed by considering the following Lemma,
which is similar to the directed triangle inequality in [GTV01], but only for the conditional version.
Lemma 6.5. (Conditional triangle inequality) Let x, y, z and u be strings.
K(x ∣ y, z) ≤K(x,u ∣ y, z) ≤K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z)
up to a logarithmic term.
Proof. Let p be a minimal program that produces x given u, z, and q a minimal program that
produces u given y, z. That is, ∣p∣ =K(x ∣u, z) and ∣q∣ =K(u ∣ y, z).
Then, we can produce a program r that takes inputs y, z and computes
⟨x,u⟩ = ⟨p(q(y, z), z), q(y, z)⟩,
using programs p, q. A description of r includes a description of p and q plus some negligible code
to sequence them (a logarithmic term), and so K(x,u ∣ y, z) ≤K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z).
Finally, by basic properties of Kolmogorov complexity, K(x ∣ y, z) ≤K(x,u ∣ y, z).
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Lemma 6.6. For string x, y and z, if K(x ∣ z) ≥K(y ∣ z), then K(x ∣ y, z) ≥K(y ∣x, z), up to an
logarithmic term.
Proof. By Definition 2.37 and symmetry of mutual information (Theorem 2.36), we have, up to a
logarithmic term:
IK(x, y ∣ z) =K(y ∣ z) −K(y ∣x, z) =K(x ∣ z) −K(x ∣ y, z).
Then, K(x ∣ z) −K(y ∣ z) =K(x ∣ y, z) −K(y ∣x, z) ≥ 0, which proves the lemma.
Theorem 6.7. Given three strings x, y and z, the conditional normalised information distance
NIDK(x, y ∣ z) satisfies the metric axioms (Definition 2.42) up to a logarithmic term.
Proof. we need to show that NIDK(x, y ∣ z) satisfies the following distance metric axioms:
(Identity). We have: K(x ∣x, z) = O(1) andK(x ∣ z) ≥ 0, implying NIDK(x,x ∣ z) = O( 1K(x ∣ z)).
(Symmetry). This is obvious by definition of NIDK : NIDK(x, y ∣ z) = NIDK(y, x ∣ z).
(Triangle inequality). By Lemma 6.5,
max{K(x ∣ y, z),K(y ∣x, z)} ≤max{K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z),K(y ∣u, z) +K(u ∣x, z)}
≤max{K(x ∣u, z),K(u ∣x, z)} +max{K(y ∣u, z),K(u ∣ y, z)}
and so
NIDK(x, y ∣ z) ≤max{K(x ∣u, z),K(u ∣x, z)}max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)} + max{K(y ∣u, z),K(u ∣ y, z)}max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)}
We proceed by considering the following two cases for the denominator:
Case 1: K(u ∣ z) ≤ max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)}. This implies:
max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)} ≥ max{K(x ∣ z),K(u ∣ z)} and
max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)} ≥ max{K(y ∣ z),K(u ∣ z)}
then,
NIDK(x, y ∣ z) ≤ max{K(x ∣u, z),K(u ∣x, z)}max{K(x ∣ z),K(u ∣ z)} + max{K(y ∣u, z),K(u ∣ y, z)}max{K(y ∣ z),K(u ∣ z)}
≤ NIDK(x,u ∣ z) +NIDK(u, y ∣ z).
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Case 2: K(u ∣ z) ≥ max{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)}.
Assume without loss of generality that K(x ∣ z) ≥K(y ∣ z). Using Lemma 6.6, we can solve
the max terms and reduce the proof to:
K(x ∣ y, z)
K(x ∣ z) ≤ K(u ∣x, z)K(u ∣ z) + K(u ∣ y, z)K(u ∣ z) (6.1)
Dividing the triangle inequality of Lemma 6.5 by K(x ∣ z), we have:
K(x ∣ y, z)
K(x ∣ z) ≤ K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z)K(x ∣ z)
Let K(u ∣ z) =K(x ∣ z)+δ, and by symmetry of information (see Theorem 2.36): K(u ∣ z)+
K(x ∣u, z) =K(x ∣ z) +K(u ∣x, z), thus K(u ∣x, z) =K(x ∣u, z) + δ.
Again we have two sub-cases:
If K(x ∣u,z)+K(u ∣y,z)K(x ∣ z) ≤ 1, then
K(x ∣ y, z)
K(x ∣ z) ≤ K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z)K(x ∣ z)
≤ K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z) + δ
K(x ∣ z) + δ
= K(u ∣x, z) +K(u ∣ y, z)
K(u ∣ z) .
If on the other hand K(x ∣u,z)+K(u ∣y,z)K(x ∣ z) ≥ 1, then we observe that K(x ∣y,z)K(x ∣ z) ≤ 1 and whatever
the value of δ ≥ 0, we will always have
K(u ∣x, z) +K(u ∣ y, z)
K(u ∣ z) = K(x ∣u, z) +K(u ∣ y, z) + δK(x ∣ z) + δ ≥ 1.
In either case, inequality 6.1 is proven, and so is the theorem.
NIDK is mathematically exact and dimensionless [Arb11], but cannot be calculated effectively,
since the Kolmogorov complexity in general is non-computable [CT06], we can only hope to
calculate an approximation. As was shown in [LCL+04], it is possible to approximate Kolmogorov
complexity using a lossless compressor, and subsequently, approximate information distance using
124
lossless compression. First, we simplify the information distance and compute its conditional
complexity, using the following definitions.
Definition 6.8 (Information Distance[LCL+04]). The information distance DK(x, y) based on
Kolmogorov complexity can be redefined as:
DK(x, y) =K(x, y) −min{K(x),K(y)}
up to an additive logarithmic term O(logK(x, y)).
Similarly, we can redefine the conditional information distance.
Definition 6.9 (Conditional Information Distance). The information distance DK(x, y) condi-
tioned to a string z, based on Kolmogorov complexity, can be redefined as:
DK(x, y ∣ z) =K(x, y ∣ z) −min{K(x ∣ z),K(y ∣ z)}
up to an additive logarithmic term O(logK(x, y ∣ z)).
The above definition can be further simplified as per the following proposition.
Proposition 6.10. For all binary strings x, y and z.
DK(x, y ∣ z) =K(x, y, z) −min{K(xz),K(yz)}
Proof. Using Theorem 2.36 we can write K(x, y ∣ z) = K(x, y, z) −K(z), K(x ∣ z) = K(xz) −
K(z) and K(y ∣ z) =K(yz) −K(z). The conditioned information distance becomes:
DK(x, y ∣ z) =K(x, y, z) −K(z) −min{K(xz) −K(z),K(xz) −K(z)}
=K(x, y, z) −K(z) −min{K(xz),K(xz)} +K(z)
=K(x, y, z) −min{K(xz),K(yz)}
Based on the above and Kolmogorov complexity approximation using real compression mecha-
nisms, NIDK can be expressed as a normalised compression distance (NCD).
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Definition 6.11 (Normalised Compression Distance [LCL+04]). The normalised compression
distance (NCD) of two binary strings x and y is defined by
NCD(x, y) = C(xy) −min(C(x),C(y))
max(C(x),C(y)) .
NCD(x, y) is a nonnegative number belonging to {r ∈ R ∣0 ≤ r ≤ 1} that represents how different
the two binary strings are. Smaller numbers represent more similar binary strings; ifx = y and the
compressor (C) is normal, then:
NCD(x,x) = C(xx) −C(x)
C(x)
= O( log ∣x∣)
C(x) ) by the idempotency property of Definition 2.39
Ð→ 0 as ∣x∣→∞
Therefore, if the binary sequence is large enough and the idempotency property holds up to a
logarithmic term, then the identity property is preserved [CAO05]. Moreover, Cilibrasi et al.
[CV05] shows that using a normal compressor (see Definition 2.39) to approximate the normalised
information distance, NCD is a valid distance measure as it satisfies the metrics axioms.
Similarly, the conditional version of NIDK can be approximated using real compression mecha-
nisms, as a conditional normalised compression distance.
Definition 6.12 ( Conditional Normalised Compression Distance). The normalised compression
distance (NCD) of two binary strings x and y conditioned to z is defined by
NCD(x, y ∣ z) = C(xyz) −min(C(xz),C(yz))
max(C(xz),C(yz)) −C(z) .
The conditional normalised compression trivially satisfies the identity and symmetric axioms, in
a similar way to Theorem 6.7; however, it is not clear whether it satisfies the triangle inequality
axiom, which will be reserved for future work.
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6.3 Theoretical Metric Validation
Obfuscated programs are software in the first place. Measuring obfuscation means that, we are
quantifying some software properties that may reflect the code’s security. Although the security
property is captured ’partially’1 using unintelligibility according to Definition 4.1, Kolmogorov
complexity requires validation to ensure its acceptance, usefulness and soundness as a software
metric. Theoretical validation is considered as a necessary step before empirical validation. Several
properties have been suggested for theoretical validating of software complexity measures such as
Weyuker [Wey88] and Briand et al. [BMB96]. Among the proposed models, Weyuker’s validation
properties, despite the criticisms that were received [TZ92], have been broadly applied to certify
many complexity measures, and are still an important basis and general approach to certify a
complexity measure [BMB96].
Weyuker proposed nine properties or axioms for complexity validation; we will apply these prop-
erties to validate Kolmogorov complexity.2 There are some concepts in Weyuker’s properties that
require some clarification in the context of Kolmogorov complexity such as functional equivalence,
composition of any two programs, permutation of statements order, and renaming.
• Functional equivalence: Two programs P and Q, which belong to a set of binary strings{0,1}+, are said to have the same functionality if they are semantically equivalent i.e. given
identical input, the output of the two programs are the same, i.e. [[P ]] = [[Q]].
• Composition : Although Weyuker did not include any formal relation to identify the composi-
tion of two programs, we consider the composition in the context of Kolmogorov complexity
as the joint Kolmogorov complexity, which can be expressed as the concatenation of two
programs P and Q that belong to a set of binary strings, before applying the complexity
measure. K(P,Q) = K(⟨P,Q⟩) = K(P ∥Q) up to a logarithmic term,3 where ∥ is the
concatenation between programs.
• Permutation: A program P ∈ {0,1}+ can be composed of concatenated sub-binary strings
pi ⊂ P ; for example, it may represent program instructions, such that: P = p1 ∥ ... ∥ pn. The
1There are other related definition for code obfuscation based on algorithmic mutual information (see Definition 4.6).
2Kolmogorov complexity is approximated using compression. The validation can be, also, conducted using lossless
compression instead, which yields approximately the same result.
3The logarithmic term is required in order to account for the computational cost finding the beginning and the end of
each program.
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permutation involves changes in the order or the structure of how these binary sub-strings are
represented in P .4
• Renaming: Renaming refers to syntactic modification of a program’s identifiers, variables
and modules names.
Weyuker’s validation properties are presented in the following.
Definition 6.13 (Weyuker’s Validation Properties [Wey88]). A complexity measure Co ∶ P → R is
a mapping from a program body to a non-negative real number and has the following properties:
1. Not constant: ∃P,Q. Co(P ) ≠ Co(Q). This property ensure the complexity measure is not
constant.
2. Non-coarse: Given a non-negative number c, there are only a finite number of programs
such that Co(P ) = c.
3. Non-uniqueness: ∃P,Q. P ≠ Q ∧ Co(P ) = Co(Q). This property ensures that there are
multiple programs of the same size.
4. Functionality: ∃P,Q. [[P ]] = [[Q]] ∧Co(P ) ≠ Co(Q). It expresses that there are function-
ally equivalent programs with different complexities.
5. Monotonicity: ∀P,Q. Co(P ) ≤ Co(P ∥Q)∧Co(Q) ≤ Co(P ∥Q). This property checks for
monotonic measures. It states that adding to a program increases its complexity.
6. Interaction matters (a): ∃P,Q,R. Co(P ) = Co(Q)∧Co(P ∥R) ≠ Co(Q∥R). This property
explains the interaction of two programs of equal complexity with an auxiliary concatenated
program. It states that a program R may produce different complexity measure when
composed with two programs P and Q of equal complexity.
Interaction matters (b): ∃P,Q,R. Co(P ) = Co(Q)∧ Co(R∥P ) ≠ Co(R∥Q). This property
is similar to the previous except that the identical code (R) is added at the beginning of the
programs P and Q.
7. Permutation is significant: Let pi(P ) be a permutation ofP ’s statements. Then ∃P. Co(P ) ≠
Co(pi(P )). This expresses that changing the order of statements may change the complexity
of the program.
4The permutations in the order of these binary sub-strings, may or may not change the semantics of the program.
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8. Renaming: If P is a renaming ofQ, P = Rename(Q), then Co(P ) = Co(Q). This property
asserts that uniformly renaming variable names should not change a program’s complexity.
9. Interaction may increase complexity: ∃P,Q. Co(P ) +Co(Q) ≤ Co(P ∥Q). This property
states that a merged program of two programs can be more complex than its component
parts.
The Renaming property as suggested by Weyuker is not desirable for code obfuscation. Function-
ally it is true, a renaming of variables does not in any way alter the structure of the code. However,
it is easy to see that it can make human understanding much more difficult. A good programming
practice is to use clear names for variables and methods, that explain accurately what they do
and go a long way towards reducing the necessity of comments in the code. Conversely, long
random names obscure their meaning by which forcing the analyst to follow the program’s logic to
understand their functionality. From a Kolmogorov point of view, meaningful names have a smaller
complexity than long random ones, and thus a program with renamed variables might well have a
different complexity than the original one. We consider this property no further.
Weyuker argued that property 9 helps to account for a situation in which a program’s complexity
increases as more additional components are introduced, due to the potential interaction among
these parts. Briand et al. [BMB96] provided a modified version of this property (a stronger
version) called Disjoint Module Additivity, which establishes a relation between a program and
the complexity of its parts. Given two disjoint modules m1, m2 such that P = m1 ∥m2 and
m1 ∩m2 = ∅ where P is the whole program, then Co(m1) +Co(m2) = Co(P ).
Below we check whether these properties are satisfied by Kolmogorov complexity.
Proposition 6.14 (Not constant). ∃P,Q.K(P ) ≠K(Q).
Proof. By simple counting, there are at most 2n programs with Kolmogorov complexity at most n.
Therefore, there must be programs with Kolmogorov complexity larger than n and so there must be
programs with distinct complexities.
Proposition 6.15 (Non-coarse). Given a non-negative number c, there are only a finite number of
programs such that K(P ) = c, i.e.
∃d ∈ N.∣{P ∈ {0,1}+∣K(P ) = c} ∣ ≤ d.
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Proof. According to Theorem 4.2.4 in [CT06] the number of strings, and so programs as they are
binary strings too, of Kolmogorov complexity that are less than or equal toc, is upper bounded by
2c, i.e. ∣S = {P ∈ {0,1}+ ∣K(P ) ≤ c}∣ ≤ 2c, which means the set S is finite.
Proposition 6.16 (Non-uniqueness). ∃P,Q.P ≠ Q ∧K(P ) =K(Q).
Proof. Construct a set Q of prefix-free code with 2n strings of length up to n, namely, Q composed
only of all the strings of length n. By basic properties of Kolmogorov complexity (Theorem 2.27)
the elements of Q have complexity at most n +O(1) such that ∀q ∈ Q.K(p) ≤ n. Therefore, by
the pigeon-hole principle there must be strings with the same complexity.
Proposition 6.17 (Functionality). ∃P,Q.[[P ]] = [[Q]] ∧K(P ) ≠K(Q).
Proof. In general, one same function can be produced by several different implementations that
might bear little resemblance (e.g. different sorting algorithms, all producing the same result).
Therefore, in general their complexities will be different. For an extreme example, consider a
program P and let Q = P ∥ R, where R is an added program that does not touch on any of
the variables, memory or other resources of P and does not return results. It takes resources
and does work, but ultimately Q just returns what P returns. Then, [[P ]] = [[Q]] and K(Q) =
K(P ) +K(Q ∣P ) ≥ K(P ). And because Q has to be independent from P in order to use other
resources, it must be that K(Q ∣P ) =K(Q) and the inequality is strict.
Proposition 6.18 (Monotonicity). ∀P,Q. K(P ) ≤K(P ∥Q) ∧ K(Q) ≤K(P ∥Q).
Proof. We need to prove that K(P ∥ Q) is greater than K(P ) and K(Q). By Theorem 2.36,
K(P,Q) = K(P ) +K(Q ∥ P ). Up to a logarithmic term (see [LV08] page 663), K(P ∣Q) =
K(P,Q) =K(P )+K(Q ∣P ). By definition, K(Q ∣P ) ≥ 0 and so K(P ) ≤K(P ∥Q). The proof
is similar for K(Q).
Proposition 6.19 (Interaction matters). (a) ∃P,Q,R. K(P ) = K(Q) ∧K(P ∥R) ≠ K(Q ∥R)
and (b) ∃P,Q,R. K(P ) =K(Q) ∧K(R ∥ P ) ≠K(R ∥Q).
Proof. Assume the existence of two binary programsP,Q such thatK(P ) =K(Q) and IK(P ;Q) =
O(1). Let R = P then, we have that up to a small logarithmic factor (see [LV08] page 663) and by
Theorem 2.36: K(P ∥R) = K(P,R) = K(P ) +K(R ∣P ) = K(P ) +O(1). On the other hand,
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K(Q ∥R) =K(Q,R) =K(Q)+K(R ∣Q) =K(P )+K(R) where the last equality follows from
the definition of mutual information (see Definition 2.35). IfR must be different from both P and
Q, then we can repeat the same proof by picking a program R that has high IK(P ;R) but small
IK(Q;R), for example.
Proposition 6.20 (Permutation). Given a permutation pi, ∃P. K(P ) ≠K(pi(P )).
Proof. Fix a program P with n distinct lines, each at mostm bits long. There are n! permutations
of P , and because the lines are all distinct these lead to n! different permuted programs. We
show that there must be a program Q corresponding to some permutation pi, Q = pi(P ), such that
K(Q) >K(P ). By construction, ∣P ∣ ≤mn and so there are at most 2mn strings with complexity
smaller or equal to P . By Stirling’s formula 5, lnn! = n ⋅ lnn − n + O(lnn). Pick n such that
lnn > ln(2) ⋅m + 1, which implies n ⋅ lnn − n > ln(2) ⋅mn so n! > 2mn. Then there are more
permuted programs more complex than P , and at least one permutation leads to a program more
complex than P .
Proposition 6.21 (Disjoint Module Additivity). ∃P,Q.K(P ) +K(Q) =K(P ∥Q).
Proof. K(P,Q) = K(P ) +K(Q ∣P ) by Theorem 2.36. Assume P ∩Q = ∅, then K(Q ∣P ) =
K(Q) since the two programs are fully independent; therefore, K(P,Q) =K(P ∥Q) =K(P ) +
K(Q) up to logarithmic precision.
The above results show that Kolmogorov complexity satisfies all Weyuker’s properties in defi-
nition Definition 6.13, with two weak exceptions that have been addressed above. Therefore, we
conclude Kolmogorov complexity is a suitable complexity measure for software, based on Weyuker
validation framework. The below table provides a comparison, in terms of Weyuker’s validation
properties, between Kolmogorov complexity and the classical complexity metrics.
6.4 Measuring the Quality of Code Obfuscation
Measuring the quality of code obfuscation requires the presence of metrics that can quantify the
complexity of the code. Our model evaluates the robustness of obfuscation using quantitative
security metrics based on Kolmogorov complexity and information distance, which calculates how
5Stirling’s formula is a powerful approximation for factorials.
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Property H.E. LOC V(G) K
1. Not constant
√ √ √ √
2. Non-coarse
√ √ × √
3. Non-uniqueness
√ √ √ √
4. Functionality
√ √ √ √
5. Monotonicity × √ √ √
6. Interaction
√ × × √
7. Permutation × × × √
8. Renaming
√ √ √
9. Disjoint Module Additivity
√ × × √
Table 6.1: Kolmogorov complexity against classical complexity measures: H.E (Halstead Effort),
LOC (Lines of Code) and V(G) (Cyclomatic complexity) using Weyuker’s properties
many changes to the obfuscated program a set of obfuscation transformations make, and the degree
of incomprehensibility or confusion.
6.4.1 Unintelligibility Index for Code Obfuscation Incomprehensibility
In Definition 4.1 we proposed an intuitive definition for code obfuscation based on the notion of
unintelligibility. Unintelligibility can be used as a metric, which measures the degree of obscurity
that is introduced by a given obfuscation transformation comparing to the original code. It aims to
estimate how much more difficult to understand the obfuscated code in comparison to the original
code, and to which extent code obfuscation transforms the complexity of the original code. In the
next definition we provide a metric for code obfuscation obscurity based on c−unintelligibility
property of Definition 4.1 called algorithmic unintelligibility Index.
Definition 6.22. The algorithmic unintelligibility Index piU of an obfuscated codeO(P,λ) is given
by:
piU(O(P,λ), P ) = K(O(P,λ))
K(P ) − 1
It turns out that piU is very similar to the potency metric for code obfuscation by Collberg et
al. [CTL97], which used classical complexity measures to estimated code obfuscation obscurity,
whereas in our case we formalise it in the context of Kolmogorov complexity using lossless
compression. The approximation version of piU is calculated using a lossless compressor C such as
piU(O(P,λ), P ) = C(O(P,λ))
C(P ) − 1
The algorithmic unintelligibility index of unintelligible obfuscated code is always positive as the
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following proposition illustrates.
Proposition 6.23. For any c−unintelligible obfuscated program O(P,λ):
piU(O(P,λ), P ) > 0.
Proof. By the c−unintelligible of Definition 4.1, K(O(P,λ)) ≥ (c+1)K(P ), it is straightforward
to see that piU(O(P,λ), P ) ≥ 0 for K(O(P,λ)) >K(P ).
Although piU is always positive for unintelligible obfuscated programs, an upper bound sets
a limit on piU , which depends on the complexity of the security parameter that is used in the
obfuscation process.
Proposition 6.24. For any c−unintelligible obfuscated program O(P,λ):
piU(O(P,λ), P ) ≤ K(λ ∣P )
K(P ) +O(1)
Proof. By Definition 6.22
piU(O(P,λ), P ) = K(O(P,λ))
K(P ) − 1
Using the non-information increase rule of Theorem 2.28
≤ K(P ) +K(λ ∣P ) +O(1)
K(P ) − 1
≤ K(λ ∣P ) +O(1)
K(P )
≤ K(λ ∣P )
K(P ) +O( 1K(P ))
6.4.2 Normalised Kolmogorov Complexity
Kolmogorov Complexity, approximated by compression, is an absolute measure, which leads to
a difficulty when we want to compare two programs with different sizes. For example, consider
a program P of 1000 bits size that can be compressed to 500 bits6, and another program Q of
106 bits size, which is compressed to 1000 bits. By using the absolute measure of Kolmogorov
6Kolmogorov complexity can be seen as the length of the best compression for a given object.
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complexity, Q is more complex than P . However, P can be compressed to almost half of its
size, where Q can be compressed to 11000 of its size, which clearly indicates that Q has more
regularities than P , and hence that makes P more complex than Q. In order to overcome this
issue, we suggest a normalised version of Kolmogorov Complexity that is relativised by the upper
bound of Kolmogorov complexity i.e. the maximum complexity a certain program can achieve.
Kolmogorov complexity is upper bounded by the length of a program, the subject of measure,
according to Theorem 2.27; this bound can be used as the maximum Kolmogorov complexity.
Furthermore, in most cases of code obfuscation, the source code of the original program is
absent, which makes the process of evaluation by comparing an obfuscated code against the original
code unfeasible. Therefore, normalised Kolmogorov complexity can be useful to demonstrate the
divergence of obfuscated code complexity, in terms of information content (high variability of
string content), from the maximum value of that complexity, without considering the clear original
code as a reference point (see Section 6.4.1 and Section 6.4.3).
Definition 6.25. The normalised Kolmogorov complexity NK of an obfuscated code O(P,λ) is
defined as:
NK(O(P,λ)) = K(O(P,λ))∣O(P,λ)∣ + 2 log(∣O(P,λ)∣)
Where ∣O(P,λ)∣ is the length of O(P,λ).
NK is normalised to take a value between 0 and 1 by dividing the Kolmogorov complexity
of obfuscated code with the upper bound (maximum value that can be achieved by Kolmogorov
complexity) in Theorem 2.27. A high value of NK means that there is a high variability of program
content structure, i.e. high complexity. A low value of NK means high redundancy, i.e. the ratio of
repeating fragments, operators and operands in obfuscated code. As before,NK is estimated using
compression; an approximate version of NK is denoted by NC:
NC(O(P,λ)) = C(O(P,λ))∣O(P,λ)∣ + 2 log(∣O(P,λ)∣)
NC is non-negative number that belongs to {r ∈ R ∣ 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. We assume that if the size of
compressed obfuscated code is equal to the size of obfuscated code itself, then the obfuscated code
is highly random, and is difficult to comprehend by an attacker. This can be justified in light of our
discussion of code regularity in Section 4.2.
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This is particularly true, as argued in [STZDG14], for relatively large programs (binary strings
of large length), since for very small programs the overhead necessary to encode the regularities of
a program could make the result larger than the original. Given that regularities can be encoded by
a relatively small piece of code, the larger the number and size of these regularities the greater the
savings of the compressed form will be.
6.4.3 Information Distance for Code Obfuscation Resilience
The unintelligibility index piU suffers from the same problem we discussed in Example 4.4. A
high unintelligibility index does not always imply secure code obfuscation, it really depends
on how the security parameter is blended with the original code. In this section we introduce
information distance as a potential solution for this problem, and establish a link with our definition
of obfuscation security in Definition 4.6.
The information distance metric can serve as a basis to quantify the level of protection that
is provided by obfuscating programs. Intuitively, the deobfuscated program should be obscure
enough compared to the original program, which gives a general indication of the resilience of
the obfuscation method against an adversary equipped with deobfuscation tools, and the level of
confusion an obfuscated technique added.
What makes information distance an interesting approach to measure software, in general, and
code obfuscation, in particular, is that it has a solid mathematical foundation. In mathematics a
metric is called a measure of distance if it satisfies the metric axioms (see Definition 2.42). Despite
the fact that the information distance is a metric, it does not provide a straightforward intuition for
measuring the security in obfuscated programs. There are many issues that need to be resolved
in order to consider information distance a valid measure for code obfuscation i.e. we need to
establish a logical and theoretical link between our definitions for code obfuscation security and
information distance, and need to specify under which conditions we can use it.
First, we observe that we can use a simplified definition for NIDK when the obfuscated code
adds even a modest amount of complexity.
Lemma 6.26. For an obfuscated codeO(P,λ), satisfying unintelligibility property of Definition 4.2,
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K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) >K(P ∣O(P,λ)) up to an additive constant, and
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) = K(O(P,λ)∣P )
K(O(P,λ))
Proof. By the chain rule of Theorem 2.36 up to a logarithmic term,
K(P ) −K(P ∣O(P,λ)) =K(O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
By c-unintelligibility, K(O(P,λ)) >K(P ), so
K(O(P,λ)) −K(P ∣O(P,λ)) >K(O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
Therefore,
K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) >K(P ∣O(P,λ)) (6.2)
It is straightforward to compute the NIDK
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) = max{K(O(P,λ) ∣P ),K(P ∣O(P,λ))}
K(O(P,λ)) by Definition 6.3
= K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
K(O(P,λ)) by Eq. (6.2)
We proceed by illustrating the relation between secure obfuscated code and normalised informa-
tion distance as a quantitative metric for code obfuscation resilience. We give an upper bound to
this metric, and show that it is closely met by a secure code obfuscation, by providing the following
theorem.
Theorem 6.27. Let O(P,λ) be a c−unintelligible obfuscated program for c > 0. Then, the
normalised information distance between P and O(P,λ) is upper bounded by 1 − IK(P ;O(P,λ))K(O(P,λ)) .
Furthermore, if O(P,λ) is -secure according to Definition 4.6, then the normalised information
distance approaches 1 as  approaches 0.
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Proof. By Lemma 6.26 and Definition 4.1
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) = K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
K(O(P,λ))
= K(O(P,λ)) −K(O(P,λ)) +K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
K(O(P,λ))
By Definition 2.35 = 1 − IK(P ;O(P,λ))
K(O(P,λ))
which proves the upper bound. Now consider the assumptions: IK(P ;O(P,λ)) ≤ K(P ) and
K(O(P,λ)) ≥ (c + 1)K(P ). These lead to
IK(P ;O(P,λ))
K(O(P,λ)) ≤ K(P )K(O(P,λ))
≤ K(O(P,λ))(c + 1)K(O(P,λ))
= 
c + 1Ð→ 0 As Ð→ 0.
Given that  is a small number lesser than 1, NIDK is approximately equal to one, which is the
maximum distance.
So far, we established the relation between our security definition and the normalised information
distance. We showed that if the security conditions for code obfuscations are satisfied (the extreme
case) then the normalised information distance tends to be close to one, which is the maximum
value that can be achieved, which also shows that the obfuscated code is totally different than the
original unobfuscated version.
In the following we are presenting some bounds on the value of normalised information distance
for obfuscated code. We can derive an upper bound based on the complexity of the obfuscation
parameter and its relation to the obfuscated code, as we see in the next theorem.
Theorem 6.28. For an obfuscated c-unintelligible programO(P,λ), where c > 0, the normalised
information distance is upper bounded:
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) ≤ K(λ)
K(O(P,λ)) +O( 1K(O(P,λ)))
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Proof.
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) = K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
K(O(P,λ)) by Lemma 6.26
≤ K(λ ∣P ) +O(1)
K(O(P,λ)) by Lemma 4.11
≤ K(λ) +O(1)
K(O(P,λ)) by Theorem 2.27.
We notice from the above theorem that normalised information distance for an obfuscated
program depends on the amount of information is the security parameter (complexity). If the
security parameter is available to an adversary A, then clearly the normalised information distance
can be the minimum as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 6.29. Let O(P,λ) be an obfuscated program, for an adversary A satisfying the intelligi-
bility property of Definition 5.1, the normalised information distance conditioned on the security
parameter λ is :
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) ∣λ) = O( logn
K(P ∣λ))
where n is the length of P and λ.
Proof.
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)∣λ) = max{K(P ∣O(P,λ), λ),K(O(P,λ) ∣P,λ)}max{K(P ∣λ),K(O(P,λ) ∣λ)} by Definition 6.4
= K(P,O(P,λ) ∣λ) −min{K(P ∣λ),K(O(P,λ) ∣λ)}
max{K(P ∣λ),K(O(P,λ) ∣λ)} by Definition 6.9
= K(P,O(P,λ) ∣λ) −K(O(P,λ) ∣λ)
K(P ∣λ) by Theorem 2.29
= K(P ∣λ) −K(P ∣λ) +K(P,O(P,λ) ∣λ) −K(O(P,λ) ∣λ)
K(P ∣λ)
= K(P ∣λ) − IK(P,O(P,λ) ∣λ)
K(P ∣λ) by Definition 2.35
= K(P ∣λ) −K(P ∣λ) +O(logn)
K(P ∣λ) by Lemma 5.4
= O( logn
K(P ∣λ))
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So far we established an upper bound on the normalised information distance; in the next theorem
we proceed with investigating the existence of a lower bound, which sets a threshold on obfuscated
code security using NIDK .
Theorem 6.30. For an obfuscated programO(P,λ), assume λ is optimal such that: K(O(P,λ) ∣P ) ≥
K(λ ∣P ) − α, for some α ∈ N. Then the normalised information distance has a lower bound:
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) ≥ K(λ ∣P ) − α
K(O(P,λ))
Proof. By Lemma 6.26
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) = K(O(P,λ) ∣P )
K(O(P,λ))
It follows from the assumption of the optimality of λ that
NIDK(P,O(P,λ)) ≥ K(λ∣P ) − α
K(O(P,λ))
The intuition behind the optimality assumption was justified in Lemma 4.11, where we showed
that λ must have the minimum algorithmic information content to go from O(P,λ) to P .
6.4.4 Normalised Information Distance for Individual Security
In Section 4.3 we identified two main types of code obfuscation (Encoding and Hiding) and studied
their security based on individual security level i.e. the security of obfuscated sub-programs. We
further extend these results by studying the effect of NIDK when the obfuscator employs encoding
and hiding techniques to obfuscate.
It is interesting to ask the following question: can we reason about the security of the obfuscated
program as a whole set of subprograms, and its NIDK? In order to check the total security of
each individual obfuscated subprogram in the set Q, we turn to a notion borrowed from classical
information theory called Channel Capacity [CT06], which computes the maximum capacity a
channel can have over all source distributions. Since the channel is the mutual information in
Classical Information Theory and we use algorithmic version of mutual information in our theory,
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we find it is natural and intuitive to require a maximization over all the individual sub-programs
of original code for algorithmic mutual information. That helps to capture the maximum possible
leakage (insecurity) of clear subprogams from the obfuscated ones. The following definitions
capture these intuitions.
Definition 6.31 (Total Hiding). Let Q be a collection of obfuscated subprograms O(pi, κi), where
pi ∈ P and κi ∈ λ, we define the total hiding security of Q as the maximum algorithmic mutual
information among all clear code such that:
InSecH(Q) = maxpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(pi;O(pi, κi))}
Similarly, we can define the total security in case of obfuscation encoding.
Definition 6.32 (Total Encoding). Let Q be a collection of obfuscated subprograms O(pi, κi),
where pi ∈ P and κi ∈ λ, we define the total encoding security of Q such that:
InSecE(Q) = maxκi∈λ,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(κi;O(pi, κi))}
In the above definitions we are looking at the maximum leakage (insecurity) in obfuscated code
with respect to the original code i.e. we are checking the worst-case scenario to reason about all
obfuscated subprograms in a obfuscated set that resembles the whole obfuscated program. The
obfuscated sub-program that leaks the most about the original one, among all other obfuscated
subprograms, is the weakest link in the security chain. The following lemma is a direct result of
applying Theorem 4.15 and Theorem 4.14 on the individual security level.
Lemma 6.33. Let Q be a collection of obfuscated subprogramsO(pi, κi), where pi ∈ P and κi ∈ λ,
then:
InSecH(Q) ≤ maxpi∈Q{δPi} −O(1) and
InSecE(Q) ≤ maxκi∈Q{δκi} −O(1)
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Proof. It can be proved directly by :
InSecH(Q) ≤ maxpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(pi;O(pi, κi))} by Definition 6.31
since pi is hidden in Q but in its original form, and by Theorem 4.15
≤ maxpi∈Q{δPi −O(1)}
≤ maxpi∈Q{δPi} −O(1)
Similarly,
InSecE(Q) ≤ maxκi∈λ,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(κi;O(pi, κi))} by Definition 6.32
the subkey κi is hidden in Q (κi contains the encoding rules), and by Theorem 4.14
≤ maxκi∈Q{δκi −O(1)}
≤ maxκi∈Q{δκi} −O(1)
In Theorem 6.27 we established a relation between algorithmic mutual information for code
obfuscation security and the normalised information distance. Intuitively, this relation states that a
reduction in the algorithmic mutual information produces an increase in the normalised information
distance between a program and its obfuscated version. Now, the question that can be raised here is:
whether can we establish the same relation, as in Theorem 6.27, based on the security of individual
level, i.e. sub-programs? In order to answer this question, we need first to compute the overall
information distance of all distances of clear sub-programs and their obfuscated versions on the
individual security level; secondly, we have to check for the existence of such a relation.
The overall normalised information distance, in case of individual sub-programs, is computed by
finding the minimum value among all distances between clear and obfuscated sub-programs. Using
the same reasoning as in Definition 6.31 and Definition 6.32 of the worst case scenario for overall
obfuscation security, we require the overall distance to be minimum. The smallest distance among
all clear sub-programs and their obfuscated versions indicates the weakest chain in the security of
the whole obfuscated sub-programs.
Definition 6.34 (Total Hiding Distance). The overall distance HNIDK between a set of subpro-
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grams pi ∈ P and their obfuscated versions O(pi, κi) ∈ Q is defined as
HNIDK(Q) = minpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{NIDK(pi,O(pi, κi))}
The above definition addresses the total hiding distance in an obfuscated program consisting of a
collection of sub-programs, where the original code still exists in the obfuscated version but in a
hidden state (see Section 4.3). The next definition is similar, but it tackles the total encoding distance
where the encoding process (security parameter) is hidden, instead of the original sub-program, in
the obfuscated set of sub-programs.
Definition 6.35 (Total Encoding Distance). The overall distance ENIDK between a set obfuscated
subprograms O(pi, κi) ∈ Q and their security parameters κi ∈ λ is defined as
ENIDK(Q) = minκi∈λ,O(pi,κi)∈Q{NIDK(κi,O(pi, κi))}
In the next stage we investigate the relation between overall obfuscation security on the individual
level and the total distance for hiding and encoding obfuscation techniques.
Theorem 6.36 (Maximum Hiding Distance). ConsiderQ a set of obfuscated subprogramsO(pi, κi)
of pi ∈ P using security parameters κi ∈ λ, then:
HNIDK(Q) ≥ 1 − maxpi∈Q{δpi}minO(pi,κi)∈Q{K(O(pi, κi))}
Proof. By Definition 6.35:
HNIDK(Q) = minpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{NIDK(pi,O(pi, κi))}
By Lemma 6.26, and Definition 4.2
= minpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{K(O(pi, κi) ∣pi)K(O(pi, κi)) }
By Definition 2.35
= minpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{1 − IK(pi;O(pi, κi))K(O(pi, κi)) }
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= 1 −maxpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(pi;O(pi, κi))K(O(pi, κi)) }
= 1 − maxpi∈P,O(pi,κi)∈Q{IK(pi;O(pi, κi))}
minpi∈Q,O(pi,κi)∈Q{K(O(pi, κi))}
by Definition 6.32 and Lemma 6.33-hiding
≥ 1 − maxpi∈Q{δpi}
minO(pi,κi)∈Q{K(O(pi, κi))}
Theorem 6.37 (Maximum Encoding Distance). Consider Q a set of obfuscated subprogramsO(pi, κi) of pi ∈ P using random security parameters κi ∈ λ, then:
ENIDK(Q) ≥ 1 − maxκi∈λ{δκi}minκi∈Q{K(κi)}
Proof. By assumption on security parameters randomness, K(O(pi, κi)) ≤ K(κi)7. Then we
follow the same proof steps as with Theorem 6.36.
6.4.5 Stealth of Code obfuscation
A typical software application can be very large, often millions of lines of code. For this reason an
initial step in any attack against software is to attempt to isolate code-segments that are more likely
than others to contain security-sensitive code. This classification can be based on the location of
the code, the order in which it is being executed (code executed early on is more likely to contain
security checks), whether it contains unusual code sequences, etc. It is therefore essential that an
obfuscated code, which is inserted into an application is stealthy, so that it does not arouse any
attention. For example, an algorithm that using a number of xor instructions to obfuscate a program
would likely be obvious, since most real programs contain very few, if any, xors. An obfuscated
code needs to be stealthy in two ways:
1. Intrinsic Stealth: The obfuscated code should be similar to the code that surrounds it.
2. Extrinsic Stealth: The obfuscated code should be similar to the code that occurs in a typical
application.
7The obfuscated programs are not as random as the (secret) security parameters (keys) that are used to obfuscate.
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The first condition makes it difficult for the attacker to select some particular methods in which
there is more chance of occurrence of the obfuscated code. The later condition ensures that the
obfuscated application, in its entirety, is less likely to throw suspicion of a presence of obfuscation.
Both the conditions makes its difficult to carry out manual, as well as automated attacks, in order to
determine the presence and the specific location(s) of the obfuscated code.
Stealth defines how well the obfuscated code fuses with the rest of the program. Stealth of
obfuscated code, intuitively, is related to the attacker’s ability to distinguish the obfuscated code that
is located in a given entity. The stealth of interest here, is self-stealth (intrinsic) of the obfuscated
code to the surrounding code where it is located i.e. how well an obfuscated code is hidden. If an
obfuscation transformation introduces code that stands out from the rest of the program, it may
be difficult for an automatic deobfuscator to spot it, but it can easily spotted by a reverse engineer.
Obvious obfuscation offers reverse engineers a clue to identify which obfuscation technique is
applied to the original code, because each technique has special characteristics. For example,
inserting ’junk’ bytes introduces many invalid instructions observed rarely in a normal binary,
and encrypting the original code introduces many data bytes observed rarely in an executable
binary. This measure is an important factor for code obfuscation security; stealthy obfuscated code
can enhance the protection level so that attackers should put more effort to figure out the used
obfuscation techniques and where the obfuscated parts are located in the code.
It is intuitive and natural to think about some sort of similarity measures to estimate and measure
the stealth in code obfuscation. Checking whether an obfuscated code is stealthy is very similar
to detecting malware. Similarity distance was used extensively to detect malware [LXX+09]
[ABCD15] [CX12] including information distance and its approximation (NCD). Therefore, it
could be possible to use NIDK and NCD to measure the stealth of obfuscated code. However, Zhang
et al demonstrate in [ZHZ+07], that the conventional information distance, and its normalised
version (NIDK) has a problem. It can account for irrelevant information that overwhelm the
similarity result. This irrelevant information is an issue when perform ’partial pattern’ matching
between two objects. Measuring the stealth of obfuscating code is based on finding any matched
code in the surrounding programs with the obfuscated code, without including all the irrelevant
information; therefore, NIDK and NCD cannot be very helpful to detect which part of software is
obfuscated. We highlight this problem by providing the following example:
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Example 6.38. Consider an obfuscated sub-program q in a set of sub-programs Q, which contains
similar sub-programs to q, and also have some other sub-programs that are different to q. We
need to check whether q is stealthy with respect to Q. We expect the similarity distance measure to
answer this question. Intuitively, q is similar to some sub-programs in Q by definition, so we expect
the similarity distance to report that q is stealthy with respect to Q.
For convenience, we compute the similarity version instead, denoted by SNID, by subtracting
NIDK from 1. Given two binary string x, y ∈ {0,1}+:
SNIDk(x, y) = 1 − max{K(x ∣ y),K(y ∣x)}max{K(x),K(y)}
We compute the similarity distance to measure the degree of stealth of q in Q.
SNIDk(q,Q) = 1 − max{K(q ∣Q),K(Q ∣ q)}max{K(q),K(Q)}
Since q ∈ Q then by Theorem 2.36 K(q) ≤K(Q),
and by Lemma 6.26 K(q ∣Q) ≤K(Q ∣ q), then
= 1 − K(Q ∣ q)
K(Q)
= K(Q) −K(Q, q) +K(q)
K(Q) by Theorem 2.36-1
K(q,Q) =K(Q) as q ∈ Q and by Theorem 2.36-1, then we have
= K(q)
K(Q)
The similarity distance, according to our derivations, depends on K(Q); it shows that the result
is far less than 1, as K(Q) is much bigger than K(q) (q is a sub-program belongs to the set Q).
However, this contradicts our assumption that q is an obfuscated program similar to other sub-
programs in Q, which means SNIDk failed to report the right value; it must report a high value
close to 1 (normalised). Furthermore, ifQ contains irrelevant information (other sub-programs that
are different from q), then it makes SNIDk accounts for these information. This could indicate that
q is unstealthy with respect to Q. However, an attacker would not be able to tell if q is obfuscated
or not, because by comparing q to Q s/he might find a similar chunks of code in Q that makes q
looks unsuspicious (stealthy).
We conclude from the above example that the conventional information distance NIDK and its
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approximated version NCD could be inefficient measuring the stealth of obfuscated code, this is
apparently due to the potential existence of irrelevant information in the surrounding code that
could overwhelm the results. In order to go around this problem, we need to only consider the
information that is relevant for our stealth matching i.e. we need to minimise measuring the amount
of information in the surrounding code that is normally ignored by attacker, when s/he performs
partial matching attack.
In [ZHZ+07] the authors introduced and justified an extension to NIDK that solves the problem
of partial pattern matching, It only requires the minimum amount of irrelevant information for
comparison. The new distance is defined and normalised as follows:
Definition 6.39 (Normalised Minimum Information Distance [ZHZ+07]). The normalised mini-
mum information distance is defined as
NIDmin(x, y) = min{K(x ∣ y),K(y ∣x)}min{K(x),K(y)}
In order to minimize the irrelevant information between obfuscated code and the surrounding
code, and to measure the degree of stealthiness, we will rely on NIDmin to obtain such a result. We
can also derive a similarity version of NIDmin by subtracting from 1.
Definition 6.40. The similarity version of normalised minimum information distance is defined as
SNIDmin(x, y) = 1 − min{K(x ∣ y),K(y ∣x)}min{K(x),K(y)}
Using SNIDmin, we can solve the problem we discussed in Example 6.38, using the same
derivation steps:
SNIDmin(x, y) = 1 − min{K(q ∣Q),K(Q ∣ q)}min{K(q),K(Q)}
= 1 − K(q ∣Q)
K(q)
= K(q) −K(Q, q) +K(Q)
K(q)
K(q,Q) =K(Q) as q ∈ Q, then
= K(q)
K(q) = 1.
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NIDmin can be approximated in a similar way to NID using compression, such that:
NCDmin = C(xy) −max(C(x),C(y))min(C(x),C(y)) .
Similarly, we can derive a similarity distance version of NCDmin:
SNCDmin = 1 − C(xy) −max(C(x),C(y))min(C(x),C(y))
= min((C(x),C(y)) −C(xy) +max(C(x),C(y))
min(C(x),C(y))
= C(x) +C(y) −C(xy)
min(C(x),C(y))
We notice that NIDmin minimises the effect of irrelevant information by taking the minimum
difference between the two objects. The main aim of introducing NIDmin is to solve the problem
of irrelevant information between two objects; however, this measure is not a full metric as it does
not satisfy the triangle inequality axiom. Li et al in [ZHZ+07] and Fagin and Stockmeyer in [FS98]
argued using two different examples that in many cases for similarity measure, especially for partial
pattern matching, it is not necessarily must for triangle inequality to hold.
The above reasoning and discussion leads us to provide a new definition for code obfuscation
stealth based on the modified version of information distance. Intuitively, it means that the stealth
of a given obfuscated code (whether intrinsic or extrinsic) requires the similarity between the
obfuscated code and its surrounding code to not go beyond a certain threshold.
Definition 6.41. An obfuscated program q is δ-stealth with respect to a set of programsQ and an
adversary A, if SNIDmin is lower bounded by δ:
SNIDmin(q,Q) ≥ δ
Where 0 < δ ≤ 1.
6.4.6 A Statistical Model for Code Obfusction Metrics
As has been discussed, measuring code obfuscation presents a serious challenge. We argue that
no single metric can provide a powerful enough predictive model to estimate the total protection
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provided by code obfuscation. We are aiming to derive a minimal set of easily calculated metrics
that can produce a single value, which quantifies and measures the quality of code obfuscation. The
proposed metrics are by no means complete to compute the robustness of code obfuscation, and we
do not claim it is the best overall. It presents an important milestone toward building a sufficient
and complete metrics to quantify code obfuscation.
A Regression model [KKM88], which is a statistical method for estimating the relationships
among variables (discussed in Section 7.5 and in more details in Section 8.2.4), can be used to
produce a polynomial equation (linear regression equation) which takes our metrics as independent
variables that contribute to overall code obfuscation robustness, i.e. the proposed metrics are used
as factors (variables) which impact the security of obfuscated software, and then a regression model
is built to calculate the security level.
The security of code obfuscation can be quantified and measured using this list of proposed
measures : normalised information distance, unintelligibility index, normalised Kolmogorov
complexity and distance stealth measure.
Definition 6.42. Given an obfuscated program O(P,λ), the Total Security quantity, SP,O(P,λ)q is
defined as:
SP,O(P,λ)q = (NIDK(P,O(P,λ));piU(P,O(P,λ)); NK(O(P,λ)); SNIDmin(P,O(P,λ)))
NIDK represents the information distance (based on normalised compression distance) (Defi-
nition 6.3), piU is the unintelligibility index measure (Definition 6.22) and NK is the normalised
Kolmogorov complexity (Definition 6.25), where SNIDmin (Definition 6.40) is the distance stealth
measure.
Having the above metrics, we can turn the quadruple values into a linear regression equation
[She07], which can predict the security of code obfuscation:
SP,O(P,λ)z ≜ a0 + a1 ∗NIDK + a2 ∗ piU + a3 ∗NK + a4 ∗ SNIDmin
Where a0 is the regression intercept, and a1, a2 and a3 are the regression coefficient or parameters
(weight of the effect factor). The intercept value can be interpreted as the value of SP,O(P,λ)q when
a1, a2 and a3 are zeros. The regression coefficient a1 can be explained as for every unit changes
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(increase or decrease) in NIDK , we expect a1 change in S
P,O(P,λ)
q , holding all other variables
constant.
This equation provides a way to measure and reason about the security of different obfuscation
techniques. All the independent variables in Sq are based on uncomputable version of Kolmogorov
complexity which can be approximated using lossless compression. The new estimated version of
Sq is denoted by Sˆq and is computed as follow:
SˆP,O(P,λ)q = aˆ0 + aˆ1 ∗NCD + aˆ2 ∗ piU + aˆ3 ∗NC + aˆ4 ∗ SNCDmin
All these parameters are estimated empirically. In the next chapter, we conduct an experiment on
a set of Java bytecode programs using a wide range of code obfuscation techniques, to calculate the
proposed metrics and derive the regression model coefficients.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we proposed a theoretical model for measuring the quality of code obfuscation.
We provided a theoretical evaluation for Kolmogorov complexity based on Weyuker’s validation
properties. We showed that Kolmogorov complexity is a suitable metric for measuring complexity
in binary programs, and code obfuscation in particular. We also adapt the work of Li et al. on
the notion of information distance for measuring similarity between clear code and its obfuscated
version. We extend their theoretical work to reason about the quality of code obfuscation by relating
information distance to the security in code obfuscation. We formalise the notion of unintelligibility
index (degree of confusion introduced) and the relative Kolmogorov complexity, and showed that
information distance metrics is a suitable measure for code obfuscation. We also used a modified
version of information distance to define code obfuscation stealth, and propose a statistic model to
measure the total security of obfuscation based on linear regression model.
149
7 Experimental Design and Tool-sets
In this chapter we present our experimental design and tool-sets that we used in the evaluation
of our metrics. We followed Wohline et al.’s framework [WRH+00] on experimental software
engineering to design and analyse the findings. The aim is to provide detailed and comprehensive
information about the experiment’s design and the tools which are necessary to conduct and
interpret the obtained results. We applied the experiment on a set of obfuscated Java jar files
of the SPECjvm2008 benchmark, using two obfuscators: Sandmark, an open source suite, and
Dasho, a commercial tool. We choose three different decompilers as an attack model, to assess the
level of resilience of obfuscated programs. We present the research problem as a set of research
questions, each question is formulated with a null hypothesis, which will be answered by using a
set of statistical methods.
7.1 Introduction
Recent empirical results [JF14] show that data compression is a promising software metric technique
to estimate human comprehension in software. So far, we have presented a theoretical validation
that complements this result, and we proposed a formal definition that reflects the natural intuition
of code obfuscation’s unintelligibility. We further advanced on the unintelligibility notion to define
the security of code obfuscation based on algorithmic mutual information (see Definition 4.6) with
respect to a specific adversary model (see Definition 5.1). Then, based on the proposed theoretical
foundation, we derived a set of metrics to quantitatively measure the quality of code obfuscation,
including: normalised compression distance, unintelligibility index and normalised compression
measure.
Despite the importance theoretical validation for metrics, in general, and code obfuscation
metrics, in particular, the measure is meant to reflect the empirical characteristic of the software’s
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properties. For example, if an obfuscated code P is more secure than other obfuscated code Q,
then the measure has to reflect this security. Therefore, it is necessary to validate any proposed
measure empirically. The measure is validated by showing that it correlates with some other
corresponding factors or other existing measure. The corresponding factor is chosen based on
the wide, intuitive acceptance or on reasonable assumptions, which makes the validation factor
itself ’valid’ by definition. Although it is always advantageous to use the validation factor directly,
it is normally not feasible to do so or expensive to conduct it. Therefore, the proposed measure
represents an easy and effective way.
To provide the empirical validation we conducted an experiment, using the proposed metrics, on
obfuscated Java jar files of SPECjvm2008 benchmark suite by applying a number of most widely
used obfuscation techniques. Specifically, we investigate the quality of obfuscation techniques
in two obfuscators: Sandmark, an open source suite, and Dasho, a commercial tool. Moreover,
we employed three decompilers as a model of attack to study the resilience of code obfuscation.
The experimental work is spread over two chapters; in this chapter we show how we design the
experiment, and what tool-sets are used. We state the research questions and what methodology
to apply in order to answer these questions. The next chapter is concerned with presenting and
interpreting the experimental results.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.2, we present the scope of
the experiment, which includes the experiments objectives. Section 7.3 provides the experimental
design and set-up, experimental process, and the analysis methodology.
7.2 Scope of the experiment
The experimental design and empirical evaluation was adapted from Wohline et al.’s framework on
experimental software engineering [WRH+00]. The goal of this experiment is to provide empirical
evidence that our metrics are suitable for measuring the quality of code obfuscation.
7.2.1 Objectives
In general, the experiment is concerned with measuring the obfuscation resilience against a set of
deobfuscators (decompilers). The main aim of conducting this experiment is two-fold: the first goal
is to study and validate the usefulness of our proposed model, as an appropriate quantitative measure
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for code obfuscation quality against a certain attack. Secondly, to evaluate the effectiveness of code
obfuscation using the proposed metric, i.e. analyse the effect of code obfuscation on security using
the proposed metrics.
In the next chapter we show the research questions that meet our goals, and we intended to
answer. They are divided into two groups: the first group is concerned with evaluating the proposed
metrics as valid measures for code obfuscation security; the second group of questions investigate
the effectiveness of code obfuscation using the proposed metrics.
Results of this experiment can be interpreted from multiple perspectives as follows:
• a researcher interested in empirical validation for code obfuscation;
• a software developer or project manager who wants to ensure a high resilience of obfuscated
programs to deobfuscation attacks before delivering it to the customers [CCFB14].
We obfuscated 11 real-world applications of the SPECjvm2008 benchmark suite, ranging in
size from medium to large, and containing several real life applications and benchmarks, focusing
on core Java functionality. Each one was written in the Java source language and compiled with
javac to Java byte-code, and the obfuscation took place on this level. In Section 7.3.5 we provide
a comprehensive description of SPECjvm2008 suite, in Section 7.3.5 we provide an overview of
SPECjvm2008’s programs; the full documentation can be found on the benchmark’s webpage
[Spe08].
7.3 Experiment Planning
7.3.1 Tool-sets and Context
There are two kinds of variables in an experiment, independent and dependent variables [WRH+00].
The independent variables (predictor variables) are those variables that we can control and change
in the experiment. We investigate the effect of the changes in the independent variables (proposed
metrics) against the dependent variable (or outcome variable),1 which is the security factor for
obfuscated code (see Section 7.3.4). That is we aim to check if the independent variables reflect the
level of security in obfuscated code using the dependent variable.
1 Often there is only one dependent variable in an experiment.
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7.3.2 Independent Variables Metrics
The set of independent variables, in this experiment, are based on selecting the following metrics
for evaluation purposes.
Algorithmic Complexity Measures
We use four algorithmic complexity measures, which are proposed in Chapter 6:
Compression. Using compression we can approximate Kolmogorov complexity and then calcu-
late the length of the compressed code using a normal compressor, see Section 2.9.
Normalised information distance. This metric is introduced in Definition 6.11. It measures the
level of confusion (level of dissimilarity) in the obfuscated code. It is a normalised measure
that takes a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a complete similarity, meaning the
obfuscation has not added any confusion to the clear code, and 1 means that the obfuscated
code is totally dissimilar to the original code.
Unintelligibility Index. We present this measure in Definition 6.22. It aims to estimate how
much more difficult to understand the obfuscated code in comparison to the original code,
and to which extent code obfuscation transforms the complexity of the original code.
Normalised compression. This measure is proposed in Definition 6.25. It is an approximation of
Kolmogorov complexity using compression, then normalised by dividing it with the upper
bound of Kolmogorov complexity (size of the code); it is a non-negative number ranging
from 0 to 1 and expresses the compressibility ratio of a certain code (in our case, a binary
string).
Classical Complexity Measures
The purpose of including classical complexity measures are of two-fold. First, we need to compare
our proposed measure to the most widely used complexity in code obfuscation. Secondly, we need
to validate them to check if they are good candidates for measuring code obfuscation. All the
classical complexity measures are computed using Testwell CMTJava, a commercial tool for Java
code quality assurance [CMT15]. We will now provide an overview of the most commonly used
classical complexity measures in code obfuscation.
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MacCabe Cyclomatic complexity. McCabe Cyclomatic complexity [McC76] is a classical
complexity measure, based on Control Flow Graphs (CFG). It measures the number of
linearly-independent paths in the CFG of a program. McCabe’s measure is an example of
control flow metrics. The McCabe Cyclomatic complexity is computed as follows:
V(G) = e − n + 2 ⋅ p
where V(G) denotes the McCabe Cyclomatic complexity, e the number of edges in a graph,
n the number of nodes in the graph, and p the number of connected components in the graph.
Halstead complexity measures. These metrics were proposed by Halstead [Hal77] to measure
software complexity attributes based on what it called software science. Halstead’s metrics
are based on some program statistics that considers the source-code a sequence of tokens, and
classifying them either as an operator or an operand token. These tokens are then counted
and categorised as follows
• η1 the number of unique operators.
• η2 the number of unique operands.
• N1 the total number of operators.
• N2 the total number of operands.
• η1 + η2 the vocabulary of the program.
All Halstead’s measures are derived from these four quantities with certain fixed formulas as
described below.
Halstead Volume (V). A metric that describes the size of the programs implementation. It
measures the information content of the program in bits;2 it is calculated as the program
length times the logarithm (base 2) of the program’s vocabulary, such that:
V = (N1 +N2) ⋅ log2(η1 + η2)
Halstead Difficulty (D). This metric describes the difficulty level of the program; it is
2The number of bits that are required to store a program of length N , provided that the operands and operators are
encoded as binary strings of a uniform length.
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proportional to the number of unique operators in the program.
D = η1
2
⋅ N2
η2
Halstead Effort (E). This metric describes the effort to implement or understand the
program, it is proportional to the volume and the difficulty level of the program.
E = V ⋅D
Maintenance Index (MI). [CALO94] This is a composite metric that incorporates a number of
traditional source-code metrics into a single number, formed by a linear regression equation
(see Section 6.4.6 and Section 8.2.4), which indicates relative maintainability. MI comprises
of weighted Halstead metrics (effort or volume), McCabes Cyclomatic Complexity, and the
number of lines of code (LOC).
MI = 171 − 3.42 ⋅ ln(E) − 0.23 ⋅ V(G) − 16.2 ⋅ ln(LOC)
7.3.3 Potency
We use the Potency (PtE) measure that is presented in Section 3.8; it measures how complex the
obfuscated code in comparison to the original code, using classical complexity measures. We use
this measure to study the effect of obfuscation using the above classical complexity before and after
obfuscation. This measure is very similar to the unintelligibility measure (see Section 6.4.1).
7.3.4 Experimental Assumptions and Choice of Dependent Variable
As discussed in Chapter 5, the evaluation criteria for successful deobfuscation attacks are whether
it is possible to produce the original code from the obfuscated version. The result of deobfuscation
process has to satisfy, in addition to the functionality, proximity, and the amount of information
needed by the deobfuscator, a set of properties that the original program satisfies. Determining
these properties brings a challenge to the experiment. We assume that the main property which the
attackers are interested in, and the defender is trying to secure, is the original code itself. Therefore,
our success criteria for deobfuscation is to obtain the original code from the obfuscated one. In this
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case, we can state that the deobfuscation is a successful attack. However, this is an extreme case
and might sound unrealistic because the adversary may be satisfied with only partial information
about the original code. To account for such conditions, we compute the percentage of successfully
retrieving of any part of the original program from its obfuscated version. We can also assume that
the attacker is hoping to construct a source-code, which is very similar to the original one, but not
necessarily the same.
Normally determining whether obfuscated code is successfully deobfuscated (in our case de-
compiled), requires a human subject to check. However, involving human subjects brings a lot
of challenges in terms of time and cost. To alleviate these challenges, we turn into an alternative
method. Ultimately, as we discussed in Chapter 4, the aim of obfuscation is to protect the clear
code by obscuring its implementation, we argued this point in Chapter 5, so an attacker should
not easily retrieve that code. We made an assumption, here, we take advantage of the presence of
unobfuscated source-code in our hands: we assume that the unobfuscated code is fairly easy to
attack (reverse) comparing to the obfuscated code. Therefore, the decompiled code (deobfuscated)
that is close to (or matches) the unobfuscated code, will provide an indication of the effectiveness
of the decompilers at producing an easily understandable code. Hence, we use this assumption to
obtain the dependent variable: the percentage of code obfuscation resilience to decompilation.
Dependent Variable
Now the question is how to establish a method to compare the decompiled code with the original
clear code without involving human subjects, i.e. aiming to reduce the effect of human subjects in
obfuscation process, we hold constant the individuals that perform deobfuscation; so to determine
the level of the attack result, we compare the decompiled obfuscated source-code to the original
clear source-code using a plagiarism detection tool. The role of the plagiarism detection tool,
here, is to measure the percentage of retrieved unobfuscated clear code in the decompiled code
(deobfuscated code). For convenience, we report the percentage of dissimilarity of decompiled code
(deobfuscated) to the original one. We use a plagiarism detection and file comparison tool (diff)
called Sherlock [she15] which is used as a part of BOSS online submission system at Warwick
university. It aids in estimating the percentage of inferred clear code from the obfuscated decompiled
jar file. The dependent variable that we want to validate against is the percentage of retrieved code
after conducting a decompilation attack. We discuss the choice of threat model in Section 7.3.7.
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7.3.5 Context: Benchmark
We used SPECjvm2008 (Java Virtual Machine Benchmark) programs as a subject of our experiment
and to evaluate the proposed metrics. We applied 11 real-world applications of the benchmark
suite, containing several real life applications and benchmarks focusing on core Java functionality.3
Each one was written in Java source language and compiled with javac to Java byte-code; the
obfuscation took place on this level. The following is a brief description of each program in the
benchmark as provided by the SPECjvm2008 documentation webpage.
Check. A program that checks JVM and Java features and tests if the Java platform is suitable to
run the benchmarks.
Compiler. This is a Java decompiler that uses the OpenJDK (JDK 7 alpha) front-end compiler
to compile .java files. The code compiled is javac itself and the sunflow sub-benchmark
from SPECjvm2008.
Compress. Compresses data, using a modified Lempel-Ziv method (LZW). It basically finds
common substrings and replaces them with a variable size code. This is deterministic, and
can be done on the fly.
Crypto. It provides three different ciphers (AES, RSA, and signverify) to encrypt data:
• aes. Encrypt and decrypt using the AES and DES protocols, using CBC/PKCS5Padding
and CBC/NoPadding.
• rsa. Encrypt and decrypt using the RSA protocol.
• signverify. Sign and verify using MD5withRSA, SHA1withRSA, SHA1withDSA
and SHA256withRSA protocols.
Derby. An open-source database written in pure Java. The focus of this benchmark is on
BigDecimal computations (based on the telco benchmark) and database logic, especially on
locks behaviour.
MPEGaudio. MPEG-3 audio stream decoder, from Fraunhofer Institut fuer Integrierte Schal-
tungen. Its mp3 library leverage JLayer, an LGPL mp3 library, with heavy floating-point
calculations and a good test of mp3 decoding.
3http://www.spec.org/jvm2008/
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Scimark. This benchmark was developed by NIST and is widely used by the industry as a floating
point benchmark. It consists of five subtest (fft, lu, monte-carlo, sor, sparse).
Serial. This benchmark serializes and deserializes primitives and objects, using data from the
JBoss benchmark. The benchmark has a producer-consumer scenario where serialized
objects are sent via sockets and deserialized by a consumer on the same system.
Startup. This benchmark starts each benchmark for one operation. A new JVM is launched and
time is measured from start to end. The start-up benchmark is single-threaded. This allows
multi-threaded JVM optimizations at start-up time.
Sunflow. Tests graphics visualization using an open source, internally multi-threaded global
illumination rendering system. The sunflow library is threaded internally, i.e. it is possible to
run several bundles of dependent threads to render an image.
XML. This benchmark has two sub-benchmarks: XML.transform and XML.validation. XML.
transform exercises the JRE’s implementation of javax.xml.transform (and associated
APIs) by applying style sheets (.xsl files) to XML documents. XML.validation exercises the
JRE’s implementation of javax.xml.validation (and associated APIs) by validating XML
instance documents against XML schemata (.xsd files).
7.3.6 Obfuscators
Two obfuscators were used: one commercial DashO [das15] evaluation copy and a free source
version of SandMark [san15]. The original benchmarks jar files were obfuscated by using 44
different obfuscation techniques of the DashO and Sandmark obfuscators.
Sandmark. A state-of-the-art code obfuscation suite developed at the University of Arizona. It
has an advantage over other available open-source obfuscation suites for Java byte-code; despite
being around for a long time, it has a high level of flexibility, customisation with a large number of
obfuscation techniques. Besides obfuscation, it provides a list of watermarking algorithms, a set of
static code analyzers, performance evaluation, a set of software engineering metrics and other static
code statistics.
All the obfuscation techniques in Sandmark are clustered into three groups: application, class,
and method obfuscation levels. Application level obfuscation techniques apply obfuscation over
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all the program’s components, where method and class obfuscations allow users to specify which
method or class to choose for obfuscation i.e. it provides a fine-grained flexibility over application
level obfuscation. This way Sandmark can deliver obfuscation for only essential parts of targeted
programs, which helps to improve the performance of obfuscated program, as obfuscation, in most
cases, penalises the performance. The complete list of Sandmark obfuscations and their description
is provided in Table 7.3, 7.2 and 7.4 .
Dasho. The second obfuscation tool, Dasho, is a closed-source commercial obfuscator tool devel-
oped by PreEmptive Solutions. It provides obfuscation for DotNet, Java and Android applications
including tamper notification and detection techniques. It uses obfuscation algorithms based on
control flow obfuscation, patented overload induction methods for renaming and code encryption;
in addition to exception handling obfuscations, optimisation and compacting techniques. Dasho has
an advantage among commercial and open-source obfuscators; it indirectly applies optimisation
techniques, which reduces the size of the code, making the obfuscated code smaller and faster to
run. The complete list of Dasho obfuscations and their description is provided in Table 7.1.
Technique Type Abbr Description
ControlFlow Control-Flow DH-C-CF This process synthesizes branch-
ing, conditional, and iterative con-
structs that produce valid forward
(executable) logic, but yield non-
deterministic semantic results and
produces spaghetti logic when de-
compilation is attempted.
Optimisation Data DH-D-OP Performs algebraic identity,
strength reduction, Constant
folding and other peephole
optimizations.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Synthetic Data DH-D-SY This is an obfuscation technique
that marks methods and fields as
a special ’synthetic’, generated by
the Java compiler that links a local
inner class to a block’s local vari-
able or reference type parameter. It
helps confusing some decompilers.
Rename FlattenHierarchy OverIn-
duction
Control-Flow DH-C-RFO A patented algorithm devised by
PreEmptive Solutions. Overload
Induction will rename as many
methods as possible to the same
name, in addition to flattening the
structure of package hierarchy by
putting all the renamed classes into
the default package.
Rename FlattenHierarchy Simple Layout DH-L-RFS Assigns a random name to each
identifier in the program, where all
the renamed classes are put into the
default package
Rename OverInduction Maintain-
hierarchy
Layout DH-L-ROM Similar to Rename FlattenHierar-
chy OverInduction; however, the
package naming hierarchy is re-
tained.
TryCatch10 Control-Flow DH-C-TC Try/Catch handlers are added to
methods to further confuse de-
compilers, on a scale of 1-10.
Table 7.1: Dasho obfuscation techniques.
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Constant Pool Reordering Layout SM-L-CPR Reorders the constants in the constant-
pool and assigns random indices to
them. The constants are randomly as-
signed some unique index within the
length of constantpool.
Objectify Layout SM-L-OB Replaces all the fields in a class with
fields of the same name with a type
Object.
Rename Register Layout SM-L-RR Renames local variables to random
identifiers.
Table 7.2: Sandmark Layout obfuscation techniques
Technique Type Abbr Description
Array Folding Data SM-D-AF Folds one-dimensional array into a
multi-dimensional array.
Block Marker Data SM-D-BM Used to hide a watermark and diver-
sify the byte-code, by randomly mark-
ing all basic byte-code blocks in the
program with either 0 or 1.
Bludgeon Signatures Data SM-D-BS Confusing the signatures of methods,
by making all of the static method sig-
natures the same, and convert all the
parameters to the type object.
False Refactor Data SM-D-FR It can be applied on two classes that
have no common behaviour. If both
classes have instance variables of the
same type, these can be moved into
a new parent class, whose methods
can be buggy versions of some of the
methods from the original classes.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Field Assignment Data SM-D-FA Inserting a bogus field into a class and
then making assignments to that field
in specific locations throughout the
code.
Integer Array Splitter Data SM-D-AS Splits a single array of integers into
two arrays and modifies all the ar-
ray initialization, read, write, and ar-
raylength references consistently of
the two arrays.
Merge Local Integers Data SM-D-MLI Combines two int variables into a
single long variable.
Overload Names Data SM-D-ON Change methods names to similar
names. Method overriding relation-
ships remain intact, whereas existing
overloaded methods may be destroyed,
and the new ones created.
Param Alias Data SM-D-PA Tries to find a (non-initializer, non-
abstract, non-native) method in a
class that takes some object type as
a parameter. It then aliases that
parameter within the method using
Thread Local Storage (the Thread-
Local class). Every load of the pa-
rameter is replaced with ThreadLo-
cal.get(), and every store is replaced
with ThreadLocal.set (Object).
Promote Primitive Register Data SM-D-PPR Replaces all the local int vari-
ables in a function with local
java.lang.Integer.
Promote Primitive Types Data SM-D-PPT Changes all primitives in every
method into instances of the respec-
tive wrapper classes.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Publicise Fields Data SM-D-PF Makes the fields of a class public.
Reorder Parameters Data SM-D-RP An obfuscator that shuffles the argu-
ment orders for all methods.
Static Method Bodies Data SM-D-SMB Static Method Bodies splits all of the
nonstatic methods into a static helper
method and a nonstatic stub that calls
it.
String Encoder Data SM-D-SE It obfuscates the literal strings of a
program. Each string is ’encrypted’
and any string reference is replaced by
a call to a method that ’decrypts’ it.
Variable Reassigner Data SM-D-VR Reallocates the local variables in a
method, in order to try to minimize the
number of local variable slots used.
Duplicate Register Layout SM-D-DR This algorithm creates an additional
variable that has its value changed
in coordination with an original local
variable. Each reference to that vari-
able value may have been changed to
reference the new variable instead.
Table 7.3: Sandmark Data obfuscation techniques
Technique Type Abbr Description
Branch Inverter Control-Flow SM-C-BI Exchanges the if and the else
part of an if-else statement. It
also negates the if instruction, for
example IFGE JVM instruction is
followed by IFLT another JVM in-
struction which negates the effect
of if, so that the semantics is pre-
served.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Buggy Code Control-Flow SM-C-BC Selects a random method from
the class file, and a random basic
block in the method: a copy of
the basic block is made and some
additional bug codes are also in-
troduced in this new basic block
which changes the local variable
values.
Class Splitter Control-Flow SM-C-CS Adds several spurious classes
by splitting the original, non-
obfuscated code, into several ob-
fuscated ones.
Duplicate Register Control-Flow SM-D-DR This algorithm creates an addi-
tional variable that has its value
changed in coordination with an
original local variable. Each ref-
erence to that variable value will
be changed to reference the new
variable instead.
Dynamic Inliner Control-Flow SM-C-DI Dynamically inlines (replacing
method invocations) method
bodies at the runtime using
instanceof.
Inliner Control-Flow SM-C-IN Inlines static method bodies by re-
placing method invocations.
Irreducibility Control-Flow SM-C-IR Adds conditional branches to a
method via opaque predicates so
that the control flow graph of the
resulting method is irreducible.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Method Merger Control-Flow SM-C-MM Merges all of the public static meth-
ods that have the same signature
in each class into one large master
method.
Opaque Branch Insertion Control-Flow SM-C-OBI Randomly inserts branches into a
method using a library of opaque
predicates.
Random Dead Code Control-Flow SM-C-RDC Adds bogus statements onto the
end of a java method. The ap-
pended code may include a vari-
ety of other instructions including
return instructions. Methods not
ending in a return statements will
impede reverse engineering tools.
Simple Opaque Predicate Control-Flow SM-C-SOP Implements simple boolean
opaque predicate (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2) and adds them to the
user’s code. The aim is to embed
opaquely true constructs which
should be stealthy.
Split Classes Control-Flow SM-L-SC This is a Node Splitting obfusca-
tion algorithm which obfuscates a
class file by splitting a node into
two. Some of the fields from the
class are moved into a newly cre-
ated class and all references to
those fields in the given class are
modified to reflect the changes.
Continued on next page
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Technique Type Abbr Description
Transparent Branch Insertion Control-Flow SM-C-TBI Randomly inserts branches into a
method. The branch will test to see
if an Object field of the class is null,
and if so it will branch.
Table 7.4: Sandmark Control-Flow obfuscation techniques
P Q Obfuscation
Q'P'
DecompilationDecompilation
Metrics
ByteCode
SourceCode
Compression-Based Measures
Classical Complexity Measures
Matching
(JAD,JD,Jode)(JAD,JD,Jode)
Figure 7.1: Schematic overview of how we applied decompilation and the metrics in the experiment.
7.3.7 Decompilation as Threat Model
In this experiment we evaluate the resilience of obfuscation algorithms by using the static analysis
techniques leveraged in decompilers. The purpose of decompilation, in this experiment, is to
produce code that is easy to comprehend i.e. to be able to understand the program. The strict
syntactic correctness is not fully required, as partially decompiled code may be sufficient for
understanding. We do not expected decompilers to produce a perfect code or a source-code exactly
similar to the original code. Dagenais and Hendren in [DH08] demonstrated the possibility of
constructing Java code from partially correct decompiled Java code.
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Java decompilation process. Decompilation can be used as a reverse-engineering tool in Java
byte-code, which consists of low-level stack-based byte-code instructions; the decompiler trans-
forms these low level instructions to high-level Java source-code. Generally the task of decompiling
Java byte-code is relatively simpler than other binary code decompilers, as Java byte-code contains
extensive meta-data, such as method names and their signature, class names and types, which
makes the task of decompilation much easier. More specifically, the Java decompilation process
involves the following analysis phases:
• Local variable typing inference. Java byte-code generally preserves the type information
for fields, method returns and parameters, however it does not have type information for local
variables.
• Merging stack-based instructions into expressions and variables. Stack variables in Java
byte-code, are mostly due to the optimisation process; they are kept on the stack to enhance
byte-code performance. It requires identifying such variables by decompilers in order to
translate them to local variables and expressions.
• Arbitrary control flow construction analysis. This is the process of reconstructing the
unstructured and arbitrary control flow of byte-code into readable high level source-code.
• Exceptions and synchronisation handling. This recovers all the exception handlers and
synchronized() statements from the Java byte-code instruction and the meta-data.
We evaluate our proposed metrics using three Java decompilers, JD [JD15], JAD [JAD15] and Jode
[Jod15], to investigate the resilience, and assess to which extend the applied obfuscation techniques
can resist decompilation attacks. Our choice was based on a study by Hamilton and Danicic [HD09],
who investigated the effectiveness of Java decompilers using an empirical evaluation on a group of
currently available Java byte-code decompilers. We selected, based on that experiment, three Java
decompilers that score the best among all decompilers in terms of effectiveness and correctness,
JD, JAD and Jode.
JD. (Java Decompiler) A freeware Java decompiler, provided as a GUI tool and command-
line version, as well as in the form of plug-ins for the Eclipse (JD-Eclipse) and IntelliJ IDEA
(JD-IntelliJ). It targets Java 5 byte-code and later versions.
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JAD. A freeware and a popular decompiler for non-commercial use, with no source-code avail-
able, and is no longer maintained. It is written in C++, and is relatively fast compared to other
Java decompliers. Jad is used as the back-end by many decompiler GUIs including an Eclipse IDE
plug-in (JadClipse).
Jode. (Java optimise and decompile environment) is an open source decompiler and obfusca-
tor/optimiser. Jode has a verifier, in a similar way to the Java runtime verifier, which tries to find
type data from byte-code class files. Jode is able to correctly infer types of local variables, and is
able to transform code into a more readable format, closer to the way Java code is naturally written.
7.3.8 Choice of Compressor
Most of the available compressors are ’Normal’ according to [CV05] (see Section 2.9), and
subsequently any of them can be used to approximate the proposed metrics. However, we had to
make the choice amongst the most effective and accurate ones. Better compression which has a
high compression rate4 is an important factor to have an effective approximation for Kolmogorov
complexity, but this statement is not always true for NCD [CV05]. In a study by Cebria´n et el.
[CAO05], using three different compressors bzip2, gzip, and PPMZ, NCD did not satisfy the
idempotent property (see Definition 2.39) in some cases, it shows that the compression skewed
according to the size of measured file. However, PPMZ showed more resilience comparing to the
rest of compressors with an average error of 0.1043%. A most recent study by Alshahwan et al.
[ABCD15], in the context of malware detection using NCD, a comparison was made among three
compressor winzip, gzip, and 7zip (PPMZ) using the same testing technique as in [CAO05]. 7zip
performed better than the other compressors. It scores an idempotent result close to zero in most
files size, with a window size of a maximum 4GB. Based on these two studies we decided to use
PPMZ for the experiment, which is implemented as a python library.
7.4 Experimental Process
For each version of a jar file obfuscated under a certain obfuscation technique, NCD, NC, and piU
were calculated. All the obfuscated programs are subjected to an automatic decompilation process.
4Data compression rate is a ratio that is calculated by dividing the uncompressed size of a (binary) program or file by
its compression size.
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Additionally, we applied the decompilation process to the clear original programs, which helps in
assessing the difference between the original source-code and obfuscated source-code decompiled
using the same decompiler. The difference was calculated by computing the percentage of original
code extracted from the deobfuscated one using Sherlock (see Section 7.3.4). The code matching
(using Sherlock) was calculated between the decompiled jar file and the original file, to estimate
the percentage of the retrieved code from the decompiled jar file.
We build a python tool to compute the proposed metrics (NCD, piU ,NC,C). We automate the
whole testing process, using a python script to glue the command line versions of Sandmark, Dasho
obfuscation, decompilation, classical complexity measures and the tool that compute the proposed
metrics. The results were saved in a repository (.mat), and all data analysis and statistical testing
were conducted in Matlab [Mat15]. All of the above components are integrated into our prototype,
Fig. 7.2 shows an overview of the tool-sets and the experimental procedure.
SPECjvm2008 
Bechmark
DashO
SandMark
Prototype 
measuring 
Engine
JD, JAD, Jode
Decompilers
P' :Obfuscated
P' :Obfuscated
Deobfuscation 
Attack
Evaluation & 
Analysis
Results
Figure 7.2: High level overview of the experimental procedure
7.5 Analysis Methodology
We apply statistical methods to verify and analyse our results. Descriptive statistics are applied in
order to present the numerical processing of a data set, and to graphically present important aspects
of the experiment data set (the collected numerical data results) and how it is distributed.
We use three types of descriptive statistics: measures of central tendency, dependency, and
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graphical visualization. In measures of central tendency we use the mean which indicates the
middle of a data set. This midpoint is normally called the average and is interpreted as an estimation
of the expectation of the stochastic variable from which the data sets are sampled [She07]. The
mean of a given sample of data points x1...xn, is denoted by x˜:
x˜ = 1
n
n∑
i=1xi
To measure the dependency between variables we used two types of statistical measurements:
correlation and regression analysis. Correlation is a number that quantifies how much two data sets
vary. We use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient to express this relation.
Spearman rank correlation ρ [She07]. This is a ranked version of Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient and belongs to non-parametric statistics, denoted by ρ. Non-parametric statistics do not
make any assumptions about the data distribution from which the sample was drawn [She07].
The Spearman rank correlation is used as an effect size, and estimates the magnitude of effect or
association between two or more variables [SL93] when paired quantitative data are available; it
helps to relate dependent variables (Decompilers efficiency) to independent variables (NCD and
NC). Given two sets of data samples, x1...xn and y1...yn.
ρ = ∑ni=1(xi − x˜)(yi − y˜)√∑ni=1(xi − x˜)2(yi − y˜)2
Spearman’s ρ can vary in magnitude from -1 to 1, with -1 indicating a perfect negative linear
relation, 1 indicating a perfect positive linear relation, and 0 indicating no linear relation between
two variables.
To further assess the relationship among the different variables (decompilation metrics), a
regression model was investigated as another method to check for dependency.
Regression analysis. This is a statistical technique for studying the relationships between the
independent and dependent variables (see Section 7.3.4 and Section 7.3.2). It provides a method
to predict changes of dependent variable(s) by looking at independent variable(s). The outcome
of regression analysis is normally a regression equation (see also Section 6.4.6). The main
difference between a regression analysis and a correlation coefficient is that regression looks for
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prediction, whereas the correlation coefficient only compares the level of dependency of two
variables. However, they are strongly related as higher correlation among variables indicates more
accurate and precise prediction of the dependent variable from independent variables. The linear
regression method is used to construct the regression equations. The coefficient of Determination
(R2) [She07] value is used as a guideline to measure the accuracy of the data model, i.e. how well
data points fit a statistical model.
Hypothesis testing. A statistical hypothesis test is a form of statistical inference, which allows
one to investigate evidence that supports some claims based on data taken from controlled ex-
periment or an observational study [She07]. The methods of inference used to support or reject
claims based on sample data are known as Tests of significance. Tests of significance are conducted
by applying what is called the null hypothesis, which represents a theory or a general statement
that has been put forward, either that there is no relationship between two measured variables, or
it is to be used as a basis for argument, but has not been proved. The null hypothesis describes
some properties of the distribution from which the sample is drawn; the aim is to reject that these
properties are true with a given statistical significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis should be
formulated negatively. An alternative hypothesis is the hypothesis that is chosen when the null
hypothesis is rejected. The aim of hypothesis testing is to investigate if it is possible to reject a
certain null hypothesis H0.
For hypotheses validation, we applied p-values drawn from Spearman rank correlation ρ, and
Mann-Whitney test [WRH+00], which is a non-parametric alternative to the t-test [WRH+00], as we
do not make any assumption about the normality of distributions in the test samples. The p-value is
used to measure the probability of the statistical significance of evidence under test i.e. representing
the probability that obtained test results are due to a Type I error :
Pr(type I error) = Pr(Reject H0 ∣H0 true)
This can be explained as the probability of falsely rejecting H0, the null hypothesis. This test
allows for checking the presence of significant differences in the paired data, and hence to weigh
the strength of the evidence. The null hypothesis is rejected if the calculated p-value turns out to
be less than a predetermined significance level (α). In this experiment, the p-value should be less
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than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis [She07]. In all of the statistical tests, we consider 95% as a
significance level, i.e. we accept 5% probability of committing a type I error.
In the Mann-Whitney test, similarly to the Spearman rank correlation, the p-value threshold is set
at 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis. Given two independent samples: x1, ..., xn and y1, ..., ym. We
rank all samples and calculate Uw.
Uw = NA ⋅NB − NA ⋅ (NB + 1)
2
− T and U ′w = NA ⋅NB −Uw
where NA = min(n;m),NB = max(n,m), and T is the sum of the ranks of the smallest sample.
So we can reject the null hypothesis if min(Uw, U ′w) is less than or equal to a criterion value
[WRH+00].
7.6 Summary
We provide a detailed description of the key elements in the design of an experiment, for the purpose
of evaluating a set of proposed metrics for measuring the quality of code obfuscation. The aim of
this experiment is to complement the previous theoretical results, to provide empirical evidence,
and to show the usefulness of algorithm information theoretical metrics reflecting the quality and
security in obfuscated code.
We based the experimentation design and methodology of analysis on Wohline et al.’s framework
on experimental software engineering. A comprehensive description of the tool-sets and experi-
mental context are given, which includes two obfuscators: Sandmark, an open source suite, and
Dasho, a commercial tool, applied to SPECjvm2008 suite. We choose three different decompilers
(JD, JAD, and Jode) as the model of the adversary.
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8 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this chapter we report the outcome of our experiments, and state formally the research questions
and formulate their null hypotheses; then we provide the analysis and interpretations of the obtained
results. We test the null hypotheses and evaluate the relation between our proposed metrics, the
classical complexity metrics and the percentage of code obfuscation resilience to decompilation
attacks, by providing evidence based on statistical analysis. We also use the proposed metrics
to analyse and study the effect of code obfuscation techniques on programs, and quantify their
resilience to decompilers.
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we provided all the design requirements to set up, implement, and conduct
experiments on a set of obfuscated SPECjvm2008 programs. In this chapter we proceed by stating
the research questions, and their null hypotheses. Then we conduct a statistical analysis, which
investigates the null hypothesis for each of the posed question by providing empirical validations
based on Spearman rank correlation and Mann-Whitney test. We first check if the proposed metrics,
normalised compression distance (NCD), unintelligibility Index (piU ) and normalised compression
(NC), are measuring the code obfuscation resilience. Secondly, we compare the metrics with other
classical complexity metrics, Cyclomatic complexity (V(G)), Halstead Difficulty (D), Halstead
Effort (E), and Maintenance Index (MI). Then we apply the validated metrics to answer the rest of
the questions. In particular, we examine if the obfuscation techniques produce any changes in the
Kolmogorov complexity (measured by compression), and whether these changes are positive, i.e. if
obfuscation techniques increase the complexity of the clear unobfuscated programs. Additionally,
we investigate if the obfuscation process produces any changes in the unobfuscated programs
of the SPECjvm2008. We also fit a multi-linear regression model aiming to produce a single
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quantitative value on a percentage scale, which predicts the resilience of Java code obfuscation
against decompilers. We proceed to provide a deep analysis of Dasho and Sandmark’s obfuscation
techniques using the proposed metrics, followed by studying the impact of decompilers on each
obfuscation technique.
The overall results shows that our proposed metrics are empirically valid to measure the quality
of code obfuscation. These metrics outperform the classical complexity measures in terms of
being correlated with the degree of code obfuscation’s resilience to decompilers. However, there is
only one exception that is related to NC: this measure shows a weak correlation comparing to the
other metrics involved in the study. The outcome of the analysis of the results sheds a light on the
importance of taking into account the attack model when measuring the quality of code obfuscation.
Applying any quantitative measure without parametrising it to a specific attacker can be misleading,
and creates a false sense of security. We show that by comparing the values of the metrics of each
obfuscated program, before and after decompilation attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 8.2, we present the research
questions, their formulated null hypotheses, and provide the validation results of the proposed
metrics model, using statistical hypotheses testing. Section 8.2.3 provides the statistical comparison
with the classical complexity metrics. In Section 8.3.2 we analyse the impact of code obfuscation
using the proposed metrics. Section 8.4 presents the potential threats and limitations that may affect
the validity of the experimental results.
8.2 The Validation Results for the Proposed Model
In this section we will empirically verify whether the proposed measures: (NCD, piU and NC)
are valid metrics to quantify the security in code obfuscation. Specifically, we try to answer the
following two questions:
(RQ1) Do the proposed metrics (NCD, piU and NC) reflect the amount of confusion added due to
the obfuscation process?
(RQ2) Do the classical complexity metrics reflect the same amount of confusion as the proposed
metrics?
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8.2.1 Hypotheses Formulation
We formulate the statistical hypothesis for each of the aforementioned research questions. An
important aspect of the experiment is to formally state clearly what is going to be evaluated in the
experiment, which leads to the formulation of the hypotheses below.
For each of the research questions, we formulate the subsequent null hypotheses groups to be
tested: For the first research question RQ1 we established the following null hypotheses:
• Null hypothesis, H10a: NCD does not measure the decrease in the efficiency of an attacker
using JD, JAD and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code similar to the
decompiled original code.
Alternative hypothesis, H11a (not H10a): NCD does measure the decrease in the efficiency
of an attacker using JD, JAD and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code
similar to the decompiled original code.
• Null hypothesis, H01b: NC does not measure the decrease in the efficiency of an attacker
using JD, Jad and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code similar to the
decompiled original code.
Alternative hypothesis, H11b (not H01b): NC does measure the decrease in the efficiency
of an attacker using JD, JAD and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code
similar to the decompiled original code.
• Null hypothesis, H01c: piU does not measure the decrease in the efficiency of an attacker
using JD, JAD and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code similar to the
decompiled original code.
Alternative hypothesis, H11c (not H01c): piU does measure the decrease in the efficiency of an
attacker using JD, JAD and Jode decompilers, trying to construct a Java source-code similar
to the decompiled original code.
Effectively, there are nine null hypotheses that can be constructed from the above hypotheses,
i.e. three null hypotheses for NCD against JD, Jode and JAD decompilers, and similarly three
null hypotheses for NC and piU respectively. For convenience, we grouped them into one main
hypotheses according to the used measure. The above hypotheses are one tailed [She07], also known
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as a directional hypothesis, which is a test of significance to determine if there is a relationship
between the variables in one direction. We apply one-tailed hypotheses testing since we are only
interested in one direction of analysing the validity of the proposed measure against the resistance
to attacks using decompilation.
The null hypotheses suggest the presence of one main dependent variable, the resilience variable
that measures the efficiency resisting decompilation (see Section 7.3.4). The independent variables
involved in this experiment are the NCD, piU and NC values.
For the second question RQ2, we construct the following null hypothesis:
• Null hypothesis, H02: The proposed measures do not perform better than the classical
complexity metrics in measuring the quality of code obfuscation against decompilers attacks.
Alternative hypothesis, H12 (not H02): The proposed measures do perform better than the
classical complexity metrics in measuring the quality of code obfuscation against decompilers
attacks.
We will start by investigating the question in RQ1 and its formulated hypotheses in Section 8.2.1,
then we will address RQ2, which shows how well the classical complexity metrics are performing
comparing to our proposed model.
The non-negative unintelligibility index piU indicates a higher complexity of obfuscated code
and less code comprehensibility (unintelligible) with respect to the original benchmark files, where
a negative value indicates less potent code (see Section 6.4.1). NCD reports the dissimilarity
between obfuscated programs and the original clear code. NCD values are ranged from 0 (exact
similarity), which means the obfuscation did not add any confusion to the original code, and 1
(totally dissimilar) which indicates the maximum level of confusion added to the original code
(see Theorem 6.27). Similarly, NC reports values between 0 and 1; NC = 0 for empty strings, this
value cannot to occur in this experiment, as all the programs are non-empty. NC = 1 indicates the
highest complexity of obfuscated code that can be achieved with respect to the maximum degree of
compression of obfuscated code (see Section 6.4.2).
Each of the proposed metrics is applied to each obfuscated program of the SPECjvm2008;
then we check if this metric is correlated with the amount of retrieved code due to the different
decompilers, i.e. the degree of code obfuscation resilience (see Section 7.3.4).
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8.2.2 Validation Analysis using Correlation and Hypothesis Testing
In this section we investigate the association and the linearity between NCD, piU and NC and the
degree of resilience of obfuscated programs, i.e. the average percentage of failure to retrieve the
original code from decompiled obfuscated code; this value is denoted, in the reported results (tables
and graphs), by a notation Gdecomp, according to the name of used decompiler, or GAllDec, which
refers to all decompilers involved in this experiment 1 (see Fig. 7.1).
We test this relation by relying on statistical methods such the Spearman rank coefficient
correlation (see Section 7.5). We calculate the Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ between
NCD, piU , and NC and the resilience of obfuscated programs in Fig. 8.1: each entry in the tables (the
figure) corresponds to the Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ between the proposed metrics
(row) and the percentage of resilience to decompilers (column); for example, the entry (NCDJAD
versus GJAD) of Fig. 8.1-(a), which is equal to 0.88, corresponds to the correlation between NCD
measure after decompiling the obfuscated programs (the benchmark) with JAD and the percentage
of resilience to JAD (GJAD). The overall correlation between NCD and all inferred programs (due
to decompilation) achieves a result close to 0.89 (strong correlation). Similarly, we can notice the
same correlation with respect to each decompiler. In the case of the piU measure, the Spearman rank
coefficient correlation ρ scores an overall result of around 0.48 (moderate correlation). On the other
hand, NC obtains a weak correlation of around 0.11. We further check for the correlation in the case
of simple compression (C);2 we find also a positive correlation, surprisingly (see Section 6.4.2),
performing much better than NC.
GJAD
NCDJAD 0.88
piUJAD 0.51
NCJAD 0.23
CJAD 0.24
GJD
NCDJD 0.90
piUJD 0.48
NCJD 0.14
CJD 0.32
GJode
NCDJode 0.85
piUJode 0.39
NCJode 0.18
C 0.25
GAllDec
NCDAllDec 0.89
piUAllDec 0.48
NCAllDec 0.11
CAllDec 0.22
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.1: The Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ between the proposed metrics and the
resilience of obfuscated programs (percentage of the clear code that was not recovered)
using decompilers (JD, JAD, and Jode).
In general, the correlations are positive; this indicates a strong positive direction of association.
1For convenience and the ease of reading, we indicate the inferred program from the deobfuscated code with G subscript
with the name of decompiler GJAD,GJD and GJode, i.e. the average retrieved data are due to decompiling an
obfuscated code.
2C is used as the main building block in the all of the proposed metrics.
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NCD tends to increase as GAllDec increases. This can, indeed, provide evidence that NCD can
measure the impact of code obfuscation resilience to attacks (decompilers). Similarly,piU and NC
show a positive correlation; however, much lower than the NCD correlation.
We also perform a significance test to decide whether based upon the experimental results, there
is any or no evidence to suggest the existence of a linear correlation between the proposed metrics
(NCD, piU ,NC) and GAllDec, in general, and according to each decompiler, GJAD,GJD,GJode. To
achieve this, we test the null hypothesis (see Section 8.2.1) H10a against the alternative (research)
hypothesis H11a .
GJAD
NCDJAD ≪ 0.05
piUJAD ≪ 0.05
NCJAD ≪ 0.05
CJAD ≪ 0.05
GJD
NCDJD ≪ 0.05
piUJD ≪ 0.05
NCJD 0.008
CJD ≪ 0.05
GJode
NCDJode ≪ 0.05
piUJode ≪ 0.05
NCJode ≪ 0.05
CJode ≪ 0.05
GAllDec
NCDAllDec ≪ 0.05
piUAllDec ≪ 0.05
NCAllDec ≪ 0.05
CAllDec ≪ 0.05
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.2: The p-values of the Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ between the proposed
metrics and the resilience of obfuscated programs using decompilers (JD, JAD, and
Jode).
We conduct the hypothesis testing by computing the p-value (see Section 7.5) in Fig. 8.2: each
entry in the tables (the figure) shows the p-value of testing a null hypothesis; for example, in
Fig. 8.2-(a) the p-value of testing the null hypothesis of whether the value ofNCAllDec, i.e. NC is
applied to the decompiled version of the obfuscated programs (the benchmark) with all decompilers,
correlates with GAllDec (NCAllDec versus GAllDec) is 0.008, which is significant because it is lower
than 0.05 threshold.
All the p-values that are used to test H10a, (NCD, piU ,NC) versus (GAllDec,GJAD ,GJD,GJode),
are below the significant levels, i.e. p-value < 0.05, as we see in Fig. 8.2. Therefore, we can
reject the null hypotheses of H10a group (see Section 7.5) and accept the alternative hypotheses
H11b group. This implies that the correlation of (NCD, piU ,NC) versus (GAllDec,GJAD,GJD, and
GJode) are indeed significant.
8.2.3 Comparison with Classical Metrics
In this section we try to answer the second question RQ2, which is about comparing classical
complexity metrics with our proposed metrics, namely NCD, piU and NC, in addition to the simple
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compression length (C).3 We answer this question by investigating the null hypothesis in H02
using the same analysis methodology as with the proposed metrics. We have five different classical
complexity measures: Cyclomatic complexity (V(G)), Halstead Difficulty (D), Halstead Effort (E),
and Maintenance Index (MI); all these measures are discussed in Section 7.3.2. We investigate the
potency (see Section 3.8) of each of these metrics for the same purpose of comparison with the
proposed metrics.
GJAD
LOCJAD 0.25
V(G)JAD 0.21
DJAD 0.18
EJAD 0.22
MIJAD 0.19
GJD
LOCJD 0.28
V(G)JD 0.26
DJD 0.14
EJD 0.13
MIJD 0.31
GJode
LOCJode 0.04
V(G)Jode 0.03
DJode 0.05
EJode 0.1
MIJode 0.20
GAllDec
LOCAllDec 0.21
V(G)AllDec 0.19
DAllDec 0.13
EAllDec 0.16
MIAllDec 0.03
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.3: Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ between the classical metrics and the resilience
of obfuscated programs using all decompilers (JD, JAD, and Jode).
Overall, the Spearman rank correlation of the classical measures versus GAllDec are positive, and
all the p-values are below 0.05, which means the correlations are significant. However, observing
the correlation per individual decompiler, we notice a very small correlation in GJode of 0.04. We
checked for significance in Fig. 8.4, and we found that the p-value are above 0.05 threshold, apart
from the Halstead effort metric (E), which scores exactly 0.05. We conclude, based on this analysis
that the classical complexity metrics, LOC,V(G),D,E and MI do not correlate with the percentage
of code obfuscation resilience based on Jode decompiler, GJode. We investigate this matter in more
detail, and find the main reason for this decrease in complexity: Jode fails to produce a complete
decompilation when it decompiles obfuscated programs of SPECjvm2008 with arbitrary byte-code,
such as BuggyCode (SM-C-BC) (see Table 7.4).
GJAD
LOCJAD ≪ 0.05
V(G)JAD ≪ 0.05
DJAD ≪ 0.05
EJAD ≪ 0.05
MIJAD ≪ 0.05
GJD
LOCJD ≪ 0.05
V(G)JD ≪ 0.05
DJD 0.01
EJD 0.012
MIJD ≪ 0.05
GJode
LOCJode 0.46
V(G)Jode 0.54
DJode 0.33
EJode 0.05
MIJode 0.54
GAllDec
LOCAllDec ≪ 0.05
V(G)AllDec ≪ 0.05
DAllDec ≪ 0.05
EAllDec ≪ 0.05
MIAllDec ≪ 0.05
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.4: The p-value of each Spearman rank coefficient correlation between the classical metrics
and the resilience of obfuscated programs using all decompilers (JD, JAD, and Jode).
3 Although, NC is a normalised measure of C, we are also interested in comparing compression length measure (C), as
an absolute measure, with other classical complexity metrics.
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GJAD
PtLOCJAD 0.20
PtV(G)JAD 0.20
PtDJAD 0.23
PtEJAD 0.26
PtMIJAD 0.12
GJD
PtLOCJD 0.19
PtV(G)JD 0.19
PtDJD 0.15
PtEJD 0.14
PtMIJD 0.16
GJode
PtLOCJode -0.02
PtV(G)Jode -0.06
PtDJAD -0.03
PtEJAD 0.1
PtMIJAD -0.18
GAllDec
PtLOCAllDec 0.15
PtV(G)AllDec 0.12
PtDAllDec 0.13
PtEAllDec 0.18
PtMIAllDec 0.07
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.5: Spearman rank coefficient correlation ρ of each classical metric potency (Pt) and the
resilience of obfuscated programs using all decompilers (JD, JAD, and Jode).
In the potency measure, using classical complexity metrics (Section 7.3.3), the overall Spearman
rank correlation obtains a positive value with p-values below the 0.05 threshold (significant).
The Spearman rank correlations, in case of Jode, produce negative values; however, they are not
significant (see Fig. 8.6) as their p-values are above 0.05, with only one exception in PtMI versus
GJode (see Fig. 8.6).
GJAD
PtLOCJAD ≪ 0.05
PtV(G)JAD ≪ 0.05
PtDJAD ≪ 0.05
PtEJAD ≪ 0.05
PtMIJAD 0.02
GJD
PtLOCJD ≪ 0.05
PtV(G)JD ≪ 0.05
PtDJD ≪ 0.05
PtEJD 0.01
PtMIJD 0.02
GJode
PtLOCJode 0.68
PtV(G)Jode 0.28
PtDJAD 0.64
PtEJAD 0.1
PtMIJAD 0.02
GAllDec
PtLOCAllDec ≪ 0.05
PtV(G)AllDec ≪ 0.05
PtDAllDec ≪ 0.05
PtEAllDec ≪ 0.05
PtMIAllDec 0.02
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8.6: The p-value of Spearman’s rank coefficient correlation between of each classical metric
potency (Pt) and the resilience of obfuscated programs using all decompilers (JD, JAD,
and Jode).
We answer H02 by comparing Spearman rank correlations between the proposed metrics and the
classical complexity measures. We can observe that the p-values of Spearman rank correlation in
the sets of measurements, after decompiling with all decompilers: (NCD, piU , NC , C), (LOC, V(G),
D, E and MI) and (PtLOC, PtV(G), PtD,PtE and PtMI) against GAllDec are below 0.05. We then move
on and use the correlations to perform the comparison; we see that all the proposed metrics, apart
from NC, outperform the classical complexity metrics and their potency measures. Therefore, we
reject the null hypothesis H02 and accept the alternative hypothesis H12, with only one exception
for NC, as it scores less than all of the classical complexity metrics.
8.2.4 Generic Linear Regression Model for Code Obfuscation Security
So far, we present the empirical evaluation of the proposed metrics. The analysis of the results in
Section 8.2.2 shows the usefulness of these metrics to reflect the degree of resilience of obfuscation
180
techniques. We now construct a multi-linear regression model to produce a single quantitative value
from all of the proposed metrics, and investigate how well the data fits this model. The multi-linear
regression equation has the following form:
Y = b + a1X1 + a2X2 + a2X3
a1, a2 and a3 are the coefficient or the slopes, b normally referred to as the intercept or constant,4
X1,X2 and X3 are the independent variables (our proposed metrics) and Y is the dependent
variable that we are aiming to predict using the independent variables.
In Section 6.4.6 we proposed that model, discussed also in Section 7.5, for estimating the security
of code obfuscation using a multi-linear regression model. This model is useful to express the
quality of obfuscated code using a single quantitative value S. We used our proposed metrics as
independent variables to estimate S. This model is only designed for Java programs (the subject of
the study) attacked by decompilation.
We established the best-fitting multi-linear regression model in Fig. 8.7 by computing a regression
equation, providing a mathematical relation between NCD, piU ,NC and GAllDec. The outcome of
estimated multi-linear regression model is given by the following equation based on the regression
analysis:
S = 73.26 + 41.32 ⋅NCD + 0.77 ⋅ piU − 26 ⋅NC
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value R Square Adjusted R Square
Intercept 73.26 1.53 ≪ 0.05
0.71 0.71
NCD 41.32 0.8 ≪ 0.05
piU 0.77 0.54 0.152
NC -26 2.24 ≪ 0.05
Figure 8.7: Regression analysis for the combined proposed metrics with versus all GAllDec.
In Fig. 8.7 we report the regression analysis of the proposed metrics; the coefficient field shows
all the slope values that are used to construct the regression equation. The standard error field
assesses the precision of the predictions, i.e. the confidence interval of predication. The p-value
field reports if the coefficients are significant. R2(R-Square) measures how close the actual data
are to the fitted regression line (estimated data). Intuitively, it can be explained as the percentage
4It represents the value of a regression equation if all other variable are zeros.
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of variation in the dependent variable, GAllDec, with respect to the data that is accounted for by
the regression model (the proposed metrics). Formally, given a data sample of n observed values,
y1, ..., yn, each associated with a predicated (fitted) value yˆ1, ..., yˆn, where y˜ is the mean (average)
[KKM88].
R2 = ∑ni=1(yˆi − y˜)∑ni=1(yi − y˜)
The adjusted version of R2 (R2adj) adjusts the statistic based on the number of independent
variables in the model that significantly affect the dependent variable. It is defined in terms of R2 as
follows, where n is the number of observations in the data set, andp is the number of independent
variables.
R2adj = 1 − (1 −R2) ⋅ n − 1n − p − 1
Having the regression equation, we can predict the dependent variable (GAllDec) using the
independent variables (NCD, piU ,NC); however, we need a mechanism to test how the data fits
this model. Generally, the regression model fits the data properly if the differences between the
observed values and the model’s predicted values are minimal.
The outcome of R2 and its adjusted version shows that the regression model is able to estimate
over 71% of the variation in the dependent variable GAllDec (observed data); it is considered as
adequate estimate, because we do not expect the model to predicate 100% of variations in dependent
variable.
The estimated regression model is fitted using a cross validation technique to avoid overfit-
ting [SL12] in the predicted data.5 The goal of a cross-validation is to measure the predictive
performance (ability to predict) of the regression model as a high R2 value may not necessarily
means the model is good. We use the K-Fold [SL12] cross-validation technique to perform the
validity checking, which randomly breaks the dataset into K partitions and performs the analysis,
by calculating the sum of errors using Mean Square Error (MSE) and Root Mean Square Error
(RSME) i.e. RMSE =√MSE. In the context of regression analysis, the mean square error measures
the average squares of error variances or deviations of the predictor estimation from the correct
5Overfitting generally occurs when a model is excessively complex relative to the amount of data available. An
overfitted model performs much worse (more errors) on the test dataset than on the training dataset, resulting in poor
predictive performance.
182
values, i.e. it measures how close a fitted line (the regression model) is to the data points. The
squared is done so that the negative values do not cancel the positive values. Given a data sample
of n observed values, y1, ..., yn, and their (predicated) fitted values yˆ1, ..., yˆn.
MSE = 1
n
n∑
i=1(yˆi − yi)2
We conduct the cross validation usingK = 10 folds 6. The outcome of the analysis is presented
in Fig. 8.8; it shows that RMSE scores on average around 10.39 ± 1.12 for all the tested folds.
This can be interpreted as the model miss-predicts the dependent variable (the code obfuscation
resilience to decompilers) by 10.39% (the dependent variable is a percentage too).
K MSE RMSE
1 86.12 9.28
2 117.56 10.84
3 132.18 11.49
4 122.61 11.07
5 72.48 8.51
6 118.26 10.87
7 83.62 9.14
8 141.7 11.9
9 96.56 9.82
10 120.65 10.98
Figure 8.8: Cross validation results on the adjusted regression model.
Investigating the standard error of regression shows 1.53% of errors occur for the intercept (the
constant), 0.8% of errors on average for the estimated coefficient for NCD, and 0.54% for piU . In
NC, we observe a relatively high score of errors for the coefficients: 2.24% comparing to NCD and
piU .
We check the p-value for each of the estimated coefficients, which are computed using t-statistic
[She07]. It tests the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are not equal to zero. The results
in Fig. 8.7 shows that the p-value of the coefficients for NCD and NC are satisfactory, as they score
below the 0.05 threshold of the significant level; apart from piU which achieves 0.15 above the
threshold, providing evidence that piU does not contribute significantly to the regression model.
We adjust the above equation to find the predictors (independent variables) that contribute
significantly to the model. We reduce independent variables into two by eliminating piU using
Stepwise regression analysis [She07]; this type of statistical analysis is conducted by sequentially
adding predictors to the model, based on their significance until a satisfactory model is found. The
6K = 10 folds is commonly used in the most of cases in linear regression model cross-validation.
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results of the stepwise regression analysis are in Fig. 8.9, the modified regression equation is given
below
S = 73 + 41.56 ⋅NCD − 26 ⋅NC
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value R Square Adjusted R Square
Intercept 73 1.52 ≪ 0.05
0.71 0.71NCD 41.56 0.78 ≪ 0.05
NC -26 2.23 ≪ 0.05
Figure 8.9: Stepwise regression analysis results for adjusting the regression model of proposed
metrics with versus all GAllDec.
We notice that eliminating piU does not reduce the values of R2, nor the standard error, for
all coefficients. Furthermore, we present diagnostic plots of the residuals, the value of errors
miss-predicting the correct data i.e. Residual = Observed value - Predicted value, to confirm that
the model is indeed satisfactory, (see Fig. 8.10).
Figure 8.10: Plot of residual versus the fitted values
Analysing the residuals helps to confirm that the model is also satisfactory. If the residuals
appear to behave randomly, it suggests that the model fits the data well. The residuals should
approximately fall into a symmetrical pattern and have a constant spread throughout the range
[She07]. We find that around 90% of residuals have constant variance at around the mean 0 using a
scatter-plot of residuals in Fig. 8.10. Despite that, we notice some bias in the residuals for a part
of fitted values. This suggests that we may expect some advantages using non-linear regression
models [KKM88], which may help to improve the accuracy of data predication; although given
the distribution of the residual (see Fig. 8.10), the improvement is possibly limited. This requires
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further study which we reserved for future work.
8.3 Measuring the Quality of code obfuscation
In the previous sections we have provided statistical evidence to evaluate (NCD, piU , and NC) as
valid metrics to measure the quality of code obfuscation, and proposed a multi-linear regression
model to provide a quantitative single value for the quality of code obfuscation. In this section,
we apply these metrics to answer the following set of the research questions. These questions are
concerned with measuring the quality of code obfuscation, per individual obfuscation and according
to their types (Section 7.3.6), in addition to their resilience to decompilation attacks.
(RQ3) Is there any change in the Kolmogorov (compression) complexity measures between a clear
code and its obfuscated version using different obfuscation algorithms? Does that change, if
it occurs, implies an increase in complexity measure, and in which magnitude?
(RQ4) Does the obfuscation process produce any changes (measured using NCD) in the clear
unobfuscated code, and in which magnitude?
(RQ5) What is the effectiveness of obfuscation algorithms using the proposed measure, by type:
Control-Flow, Data and Layout obfuscation?
(RQ6) What is the impact of deobfuscation (decompilers) on code obfuscation resilience?
8.3.1 Hypothesis Formulation
The above set of the research questions deals with using the proposed metrics to study the quality
of code obfuscation. Among these questions, we formulate the null hypotheses for the questions
RQ3 and RQ4, the rest of the questions are answered based on the descriptive statistic (average)
and visual data inspections using graphs. For question RQ3, two null hypotheses are set as follows:
• Null hypothesis, H03a: There is no difference in the Kolmogorov complexity (compression)
between clear and obfuscated code i.e. for an obfuscated programO(P,λ) of a program P ,
C(O(P,λ)) = C(P ).
Alternative hypothesis: H13a: There is a difference in the Kolmogorov complexity (com-
pression) between clear and obfuscated code i.e. for an obfuscated program O(P,λ) of a
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program P , C(O(P,λ)) ≠ C(P ).
Upon testing this hypothesis, we proceed and check whether the difference, if it exists, is a
result of a positive increase. Therefore, we formulate the following null hypotheses:
• Null hypothesis, H03b: There is no increase in the Kolmogorov complexity (compression) of
clear code due to obfuscation.
Alternative hypothesis: H13b: There is an increase in the Kolmogorov complexity (compres-
sion) of clear code due to obfuscation.
To answer question RQ4, we use the following null hypothesis:
• Null hypothesis, H04: There are no changes in the clear code due to obfuscation i.e. for an
obfuscated program O(P,λ) of a program P , NCD(P,O(P,λ)) = 0.
Alternative hypothesis, H14: There are changes in the clear code due to obfuscation i.e. for
an obfuscated program O(P,λ) of a program P , NCD(P,O(P,λ)) ≠ 0.
8.3.2 Obfuscation Analysis using NCD
We use the normalised compression distance (NCD) to study the quality of obfuscation. The
reported data of this measure is presented in Fig. 8.11. We start by answering the hypothesis H04 of
question RQ4. It concerns with checking whether obfuscation produces changes to the clear code.
The reason for including this question is to check whether the clear programs (the benchmark)
are sensitive to obfuscation using different obfuscation algorithms, without applying our attack
(decompilers). Although we can visually answer this question by inspecting Fig. 8.11, we apply the
Mann-Whitney statistical test (see Section 7.5) to check whether we can reject the null hypothesis
(when the p-value is less than 0.05). The outcome of the Mann-Whitney test shows that we can
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis, as the p-value is smaller than 0.05.
This shows that NCD is a non-zero value for all obfuscated programs. Furthermore, we test the
NCD, using the Mann-Whitney test as well, for all the decompiled obfuscated code usingJAD, JD
and Jode i.e. NCD between the clear decompiled code and the decompiled obfuscated code. The
results show that NCD is also positive.
It is clear that obfuscation creates changes to clear code; we investigate the obfuscation effec-
tiveness before decompilation using NCD in Fig. 8.11. First, it is noticed that the NCD (lines
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Figure 8.11: Averaged NCD for all obfuscation techniques with (NCD) and without decompilation
attack (NCD-JD, NCD-JD, and NCD-Jode)
labeled with NCD) between the clear code and the obfuscated code, using all the obfuscated
techniques, have similar values. However, these values are close to 1 (NCD = 0.98), which means
that obfuscation has made substantial changes in the clear code of SPECjvm2008 benchmark,
making the obfuscated code totally different from the original clear code. Only one technique
shows a different behaviour: SM-C-CS, a class splitter obfuscation technique, a part of Sandmark’s
obfuscator techniques.
Analysis Per Obfuscation Type
We analyse the obfuscation transformation algorithms according to the type of transformations
(see Section 7.3.6): Control-Flow, Data and Layout, and report the average NCD for each type
after we subject the obfuscated programs of SPECjvm2008 to decompilation. The aim is to
answer the part of question RQ4 that is related to NCD measure. We see the results in Fig. 8.12 :
Layout obfuscation techniques perform better than Control-Flow and Data obfuscation. The Layout
obfuscation algorithms, specially Dasho’s techniques, produce more changes in the benchmark
programs than the Control-Flow and Data obfuscation types. We investigate this matter in more
detail; it is noticed that Dasho’s Layout obfuscation techniques (based on Overload-Induction)
apply intensive renaming for identifiers and variables, which render the decompilation process in
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Figure 8.12: Averaged NCD measure per decompiled obfuscation transformation. Control-Flow,
Data and Layout obfuscation.
many instances useless. Therefore, this type of obfuscation algorithms overload the result ofNCD
between the clear code and the deobfuscated programs using decompilation.
The Impact of Decompilation on Obfuscation Resilience
We answer question RQ5 by investigating the effect of decompilation as an attack on code obfus-
cation resilience using NCD. Fig. 8.11 reports the results: it shows three different lines labeled
with JAD, JD and Jode which resemble the average NCD of obfuscation techniques after being
subjected to decompilation.
Overall, we observe a significant decrease in the NCD of all obfuscated programs due to
decompilation. This decline in NCD varies among the different obfuscation techniques, which also
indicates different behaviour in terms of resilience to decompilation process. It is difficult, based
on Fig. 8.13, to clearly distinguish the resilience of obfuscations among the different decompilers,
as they score almost similar results. However, most of the obfuscation techniques show the highest
resilience against JD with around 50% more than JAD, and around 80% more than Jode. We
further investigate the resilience of each obfuscation techniques against all decompilers: String
Encoder (SM-D-SE) shows the highest resilience for JD and JAD, where Rename OverInduction
Maintainhierarchy (DH-L-ROM) shows the highest resilience for Jode. ClassSplitter (SM-C-CS)
demonstrates the lowest resilience for JAD, and Constant Pool Reordering (SM-L-CPR) shows the
weakest against JD. In the case of Jode, Field Assignment (SM-D-FA) scores the weakest resilience.
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8.3.3 Obfuscation Analysis using piU
In this section we report on the analysis of obfuscation unintelligibility index (piU ), the algorithmic
complexity difference between clear and obfuscated code (see Definition 6.22). We answer the
question RQ3 in Section 8.3 by investigating its formulated null hypothesis H03a, which states
that there is no difference in the Kolmogorov complexity (approximated by compression) between
clear and obfuscated code; we test if piU = 0 which is equivalent to C(O(P,λ)) = C(P ), see
Section 6.4.1. Visually, in Fig. 8.13, we observe that all obfuscation techniques produce changes in
the complexity of obfuscated code, as the upper line labeled with Un-Index does not produce any
zero value of piU . The visual results in Fig. 8.13 are reported on average, by computing the mean
(see Section 7.5). However, by applying the Mann-Whitney statistical test we can get even better
statistical evidence (multiple pairwise comparisons) that supports the visual investigation, and
subsequently checks whether we can reject the null hypothesis. The outcome of the Mann-Whitney
test shows that we can reject the null hypothesis with high statistical significance, as the p-value is
below 0.05.
Figure 8.13: Averaged Un-Index for all obfuscation techniques with and without decompilation
attack.
In the case of checking the changes in the kolmogorov complexity after the decompilation, we
could not infer this result visually as we see in Fig. 8.13. Using the Mann-Whitney statistical test,
we reject the null hypothesis that the complexity of the deobfuscated programs (decompiled) are
not different than their clear unobfuscated code.
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While the statistical test of H03a allows for checking the presence of significant differences,
it does not provide any information about the magnitude of such a difference. We proceed to
investigate to what extent the use of obfuscation changes the complexity of source-code i.e. the
magnitude of changes in the complexity (piU ), and whether they are positive or not, by checking the
null hypothesis H03b. The outcome of the Mann-Whitney statistical test shows that the magnitude
of changes in complexity, due to the obfuscation process, is always positive with high statistical
significance, as their p-value report below 0.05. Similarly, we notice the same results that show the
positive magnitude (on average) for most of the deobfuscated programs (piU > 0).
Analysis Per Obfuscation Type
This section answer the part of question RQ4 which is related to the piU measure (see Section 8.3).
The results are presented in Fig. 8.14. Control-Flow obfuscation techniques outperform both Data
and Layout obfuscation techniques in most of the benchmark programs (9 out of 11). That was
a bit surprising, as we expected the Data obfuscation to exceed both Control-Flow and Layout
obfuscation in terms of complexity. This is due to the nature of Data obfuscation that adds a lot
of noise to a program’s data structure comparing to Control-Flow obfuscation type, which only
complicates the structure of Control Flow Graph (CFG). We check the main reason behind this
behaviour; we notice that most of these algorithms in Dasho and Sandmark add a lot of spurious
branches full of random code, especially opaque predicates (see Section 3.4.2). Layout obfuscations
score the lowest (8 out of 11 benchmark programs) as the most of these algorithms rely on renaming
techniques, especially in Dasho’s obfuscation techniques; Dasho obfuscator renames as many
methods as possible to exactly the same name. Apparently, this produces a high level of redundancy
and regularity, which reduces the complexity of the code. Furthermore, in particular, Dasho’s
obfuscation techniques employ, in addition to renaming, heavy optimisation methods.
The Impact of Decompilation on Obfuscation Resilience
In this section we proceed to answer question RQ5 in Section 8.3 using the piU as a measure
for studying the effect of decompilation attacks on the obfuscated benchmark programs. In
Fig. 8.13, we can see that decompilation successfully managed to decrease the piU of the obfuscated
benchmark programs, for the majority of obfuscation techniques. However, we notice in two
Dasho’s obfuscation techniques: Rename Flattenhierarchy Simple (DH-L-RFS) and Rename
190
Figure 8.14: Averaged Un-Index (piU ) measure per decompiled obfuscation transformation. Control
Flow, Data and Layout obfuscation.
FlattenHierarchyOverInduction (DH-C-RFO) their decompilation increases the piU above their
original piU . To explain this behaviour, we see on the one hand that both of those two obfuscation
techniques employ heavy use of renaming; most of the renaming replaces variables and identifiers
with less complex ones, normally adding the same and simple unreadable identifiers. On the other
hand, decompilers replace the obfuscated variables and identifiers with more complex names.7
Rename Register (SM-L-RR) and Overload Names (SM-D-ON) achieve the lowest piU of all
deobfuscated benchmark programs, as the decompilers replace all overloaded methods and local
registers (byte-code level) into less complex and randomless names. String Encoder (SM-D-SE)
shows the highest scores of piU before decompilation. The reason behind this is that String Encode
uses an encryption process which produces a lot of randomness in the code. However, decompilers
are effective at reducing the piU of SM-D-SE, but not to the level of other deobfuscated (decompiled)
programs (different obfuscation techniques). We investigate this reduction in the piU , and noticed
that the reason was not due to the effectiveness of decompilers producing correct and less complex
program, but was related to the fact that decompilers failed to produce the correct code out of
obfuscated one.
7The names replaced by the decompilers (JD, JAD and Jode) are more complex but more readable than the obfuscated
variable names.
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8.3.4 Obfuscation Analysis using NC
We use the normalised compression (NC) to study the impact of obfuscation on clear code. The
reported data of this measure is presented in Fig. 8.16. Around 50% of obfuscation techniques,
of different obfuscation type, score similar normalised compression values (NC=0.91) with very
minor differences, and all of these techniques are part of the Sandmark obfuscator framework. This
could indicate a common design pattern among these techniques, which needs further investigation.
Dasho’s obfuscation techniques show different behaviour: only Data obfuscation type techniques
have similar NC values. We also find that String Encoder (SM-D-SE) and BuggyCode (SM-C-BC)
perform better than all the obfuscation techniques in terms of NC, where Class Splitter (SM-C-CS)
and Rename FlattenHierarchy OverInduction (DH-C-RFO) score the lowest among all obfuscation
techniques.
Figure 8.15: Averaged NC measure per decompiled obfuscation transformation. Control-Flow,
Data and Layout obfuscation.
Aggregating the obfuscation techniques according to their types shows a very minor difference
using the proposed metric (see Fig. 8.15). Layout and Control-Flow obfuscation performed roughly
the same, slightly exceeding Data obfuscation techniques.
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Figure 8.16: Averaged NC for all obfuscation techniques with and without decompilation attack
(NC-JD,NC-JD, and NC-Jode).
The Impact of Decompilation on Obfuscation Resilience
We study the effect of decompilation as an attack on code obfuscation resilience using NC as a
measure. Fig. 8.16 reports the results; it shows three different lines labeled with JAD, JD and Jode,
which resemble the average NC of obfuscation techniques after being subjected to decompilation
for all the benchmark programs. Most of obfuscation techniques, in this study, show high resilience
against JD and JAD, and weak resilience against Jode. Analysing each obfuscation technique,
we observe a high resilience of Dasho’s obfuscation techniques against JD, apart of Synthetic
technique which scores the lowest complexity. Synthetic (DH-D-SY) is a technique designed to
fail decompilation; however JD was very effective at thwarting this technique. StringEncoder
(SM-D-SE) has the highest resilience against JD where Class Splitter (SM-C-CS) demonstrates the
lowest resilience. TryCatch10 shows a high resilience against JD and JAD, as they are ineffective
against the intensive use of try-catch blocks.
Jode performed better than other decompilers at reducing the complexity of obfuscation trans-
formations on individual technique, as we see in Fig. 8.16. Jode is very effective at reducing the
complexity of TryCatch10 (DH-C-TC) obfuscated programs comparing to JAD and JD. We notice
that Jode managed to reduce the NC to the benchmark baseline level in Fig. 8.16. We check this
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matter in more details, and find the main reason for this decrease in normalised complexity: Jode
failed to produce a complete decompilation when it decompiles the programs that were obfuscated
with arbitrary byte-code, such as BuggyCode (SM-C-BC). We also realised the same problem with
JAD; surprisingly Jode failed to replace java.lang.Integer object to the correct int in the
source code for Promote Primitive Register (SM-D-PPR), and Promote Primitive Type (SM-D-PPT)
obfuscation, which agrees with Hamilton et al.[HD09] observation that Jode sometimes fails at
resolving and inferring the correct types. Nevertheless, Jode decompiles the other obfuscated
programs with a reasonable accuracy. In general, all decompilation managed to reduce NC to a
certain degree, where Jode outperforms all the decompilers at reducing the complexity of obfuscated
programs.
Figure 8.17: Averaged NC measure for all decompiled obfuscation techniques according to
obfuscators.
8.3.5 Discussion on the Findings
In this section we elaborate more on the outcome of the experiment, and discuss the implications
of the finding as a result of answering the posed research questions. The NCD shows that all the
obfuscation algorithms produce drastic changes in the original code; the amount of these changes
are similar among most of the obfuscated programs. However, the NCD measure behaves totally
different when the obfuscated code is subjected to an attack. The deobfuscation (using decompliers)
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responds distinctively to each individual obfuscated technique; NCD reflects this behavior by
reporting different values. This means that each obfuscation technique provides different resilience
to the attacks.
We can notice the same behaviour using unintelligibility index piU . Increasing Kolmogorov
complexity, which can be monitored using piU , shows the different resilience of obfuscated code
to the decompilers. Higher piU before decompilation did not match the increase in the piU after.
However, in case of normalised compression NC, after decompilation, the deobfuscated programs
have the same trends as the obfuscated programs, but NC correlates poorly with the obfuscation
resilience using GAllDec, where simple compression length (C), along other classical complexity
metrics correlate better with GAllDec.
In general, this shows the danger of relying on absolute metrics as a means to predict the
obfuscation resilience, without taking into account the attacker itself when we measure. For
example, if the goal of the defender is to obfuscate a program so that it becomes difficult to
decompile, then the defender has to test the obfuscated program against a decompiler. Subsequently,
the outcome of the decompiler, which is code as well, can be measured using the proposed metrics
to estimate the obfuscation resilience.
Figure 8.18: Averaged NCD measure for all decompiled obfuscation techniques according to
obfuscators.
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We find that the initial complexity of clear code affects piU , especially when we investigate RQ3.
In some of the benchmark programs, the compression length is relatively big (high Kolmogorov
complexity) so that the obfuscator has a little room to increase the complexity. We see that
in Fig. 8.14 for benchmark programs: crypto, compress, and xml. For example, if the clear
program contains a small number of string variables, then the obfuscation using String Encoder
(SM-D-SE) becomes insignificant. Similarly, if the code does not contain generics or arrays, then
the obfuscation techniques that manipulate these data structures become ineffective which can
undermine the potential of code obfuscation having effective protection. Therefore, the defender
has to decide whether the clear code needs to be obfuscated or not, and which feature to obfuscate,
probably by using Kolmogorov complexity (compression length) as a ‘sanity check’ metric to test
the initial complexity.
Finally, our finding confirms the theoretical reasoning in Section 4.2.4: increasing the complexity
of obfuscated does not always produce increases in the NCD, this can be seen in Fig. 8.11 and
Fig. 8.13. In many instances, such as Rename Flattenhierarchy Simple (DH-L-RFS) and Rename
FlattenHierarchy OverInduction (DH-C-RFO) which obtain the lowest Kolmogorov complexity
(compression), their NCD measures are relatively high; this case is typical in Dasho’s obfuscation
techniques. In general, we see from Fig. 8.18, 8.17, and 8.19 that Dasho’s obfuscation techniques
outperformed Sandmark’s obfuscation techniques using all proposed measures.
Figure 8.19: Averaged Un-Index (piU ) measure for all decompiled obfuscation techniques according
to obfuscators.
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8.4 Limitations and Threats of Validity
In this part we address the potential threats to the experiment that may affect the outcome of our
results. We investigate these possible issues using Wohlin et al.[WRH+00] general framework
for threats validation in software engineering experiments. The framework consists of four major
classes: internal, construction, conclusion and external validity threats.
8.4.1 Internal Validity
Internal validity demonstrates the extent in which our operations are sound and accurate. It checks
for the effect of additional factors that may or may not account for which negatively influence our
results.
Compression acts as an upper bound estimation for Kolmogorov complexity; however, it is
safe for large binary sequences (of length l ≥ 50 bits) [STZDG12]. For short binary sequences,
compression becomes inefficient; many researchers are trying to tackle this limitation by providing
alternative solutions based on the Coding theorem such as [GZD11]; the Coding theorem connects
algorithmic probability (or frequency of production) [ LV08] to Kolmogorov complexity for com-
puting effective complexity estimation for short binary strings. This approach is beyond the scope
of this thesis; in our case, all the benchmarks programs are large in size.
We also employ plagiarism detection technique (Sherlock) to measure decompilation similarity
between the original decompiled benchmark programs and its obfuscated versions. Sherlock
is based on syntactic matching; it is used, in our experiment, to measure the effectiveness of
decompiled obfuscated compared to the original code using digital signatures by finding similar
pieces of text, i.e. for matching strings of words. We tried to eliminate the threat of using such a
syntactic tools in decompilations by decompiling the original (clear) byte-code of each benchmark
and the obfuscated version using the same decompiler; then we could apply our matching tool with
a high confidence of producing accurate matching results (see also Section 7.3.4).
8.4.2 Construction Validity
Construction validity checks if our approach (theory) has any actual, real relation with observation
(resilience of code obfuscation) using the dependent variable: percentage of failing to find the
original code from the obfuscated one. It is used to describe the extent to which our measurements
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describe the desired attribute we want to compute (code obfuscation security). We justify the choice
of this factor, as a valid evaluation factor for successful deobfuscation, in Section 7.3.4.
It is well known that reverse engineers apply different types of methods to successfully deobfus-
cate obfuscated code; beside decompilers (including static analysis and reverse engineering tools)
they apply dynamic analysis such as debuggers and profilers. We do not claim that our threat model
using decompilation is the only model to evaluate the resilience of code obfuscation. Decompilation
is still an immature technique compared to compilers and other disciplines in software engineering,
as decompilers can fail sometimes even for clear unobfuscated code. Despite these limitations,
decompilers are still an important tool in the hands of reverse engineers to attack obfuscated code.
In this experiment, we select three Java decompilers that are subject to an empirical validation for
their effectiveness [HD09], in order to eliminate any bias relying on one decompiler.
8.4.3 Conclusion Validity
Threats to conclusion validity address the issues that affect the ability to draw the correct conclusion
about the relation between our treatment (our proposed metric) and the outcome (resilience of code
obfuscation). We justify the choice of selecting the statistical methods in Section 7.5. We also
find a statistical significance between our proposed metrics, and decompilation. The conclusions
have been drawn based on objective statistical tests; we have adopted non-parametric tests (such
as Mann-Whitney and Spearman Rank Correlation) that do no make assumptions on the normal
distribution of data. We analyse and study the multi-linear regression models using some diagnostic
plots for error rate (regression models), and p-value for hypotheses testing.
8.4.4 External Validity
External validity investigates the extent to which we can generalise what we learn from our
measurements to other (similar) disciplines or other programming paradigms. Our proposed metrics
can be applied to any programming paradigm, with no restriction. However, since our regression
model estimates the security in code obfuscation, it is only applicable to Java byte-code and cannot
be generalised to all programming languages as in [CALO94] for Maintenance Index (MI). It will
require more extensive empirical and experimental efforts to validate this result over benchmarks
of different programming paradigms, which can be reserved for future work.
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8.5 Summary
The empirical results demonstrate the possibility of using an Algorithmic Information Theory
approach to measure the quality of code obfuscation. Based on Kolmogorov complexity and
data compression, we establish consistent metrics for software protection without having to rely
on classical software complexity metrics, to reason about the amount of security added by each
obfuscation technique. We empirically validated the usefulness of the proposed metrics (NCD,
piU and NC). The results shows that all the proposed measures are positively correlated with the
percentage of code obfuscation resilience to an attacker using decompilers, which indicates a
positive relationship with the obfuscation resilience factor (percentage of failing to retrieve the
original clear code), yet at different level of correlations. The NCD offers the highest correlation, the
piU shows a medium correlation, where the NC scores the lowest. We also construct a multi-linear
regression model, using the proposed metrics, to estimate Java programs resilience to decompilation
attacks.
We used the proposed metrics to study the quality of code obfuscation. We find in the most of
cases the effectiveness of an attacker (using a decompiler) is greatly reduced by the level of noise
and irregularities introduced by obfuscation techniques. The more code is lifted from the obfuscated
jar files using decompiler, the less the degree of similarity distance (using NCD), Unintelligibility
Index (piU ) and normalised Kolmogorov complexity (usingNC). The analysis of the results shows
the importance of defining a clear attack model, which has to be taken into account when we apply
the proposed measures. In general, we see from the obtained results that Dasho’s obfuscation
techniques outperformed Sandmark’s obfuscation techniques using all proposed measures. Among
all decompliers we find that Jode is the best decompiler according to all proposed metrics. Layout
obfuscation techniques exceed Data and Control-Flow obfuscation techniques usingNCD. On the
other hand Control-Flow obfuscation techniques score the best values according to piU . In case of
NC, Layout, Control-Flow, and Data obfuscation techniques achieve similar results.
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9 Conclusion
Code obfuscation presents an effective and promising protection mechanism for software intellectual
property; it can be extended to solve may problems that cryptography has not yet addressed.
However, code obfuscation is as yet in its infancy, and very few theoretical investigations exist
that reason about its security. Moreover, the early theoretical work by Barak et al. showed that
it is impossible to find a general purpose obfuscator that can efficiently obfuscate programs, and
secure programs according to the virtual black-box security model. On the other hand, the recent
theoretical advances by Garg et al. using indistinguishably obfuscation, have shown the possibility
of constructing secure obfuscation based on linear maps, Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles, that satisfy
indistinguishability obfuscation. Despite that result, there are no theoretical or practical frameworks
that can reason about the security of current obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, it is an open
problem whether there exist quantitative metrics that can measure the quality of code obfuscation.
In this thesis, we attempted to tackle these challenges by following two research methods. We
pursue a theoretical and formal approach to address the lack of theoretical foundations for the
security of code obfuscation, and find quantitative metrics that can measure and certify obfuscated
programs. Then we applied an experimental validation approach to evaluate and test whether our
proposed model (theory and metrics) is empirically sound. We proposed a novel approach that
established a theoretical foundation for code obfuscation security which quantitatively captures the
level of confusion that is added by code obfuscation.
The main idea of this approach is to apply Algorithmic Information Theory (Kolmogorov
complexity) and algorithmic mutual information to build security foundations for code obfuscation,
and to model adversaries with deobfuscation capabilities. First, we defined code obfuscation based
on the notion of Unintelligibility; the rationale behind this definition is that an obfuscated program
must be more difficult to understand than the original program. Then, we showed that in some
cases unintelligibility in not sufficient to reason about code obfuscation security, which led to a
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further definition for code obfuscation security that is based on algorithmic mutual information.
This definition allows us to reveal a negligible amount of information about the original program to
an adversary.
We compared our security definition with the famous impossibility result of code obfuscation,
and we showed that our proposed security model differs substantially from the virtual black-box
obfuscation model that led to this negative result, in the sense that our definition is a less stringent
form of obfuscation rather than a weak form of black-box obfuscation. We assume the functionality
of an obfuscated program to be almost completely known and available to an adversary, and only
require hiding the implementation rather than the functionality itself. This approach to obfuscation
is very practical and pragmatic, especially for software protection obfuscation. We further compared
our security model with indistinguishability obfuscation, and argued that with indistinguishable
obfuscation it is very difficult to provide a guarantee about what obfuscation hides. We also showed,
according to our proposed definition of security and under reasonable conditions, code obfuscation
is secure.
We investigated the security of two main approaches to obfuscated code in software, encoding
and hiding, at the subprogram level. We studied the security of combining different obfuscation
techniques, which is essential for dynamic obfuscation, and malware design that employs different
obfuscations during runtime to avoid detection.
We model adversaries with deobfuscation capabilities, and compute the attack outcome (success)
algorithmic mutual information. We theoretically showed that Kolmogorov complexity is a valid
metric to measure software. Then we derived a comprehensive set of quantitative metrics that are
approximated by lossless compression: unintelligibility index, normalised Kolmogorov complexity,
normalised Compression distance, and code obfuscation stealth, to measure the quality of code
obfuscation, and justify their usage in the light of our security model.
The proposed metrics were validated empirically to check whether they are effective and sound
metrics to measure code obfuscation security. We obfuscated the SPECjvm2008 benchmark
programs using two obfuscators: Sandmark, an open-source obfuscation suite, and Dasho, a
commercial obfuscator. Then we applied three different decompilers, as a model of attack, to study
the degree of resilience exhibited by each obfuscated programs. The results showed that all the
proposed measures are positively correlated with the percentage of code obfuscation resilience to
an attacker using decompilers, which indicate a positive relationship with obfuscation resilience
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factor (the percentage of the clear code that was not recovered); however, at different levels of
correlations. Furthermore, the results shed light on the danger of relying on absolute metrics as a
means to predict the obfuscation resilience, without taking into account the attacker itself when
measuring. We also found that the initial complexity of a clear program affects the quality of
the obfuscated version. Therefore, the defender has to decide whether the clear code needs to be
obfuscated or not, and which features to obfuscate.
To the best of our knowledge, our model presents a new practical approach to measure, quanti-
tatively, the security of the current state of art obfuscation techniques, without having to rely on
classical complexity metrics as in [CCFB14, CTL97]. The results of this thesis partially comple-
ment the experimental work of Jbara et al. [JF14] on program comprehension and understanding
using compression, by providing rigorous theoretical foundation and metric validation, which
justify the use of Kolmogorov complexity and compression, as the upper bound approximation for
Kolmogorov complexity, to measure unintelligibility in code obfuscation. However, we advance on
this theory and use algorithmic mutual information as the basis for code obfuscation security.
9.1 Future Work
Our proposed theoretical security, the adversary model, and the proposed metrics are by no means
complete to predict and compute the security of code obfuscation, and we do not claim it is
the best achievable overall. It only presents a milestone towards paving the way and inspire
security researchers into adapting, and building a sufficient and complete metrics to quantify code
obfuscation security. Towards achieving this important goal, we propose the following research
directions.
Characterise the security of particular obfuscation technique. We are planning to study and
characterise the security of particular obfuscation techniques, and to analyse more carefully
the scenario of active adversaries that equipped with dynamic analysis tools. For example, in
Section 4.4 we studied the security of combining multiple obfuscation techniques; however,
we did not cover the case of self-modified obfuscated code that is used to counter static-
analysis attacks. In this technique, the program is in constant flux of changing, and an
adversary attacks (typically using dynamic analysis tools) each version of the modified
obfuscated code. S/he may obtain partial information on every single instance of multiple
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obfuscation, and tries to combine the partial information in order to construct the original
clear code. That requires a security analysis for every single instance of modified obfuscated
program separately.
Experimental evaluation for dynamic obfuscation technique. The proposed metrics were
validated empirically on a set of Java source and byte code of SPECjvm2008 programs. We
are interested in extending our validation framework to cover other programming languages
such as C, C++, JavaScript and assembly language.
In our experiment, we used an attack model where the adversary can only use static analysis
techniques; the metrics that we proposed do not certify code obfuscations against dynamic
analysis tools such as profiling, debugging and dynamic slicers.
Experimental work to validate stealth in code obfuscation. One of the main problems with
measuring stealth is that it is context dependant. In Section 6.4.5 we propose a modified
version of Information distance that measures the intrinsic and extrinsic stealth in obfuscated
programs, and eliminates the dependency factor. However, we did not provide empirical
evidence about the validity of this metric. We are planning to design experiments, in a
similar way to Chapter 7 and 8, to measure and validate the stealth measure, and to test
its effectiveness in detecting and distinguishing obfuscated code from clear code. Another
interesting research direction, would be to apply the proposed stealth measure to classify and
detect malware in a similar way to [ABCD15].
Kolmogorov complexity to measure program semantics Compression is used as an upper
bound approximation for Kolmogorov complexity. So far we present our theoretical foun-
dation and metrics for code obfuscation security based on binary strings; a very important
question that can rise here is whether can we apply our approach on programs semantics in-
stead of binary strings. Giacobazzi et al. [GR97] propose the notion of Domain Compression
in abstract interpretation theory (see Section 3.6.2) as a refinement of a finite abstract domain,
and showed that is possible to simplify abstract domains through abstract compression. We
envision that this approach could be the way to reason about Kolmogorov complexity of
programs based on their semantics properties. If the concrete semantics of an obfuscated
program are abstracted and then compressed, it could be a way to measure the complexity of
the programs’ semantics in obfuscated code. Moreover, it can be used to study the security
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of more sophisticated obfuscation techniques that require a semantic-reasoning approach to
deobfuscate [CLD11b] as in virtual obfuscations (see Section 3.6.4).
Explore the relation between Shannon Entropy and Kolmogorov complexity. Shannon En-
tropy is asymptotically equal to Kolmogorov complexity, as Shannon entropy is the expected
value of Kolmogorov complexity (see Section 2.11). Despite that relation, it is unclear
whether Shannon Entropy can equivalently address the security of code obfuscation as with
Kolmogorov complexity, and under which conditions; an interesting research direction that
is worth investigation, is to study code obfuscation security in the context of Classical
Information Theory.
Towards a unified theory for software protection. Finally, Algorithmic Information Theory
can be the tool to study security in many open problems in software protection such as
software watermarking, software birthmark, and software temper-proofing. We envisage that
Algorithmic Information Theory is a candidate for building a unified theory for software pro-
tection, that could lead to new, effective, provably secure, and practical, software protection
techniques.
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